

Galicia as an “Austrian” myth

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From an Austrian point of view “Galicia” was always a peripheral phenomenon, a region that, even when under Austrian rule, was a distant province. It was a place where identities and borders overlapped and it wasn’t until 1989, more than 70 years after Galicia disappeared from the political map, that a nostalgia for its plurality re-emerged in Austria’s cultural memory.

The development of the “Myth of Galicia” from an Austrian perspective

When, as part of the so-called First Partition of Poland in 1772, today’s southern Poland and western Ukraine were awarded to the Habsburg Monarchy, this represented by far the largest territorial expansion of the final 150 years of the multi-ethnic state. For the first time the Habsburg Monarchy encompassed large Polish, Ukrainian (“Ruthenian” in the terminology of the day) and Jewish populations. In order to legitimise this territorial expansion, the House of Habsburg drew on claims via the Hungarian crown and the legal language of “revindication” was employed.¹ In 1205, the Hungarian King Andrew II had also been granted the title “rex Galiciae et Lodomeriae”. For want of other historical points of reference, the new, distant province was given the name of “Galicia and Lodomeria”. During the Napoleonic Wars it was unclear whether and with what border this new province would remain part of the

Habsburg Empire or whether it was a bargaining chip in negotiations with Prussia and tsarist Russia. The borders of this artificially-created Galicia were in fact altered several times during the Napoleonic Wars and again in 1846 (incorporation of Kraków) and 1848 (creation of Bukovina as a separate Habsburg *Kronland*, or crownland).

Habsburg rule over Galicia lasted until the end of the First World War, some 146 years altogether. From a Viennese perspective, until the mid-19th century Galicia remained a “colony” that was to be integrated into the administration and Germanised, at least in the larger towns. After 1848 a very different period of Austrian rule began. Galicia became a crownland in which the administration and political leadership was handed over to a Polish elite loyal to the Habsburgs and in which, at the same time, the liberal constitutional state after 1867 was supposed to guarantee the rights of the Ruthenian and Jewish populations.

The first decades of Habsburg rule were semi-colonial in character and were shaped by the Germanisation and centralisation measures of the Josephinian authorities. The administration was run predominantly by Czech and ethnically German Austrian officials transferred to Galicia. The Austrian emperors sought to encourage German settlement of the newly acquired province. Galicia also became a testing ground for new legal proposals (e.g. the West Galician Code of 1797). Especially in the capital of Lemberg [Lviv], the ideas of an enlightened, bourgeois world were to be spread through German-speaking educational

¹ See Abraham Jacob Brawer, *Galizien. Wie es an Österreich kam*, Leipzig 1910, pp. 7–10.

institutions and cultural organisations and German-language newspapers.²

The attitude of the Viennese centre towards Galicia only started to undergo a fundamental shift in the period between the bourgeois-national revolution of 1848 and the liberal Austrian constitution of 1867. Galicia became a crownland with autonomous rights, its own regional parliament, and self-government (the Galician Compromise).³ Although national rights were granted to both of the equally-sized populations of Poles and Ruthenians, in practice this meant that the economically and socially dominant Polish elite took over political rule in Galicia. It also meant that, until 1918, the Austrian government was heavily dependent on Polish support in the Viennese *Reichsrat* on the one hand, while being obliged to mediate between Polish and Ukrainian demands for national rights in the crownland on the other. The Jews comprised around 10 percent of the population and, as in the rest of Austria, they were granted greater rights in 1848 and equal citizenship finally in 1867, although they were not recognised as a separate ethnic group ("Volksstamm" or "tribe" in the language of the day). For them, the new situation meant that within an environment shaped by ethnic politics, they had to choose between membership of either the German or Polish linguistic group and, because of the power relations on the ground in Galicia, were under pressure to "Polonise".

Economically and socially, Galicia remained a backward and poor province in this period⁴, even if progress was heralded by urban development, the rapid expansion of the rail network, the export of raw materials (most notably after the discovery of large oil reserves in the area around Boryslaw/Drohobycz in the 1850s), and a great reduction in illiteracy (expansion of education). If Viennese newspapers reported on Galicia, "Galician destitution" and

alcoholism were the common themes. In the final decades of the Habsburg Monarchy, poverty combined with rapid population growth led to mass emigration overseas (United States, Canada).⁵ There was also marked Jewish migration to Vienna, which gave rise to defamation campaigns against the "Ostjuden" [lit. "Eastern Jews"]⁶, in particular after the end of the Danube Monarchy. At the same time, Galicia became important for Austrian military strategy on account of its geographical location on the border with Russia. Kraków and Przemyśl were built up into fortress towns and rail connections capable of transporting large numbers of troops were prepared along the long border with Russia.

During the First World War, Austria-Hungary suffered heavy losses as the Russian army advanced as far as Przemyśl and almost reached Kraków. The battles fought in Galicia, which claimed hundreds of thousands of victims, are one of the few strong connections that Austria still has with Galicia today. Hundreds of Austrian war cemeteries in Galicia commemorate the battles of the First World War, and literary works of Georg Trakl, Karl Kraus, Joseph Roth and Franz Theodor Csokor deal with the fighting there.

With the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, not only did Galicia disappear from the political map but Austrian interest in this former crownland also vanished overnight. Only the migration of Galician Jews to Vienna, which peaked around 1900 and again during and after the end of the First World War, continued to represent a link to the now already mythological "Galicia".

The outbreak of the Second World War and the deportation and extermination of the Central European Jews ended any form of Galician heritage in Austria. Often harking back to the Austro-Hungarian era, the memory of "Galicia" survived only in the Jewish population, fled into exile. The fact that the National Socialist regime used the term "Galicia" for its ideology of expansion and "Lebensraum" (lit. living space) in today's western Ukraine was not seen as a reference to the old Austria.

2 Maria Klanska, "Lemberg. Die 'Stadt der verwischten Grenzen'", [in:] *Lemberg/Lviv 1772–1918. Wiederbegegnung mit einer Landeshauptstadt der Donaumonarchie* (179. Sonderausstellung Historisches Museum der Stadt Wien), Vienna 1993, pp. 10–16, 11.

3 Christoph Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein, *Freiheit in der Unfreiheit. Die nationale Autonomie der Polen in Galizien nach dem österreichisch-ungarischen Ausgleich von 1867* (Studien der Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa an der Universität Dortmund), ed. Johannes Hoffmann, vol. 11, Wiesbaden 1993.

4 Norman Davies, *Vanished Kingdoms. The History of Half-Forgotten Europe*, London 2011, p. 457.

5 See Martin Pollack, *Kaiser von Amerika. Die große Flucht aus Galizien*, Vienna 2010.

6 Gabriele Kohlbauer-Fritz, "Zwischen Ost und West. Spaziergang durch eine Ausstellung", [in:] *Zwischen Ost und West. Galizische Juden und Wien*, ed. Gabriele Kohlbauer-Fritz for the Jewish Museum Vienna, Vienna 2000, pp. 81–87.

After 1945 not only was the territory of the former Galicia divided by new international borders, but from an Austrian perspective it was “behind” the Iron Curtain. It seemed that all interest was gone in its creation or disappearance, which had been driven by external factors, and “the cultural variety of its society was subsequently – and again, mainly from without – destroyed by genocide and expulsion.”⁷

It was only the slow, cultural rediscovery in the 1970s of “Central Europe” as a term of protest against the uniformity of Communist rule in the Soviet Union and its satellite states that once again allowed the myth of a liberal and orderly “Galicia”, part of the Habsburg Monarchy and thus not part of eastern Europe, to re-emerge in Poland and Ukraine.⁸ The mental rediscovery of the pluralist world of fin-de-siècle Vienna around 1900 began in this period in Austria too, bringing with it the recollection of just how many of the artists and academics of that time were originally from Galicia. With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989, “Galicia” and its myths became a popular topic for historical research and exhibitions⁹, yet also for a nostalgic view of “the good old times” before the catastrophes of the 20th century. Galicia became part of the “Habsburg myth”¹⁰, as had already been the case in the literature in the inter-war years (Joseph Roth, Bruno Schulz).¹¹ Today in Austria the term Galicia denotes an exotic outpost of the sunken Habsburg world, whose cultural rediscovery marks a contribution to the very necessary

debate on the tradition of plurality as part of Austrian identity.

On the meaning of the “Myth of Galicia”

For almost 150 years, southern Poland and western Ukraine constituted, under the official name of the “Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria”, the largest and most populous crownland of the Habsburg Monarchy. Yet the rest of Austria did not perceive Galicia as part of its shared cultural space. Today, almost 100 years later, the myth of “Galicia” is an important positive factor for the regional identity of both southern Poland and western Ukraine, and for cultural relations between Poland, Ukraine and Austria. It is thematised in literature and increasingly used to attract tourists.

It is not merely the architectural legacy or the literary traces that have given rise to a strong cultural memory of “Galicia” among intellectuals. This in spite of the fact that the region has not been known by this name for nearly 100 years, has been administrated by two separate states for almost 70 years, and had its regional consciousness deliberately suppressed during the Communist era.¹² The positive memories feed on both fact and myth. Often it is not clear to which of these categories each phenomenon belongs (cultural pluralism, emergence of national movements, modernisation and civilising measures, orientation towards Europe). The transformation processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe are accompanied within the region and in the West by the resurrection of historical myths and the search for “lost worlds of plurality”.

A few years ago, the west Ukrainian writer Yuri Andrukhovych compiled a list of reasons for the positive attitude of western Ukrainians towards the terms “Galicia” and “Central Europe”, which drew heavily on the postmodern qualities of the late Habsburg Monarchy (“Großmama Österreich” or “Grandma Austria”).¹³ He begins the list with the observation that “thanks precisely to the infinite linguistic and ethnic variety of this world, the Ukrainian element was able to survive... without

7 “...die kulturelle Vielfalt seiner Gesellschaft wurde nachträglich – und wieder maßgeblich von außerhalb – durch Völkermord und Vertreibung vernichtet.” Introduction by Simon Handler and Francisca Solomon [in:] *Galizien. Fragmente eines diskursiven Raums*, ed. Doktoratskolleg Galizien, Innsbruck 2009, p. 9.

8 For an overview of the rich literature of Central Europe and a portrayal of the historical development of the Central European region, see: Lonnie R. Johnson, *Central Europe. Enemies, Neighbors, Friends*, New York/Oxford 1996.

9 See: *Krakau zur Zeit der galizischen Autonomie (1866–1914)*. Ausstellungskatalog Stadtmuseum Graz – Muzeum Historyczne Miasta Krakowa, Graz 1989; also Irene Kohl and Emil Brix, *Galizien in Bildern. Die Originalillustrationen für das “Kronprinzenwerk” aus den Beständen der Fideikommissbibliothek der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek*, Vienna 1997.

10 For a comprehensive treatment of the literary dimensions of this, see: Claudio Magris, *Der habsburgische Mythos in der modernen österreichischen Literatur* (new edition), Vienna 2000.

11 Stefan H. Kaszynski, *Österreich und Mitteleuropa. Kritische Seitenblicke auf die neuere österreichische Literatur*, Poznan 1995.

12 See Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia: History and Fantasy in Habsburg Culture*, Stanford 2010.

13 Yuri Andrukhovych, *Das letzte Territorium. Essays*, Frankfurt am Main 2003, pp. 40–42. The following translations in this article are by Joanna White.

the old Austria we would not be here today."¹⁴ His ironic declaration of love reads: "I think that for this alone 'old Prohazka', the emperor Franz Joseph I, deserves to win the Nobel Prize for the Preservation of Cultural Species, should such an award be given posthumously or given at all."¹⁵

He points to the west Ukrainian dialect with its Germanisms such as "shlak by yoho trafyv" ["der Schlag soll ihn treffen" – "he can go to hell"]. He points to the astonishing liberality of this empire that had to offer shelter to practically all "from the Hasidim ... to the common gypsies of the Marmaros."¹⁶ He cites the architecture left behind in the towns, which "disregarding all adverse circumstances resist decay."¹⁷ And he points to perspectives that "look to the West" ["nach Westen [...] blicken"]. Galicia belonged to the same shared political organism as cities like Venice and Vienna: "At the beginning of our century I would have needed no visa to meet with Rilke or perhaps with Gustav Klimt."¹⁸

Galicia is a fascinating topic. This makes dealing with it in a critical, academic way difficult. The literati write of the vanished world of diversity. Publicists seek out the culture of the Galician Jewry. In some houses in Kraków and Lviv, portraits of Emperor Franz Joseph have not been thrown away but carefully kept in storage. For some, nostalgia has become a maxim to live by. In western Ukraine and southern Poland, Galicia is now "the good old times". How did this fashion for Galicia, for conceptualising it as a "civilising influence", come about? How is it that a region created artificially by external forces at the end of the 18th century, in which three very different ethnic groups were settled and which, at the end of its existence, was considered the "poorhouse of Europe", can still affect how people think about their identity today?

14 "...gerade dank der unendlichen sprachlichen und ethnischen Vielfalt dieser Welt das ukrainische Element überdauern konnte... ohne das alte Österreich gäbe es uns heute nicht."

15 "Ich finde, schon aus diesem Grund hätte der „alte Prohazka“, der Kaiser Franz Joseph I., den Nobelpreis für kulturelle Arterhaltung verdient, wenn ein solcher Preis posthum und überhaupt vergeben würde."

16 "...von den Chassidim...zu den ganz gewöhnlichen Zigeunern aus der Marmaros."

17 "...ungeachtet aller widrigen Umstände dem Verfall widersetzen."

18 "Zu Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts hätte ich kein Visum gebraucht, um mit Rilke zusammenzutreffen oder vielleicht mit Gustav Klimt."

Karl Emil Franzos gave his collection of stories from Galicia and the neighbouring regions the title *Aus Halb-Asien* [From Half-Asia]. Ivan Franko and, to some extent, the later Joseph Roth adhered to this judgement when they spoke of civilisation in Galicia. All three literary figures also agreed that the region's situation changed fundamentally with its incorporation into the Habsburg Monarchy. Galicia became at one and the same time a distant province and a near suburb of Vienna. Particularly in the final decades of the Habsburg Monarchy, Galicia's connections to the capital and, with that, to the cultural world of fin-de-siècle Vienna were strengthened by the post-1867 liberal and constitutional administration and the region's integration into the increasingly dense transport network of the multinational state. Vienna became attractive in terms of culture and civilisation; for some as the place of their education, for others as the place of their salvation. Those travelling to Vienna were above all Jewish emigrants, students from all ethnic groups, and people who wanted to participate regularly in the cultural life of the Court Opera or the coffee house, as well as government officials, military personnel, politicians and businessmen. In Galicia itself, Vienna was present mainly through Austrian magazines and newspapers. In the middle classes of all national groups at least, reception of world events overwhelmingly took place through the prism of the Viennese press. Manès Sperber wrote in his autobiography that as a child before the First World War he regularly had to read aloud from the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse* to his sight-impaired grandfather. And this was happening in a seemingly far-flung, small Galician town near the border with Bukovina. Billy Wilder and Simon Wiesenthal also number among today's world-famous "Galicians". Even those born later, like Roman Polanski and Krzysztof Penderecki, refer to their Galician roots.

To this day, the history of "Galicia" is seen differently from Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish and Austrian perspectives. Moreover, there are at least two competing images of life in Galicia, especially in the final decades of the Habsburg Monarchy. In one image, Galicia is the epitome of a poor, socially divided and economically exploited region at the edge of Europe, from which some two million people emigrated in just a few decades. In the other image, Galicia is seen as an example of Central European diversity where the principles of liberal constitutionality were

applied and in which Poles, Ukrainians and Jews enjoyed equal rights.

Until the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, the area of "Galicia" annexed to the Habsburg Empire following the Partitions of Poland was the most underdeveloped region of the entire empire. Poverty, illiteracy, alcoholism and emigration are the most important topics of any social history of Galicia from 1772 to 1918. The determining political topics were the national conflicts between Poles and Ruthenians, anti-Semitic disturbances, and the absolute dependence on both the *Reichsrat* in Vienna and on the predominantly Polish administration in the crownland. Economic relations between the agricultural base, the expanding trade networks and the new raw materials industries (oil) increased economic disparity and led to mass poverty.

Despite this, there is a positive, mythologised image of Galicia in parts of Poland and Ukraine today that is reflected in extensive literary and historical treatments of the topic. Historians usually seek an explanation for this image in the political and cultural renaissance of the Poles in the period of autonomy after 1866, in the development of a Ukrainian national movement, in Jewish emancipation, and in the volatile history of this region after 1918. All these processes have contributed to a positive image of Galicia but they only partially explain the contradiction between the socio-economic backwardness of the region and the recurring attempt to formulate Galicia as something remarkable.

Even as recently as in 1981, Norman Davies opened his chapter on Galicia in his standard work on the history of Poland with: "The life of the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria was short and sad... and few people mourned its passing."¹⁹ He compared the economic and social situation with that of the other two partitions and even in this comparison he considered Galicia to be generally underdeveloped. Indeed, Galicia, together with Bukovina, remained the most underdeveloped crownland for the entire duration of its membership of the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1859 only 20% of children required to attend school actually went to school; by 1900 this had at least risen to 71%. The percentage of people unable to read and write was still 59% in 1910.

Although the backward backwater of a weakening major power, this region became, perhaps for this very reason, a new focal point for Polish, Ukrainian and Jewish identity. The worldview of Galician authors like Joseph Roth, Bruno Schulz and Józef Wittlin was shaped by a sense that they were living in a society in which an "ambivalence of feeling" prevailed. Love and hate, life and death were simply aspects of reality and could very well arise at the same time. A saying aimed proverbially at *Altösterreich* (or former Habsburg Austria) encapsulates this ambivalence: "The situation is hopeless, but not serious" ["Die Lage ist hoffnungslos, aber nicht ernst"]. The world could be turned into a *Gesamtkunstwerk*, a total work of art, in which ideas of harmony became part of public and private life in the most bizarre forms. Reality was made up from equal parts of the seeming and the real. Lemberg [Lviv] could be described as "Little Vienna" because it had coffee houses in which, like some places in Vienna itself, as many as 160 newspapers were regularly available. Categories stable elsewhere, like language, nation and cultural awareness, were relativised within the pluralistic experiences of the fin-de-siècle and placed in new relationships.

Habsburg Austria's contribution to the modernisation of Galicia

The region's development in the 19th century is seen in historical research as something contributed by Austria and as something that remains a defining force in political and social attitudes to this day.

For eastern Galicia in particular, incorporation into the Habsburg Monarchy meant that orientation towards the West became possible for the first time. Galicia became a poor but nevertheless integrated part of Europe. Europe's traditional religious border between Rome and Byzantium, which ran straight through Galicia, had been crossed. Galicia and with it Austria became, physically and spiritually, a gateway to Europe.

In this region, all of the formative processes of urbanisation and modernisation have their roots in the 19th century and are therefore still linked to the term "Galicia" in the present. Intensive state and regional investment in roads, railways, public buildings and in the entire urban infrastructure in the second half of the 19th century to some extent still define cityscapes in southern Poland and western Ukraine.

¹⁹ Norman Davies, *God's Playground. A history of Poland* (2 vols.), Oxford 1981.

For both the Polish and the Ukrainian national groups, Galicia was the geo-political space in which large parts of their later political elites were educated. Early experiences of constitutionality and democracy were gathered in Galicia (Kraków was considered the Polish Athens before the First World War, Galicia the Ukrainian Piedmont). Galician autonomy after 1866 offered Poles and Ukrainians cultural and academic freedom, contributing significantly to the development of both national societies.

Galicia's complicated ethno-political situation with all its national, social and economic conflicts forced the political system of the time and its inhabitants to deal with the question of plurality on a theoretical and on a practical level. With Habsburg Austria's decision to enact a constitution based on the rule of law (1867), Galicia became a dedicated space of Polish, Ukrainian and German-Jewish cultural blossoming. The civilising influence of dealing with plurality in an everyday setting shaped the culture in specific ways. Martin Buber's "philosophy of dialogue" is one example of this.

However, these steps towards modernisation did not lead to a sustained improvement in the actual living conditions for the overwhelming majority of the population. Even during its actual existence, Galicia seems to have been more about a certain "attitude to life" ["*Lebenshaltung*"] than the "conditions of life" ["*Lebensbedingungen*"]. Writing about Kraków as the "capital" of Polish Galicia around 1900, the young Polish satirist Tadeusz Boy-Żeleński remarked: "Nowhere does one live more by imagination and so little in reality than in Kraków" (in *Znasz-li ten kraj?... Cyganeria krakowska*). If today Galicia can be thought of as a model for civilisation, then this is because of fundamental changes to our own world. Recent decades have given rise to the possibility of an open society in the geographical territory covered by former Galicia, in which traditional connections are used in order to strengthen the rule of law and democracy. Another determining factor has been an intensive engagement with Jewish traditions, turning Galicia into a sought-after research topic around the world.

Historical Galicia was a "creative milieu" and a model of civilisation in which answers were sought to the question of how different national groups and people of different cultural backgrounds could live together in one state. In this question, the late Habsburg Monarchy's liberal, constitutional state can boast some success. However, it failed

to make significant improvements to the social and economic conditions in the distant province and it seems that these aims were not a priority for the crownland's conservative political leadership. Even in the famous address of loyalty given by the Galician *Sejm* to Emperor Franz Joseph on 10 December 1866, "justice" is placed last in the list of Austria's duties towards Galicia: "We desire that Austria... be a protective shield for the civilisation of the West from the outside, for the rights of the nationalities, for humanity and for justice."²⁰

New international borders were drawn in the 20th century; the Galician Jews were murdered or expelled; Poles and Ukrainians were largely separated from one another as a result of repatriation. Yet the myth of Galicia appears to lend the region an identity to this day.

The Polish Germanist Stefan H. Kaszynski describes the power of this myth as the result of the fact that, even at the time of its establishment in 1772, Galicia was simultaneously myth and reality: "Galicia was already a legend during its lifetime: on the one hand a harsh, almost inhuman reality, on the other hand an Arcadian unreality shrouded in myth. Temporal distance pushes reality into the background and allows the Arcadian myth to blossom. It is without doubt a Central European myth, this happy Galicia, a fragment of the Habsburg myth but much darker, more fantastic and sinister."²¹ Today's research on Galician traditions links academics and universities in Ukraine, Poland, Austria, the USA, Israel and many other countries. Memories of Galicia also connect Jewish emigrants and their descendants across the world.

But Galicia is more than just an exciting research topic or the search for one's own roots. For many people in this area today it stands for a regional identity grounded in history, for co-operations between Ukraine and Poland, for the economic exploitation of cultural

20 "Wir wünschen, daß Österreich... nach außen ein Schutzschild der Zivilisation des Westens sei, der Rechte der Nationalitäten, der Menschlichkeit und der Gerechtigkeit."

21 "Galizien war schon zu Lebzeiten eine Legende: einerseits eine harte, fast unmenschliche Realität, andererseits eine mythenumwobene, arkadische Irrealität. Die zeitliche Entfernung rückt die Realität in den Hintergrund und lässt den arkadischen Mythos gedeihen. Es ist zweifelsohne ein mitteleuropäischer Mythos, dieses glückliche Galizien, ein Fragment des Habsburgermythos, aber noch viel phantastischer, dunkler und unheimlicher."

heritage, for critical, civic awareness, and for the desire to belong to Europe. Europe relies on its traditions of diversity; they give it strength and the prospect of a better life for all Europeans, whether they live in Przemyśl, Ternopil or Vienna. Austria should not forget that

in Central Europe, the centre and the periphery have always depended on one another but that this was always easier to recognise and to appreciate for the periphery.

Translated from the German by Joanna White

Galicia as a “Polish” myth

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Long was Austria loathe to spend “even a penny” on Galicia. At first it was the toughest of the three “partitions” into which Poland was cut up, “invented by administration”, and lagging furthest behind in terms of civilisation¹, then it unexpectedly moved up a level as a supplement of Austro-Hungarian dualism, became Polonised, and turned itself into the centre of Polish learning and culture, cradle of parliamentarianism, and a hothouse of civil servants and ministers. It became known as “the Polish Piedmont” but also as “Golicja i Głodomeria” [a play on words on the official name Galicja i Lodomeria and *goły* = naked and *głodny* = hungry – translator’s note]. It was observed from the heights of university chairs and also from the social lows, from the perspectives of economy and culture, mansion, café, city, country, office, school, and garrison. From Wielkopolska and the Congress Kingdom of Poland. Like no other partition, Galicia was idolised. And like no other also ridiculed.

There are myths that are more or less popular. Macro and micro. A myth concerns memory that is processed or being processed. No one knows when it is born. Or when it dies. Nor how many combinations of micro-myths it contains. It remains unknown how much of Galicia is contained in the Habsburg myth and vice versa. To what degree it results from Austrian-Polish or Polish-Austrian

politics, to what degree it is a creation of memoir literature, to what degree of belles lettres, and to what – whether we like it or not – of the myth-forming Franz Joseph?² The roots of the myth must be sought somewhere between Agenor Gołuchowski, Stanisław Szczępanowski, and Stanisław Wyspiański. Between politics and journalism, and literature – not only Polish but rather that of the entire imperial and royal “continent of the spirit”. Between the loyalism of the Stańczyks, impressionist poverty, and the historiosophic-artistic aura of *The Wedding* (*Wesele*). The myth is an essay. The myth creates an essay.

Caveat: consciously, and as commissioned by the publisher, I limit myself here to the Polish aspect of the issue, and I emphasise the point of view of a historian of politics. pass over the recently fashionable analyses of “the discourse of cultural hegemonies”, continuities of colonialisms, post-colonialisms, “internal orientalisms”, and especially the “post-imperial approach based on the post-colonial methodology” that are applied also in reference to Galicia.³ Some of these approaches are interesting. Others are pure form. Yet others are naively

1 L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, [in:] *History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture*, Stanford 2010.

2 More on the subject, see: K.K. Daszyk: “Między polską racją stanu a habsburskim mitem. Dom Habsburgów w galicyjskiej myśli politycznej doby autonomicznej”, [in:] *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, vol. 1: *Historia i polityka*, Rzeszów 1994, pp. 69–81.

3 K. Kaps, J. Surman, “Galicja postkolonialna czy postkolonialnie?”, *Historyka*, vol. 42: 2012, p.17; contains an extensive discussion of the literature on the subject.

egocentric and self-centred to the point of disregarding what they stem from.

Galician policy of the time of autonomy bears the hallmarks of the famous paradox: in its premises conservative, it is "revolutionary" both in its evaluation of the past and in the conclusions that it draws from that past. It reduces the national uprisings to *liberum conspiro*. It revalues values, imposes loyalism, commands egoism, and denotes a game with the participation of the emperor, but also Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Ukrainians and representatives of many other nationalities – a parliamentary, cabinet, and backstage game played by a collection of several dozen parties in the face of "an infinite number of world-views", in the defence of the constitutional order and in a culture of respect for law. In a world of supranational compromises. With a huge number of unknowns. And with a rather weak strong suit at the start. That battle, unprecedented in our history, would have been easy to lose. Victory had to sprout myths.

For a historian of politics, this is a significant part of the Galician macro-myth, which is usually reduced to literature. That is why we should first call upon Count Agenor Gołuchowski, in the field of politics a figure as symbolic as he is mythical. In 1860 he announced the famous October Diploma, the harbinger of not only constitutionalism but also a federalist form of organisation of the state. He was soon to become the father of the Galician autonomy, which in itself had hardly anything in common with federalism, though quite a lot with an alternative centralism associated with the policies of German liberals. Without investigating these "details", Gołuchowski's compatriots were to raise a monument to him in Lwów (today Lviv, at the time Lemberg), not far from the building of the diet. His son was to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, and hold functions akin to those of chancellor. The narrative develops: Gołuchowski Senior plays the "father" of autonomy, the parliament is its expression, and Gołuchowski Junior proof that even the paths leading to the top echelons of the monarchy are open to Poles. In time, the governor of Galicia and minister of foreign affairs of the monarchy, the father and the son, were blended into a single being, and this syncretic version is still repeated today by guides taking their groups around Lviv. Certainly, the rare masculine name, treated as an inheritance, is not without significance here. Jews would have

even made jokes about it ("So young, and he's already an Agenor"). An acquaintance of mine is interested in the Gołuchowskis and Galicia for the sole reason that he bears the same first name. Agenor Gołuchowski "Senior" is believed to have "tricked" Austria: he was a great lord, a skilful player, and he did in Galicia what Wielopolski did in the Congress Kingdom. The difference being that, unlike the margrave, he was successful. Most attractive in him was the image of proud aristocrat who bowed down before no one save the emperor, and the unbelievable efficiency of his actions, which he turned into a dogma diverging both from previous experience and the way politics was treated.

It is not up to me to decide whether history is a myth. I cannot tell whether you can assist at the birth of a myth (even when its micro version is concerned). The Gołuchowskis' coat of arms had once been Leliwa. Below the count's crown and peacock plumes, in the upper section of the now marshalled shield, they had a two-headed eagle. "With tongues gules, with sword and sceptre or in right talon, and an orb or in the left."⁴ The Habsburg eagle was rumoured to have been awarded to Gołuchowski Senior by Emperor Franz Joseph in recognition of his extraordinary services to the royal house and the state. This was the version repeated by people who knew the business well, holders of professorial and aristocratic titles. I have heard it repeatedly from quite improbable parties. Interestingly, everybody's vigilance was long dormant, and stimulated neither by the imperial monogram – I(osepho) II – present within the coat of arms, nor by the much earlier (and not overly constructive) efforts of the Gołuchowskis for the title of count (which, after all, frequently entails changes in the coat of arms). It was repeated that Franz Joseph appreciated his minister greatly and showed him favours. The Habsburg eagle in the coat of arms was to be its most telling, crowning proof.

The commendable beginnings of the autonomy and the prophetic fatherhood were not insignificant here. The Gołuchowskis, Zaleskis, and Badenis would not have got so far and would not have been who they were if not for the career opportunities generated by autonomy. The Potockis, Tarnowskis, and Sapiehas evoked the glorious past of the noble Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. On the

4 S. Górczyński, *Arystokracja polska w Galicji. Studium heraldyczno-genealogiczne*, Warszawa 2009, p. 143.

other hand, the Miers, Baworowskis, and Badenis embodied the present and the link to the house of Habsburg that provided the myth with its subsoil from the beginning. The Zaleskis – who derived their pretences from Wacław of Olesko, the first to stand at the helm of the country's administration – enclosed their family history within Galicia. So did the Badenis, whose name had the country [informally] called Badenia or the Grand Duchy of Badenia – and the incidental mentions of the family's Italian roots could change hardly anything here (the more so that they were efficiently counterpointed with intelligence that they were rather Wallachian [Polish *wołoskie* and not *włoskie* – translator's note]). The Gołuchowskis, Badenis, Miers, and Zaleskis "were born" and discovered "a dynastic inclination" only in the Habsburg state, and that is why it was easier for them to "dream of the emergence of an Austro-Hungaro-Polish Empire."⁵ They even believed that if Austria had never existed there would have been a need to invent it, as central Europe was a national mosaic; moreover, one threatened by Russia from the east. Still, "before Poland emerges, there will be plenty of divisions" – a fashionable historian by the name of Józef Szujski reassured, raising concerns that this could happen "at the Greek calends". In Austria it was possible to justify compromises, catch a patriotic breath, and at the same time gradually "become established" economically and, as Grzymała Siedlecki wrote, "even worse: spiritually."⁶

The Badenis and the Zaleskis became quite well established in both these ways. They blazed the trail of great careers. They came to riches, vied with ancient aristocratic families (and with one another), and connected themselves to Austria with multiple threads. Their example may be used to understand many a Galician legend. One may become enamoured with their careers. They wore Polish garb, and observed national holidays and anniversaries. They introduced Polish into their correspondence and conversations with foreigners (in fact, putting it on an equal footing). They abhorred persecution and never shed blood for their homeland. They operated at the very top of the monarchy. They indulged in an offhand, lordly manner. Yet there can have been few who believed that what they did was no more than

"ethnographic signs".⁷ For they preserved Polishness, more or less successfully. And they preserved it for the future, though how distant, they could not know.

Their Galician careers were justified by "a civic mind, the foundation of all moral authority".⁸ There came the moment of emergence of the Polish cause (even if in a local variation) and of "civic" (national?) duties, which included being a deputy, a member of the administration, or holder of an important post. These tales take pride in the first doctor, more often starost, envoy, governor, or minister; they record various promotions at court, yet as a rule they gloss over the first count, who as such became an anecdotal figure in Galicia ("just toss a stone and you will hit a count"). This only excluded the greatest, and that not for the reason of genealogy. Badeni and Gołuchowski were to become doctors of law and letters. Stanisław Tarnowski was to add a professorship to his old name. The number of professors was to include Leon Piniński, Stanisław Madeyski, both Morawskis, and, much less wealthy than all of them, Julian Dunajewski, and also the "burgher" in this cluster, Michał Bobrzyński. In the course of many magnificent careers of Galicia, a university chair was to become associated with the parliamentary bench, and politics to approach something the like of a higher doctorate. It was not so throughout the monarchy, not to mention in the remaining two partitions. Professors of politics were to improve the soundness of Galicia through their reason. The Potockis and Sanguszkos through their "ancient" genealogy. The aristocrat, minister, and prime minister Alfred Potocki was the "most perfectly cultured person in Europe". Professor and minister Dunajewski had the fan base that the stars of sport enjoy today. They would remember the (large) number of opponents who were floored, knocked out by his powerful oratory punches, and how he once wittily explained in the parliament that as a professor he actually never got used to being opposed. At his service, Dunajewski had Kraków's *Czas*, which he personally influenced, the Jagiellonian University that owed him the Collegium Novum, and a circle of students, notably Bobrzyński. A powerful alliance!

Let us devote some space to the antecedents of the Galician micro-myth. Let us record the striving for titles

5 K. Lanckorońska, *Szkice wspomnień*, Warszawa 2005, p. 60.

6 A. Grzymała Siedlecki, *Nie pożegnani*, Kraków 1972, p. 185.

7 Quoted from: M. Bobrzyński, *Z moich pamiętników*, foreword A. Galos, Wrocław 1958, p. VI.

8 K. Lanckorońska, *Szkice wspomnień*, op. cit., p. 68.

of count after the first partition of Poland, and focus on the presence of Poles in the army under the black-and-yellow banners. Let us note also that nothing inglorious was seen in that. There were queues for titles. At Wagram in 1809, there were Poles on both sides of the front, and they would cast "curses in their mother tongue" at one another.⁹ At Sadowa, the situation was repeated. Austrian lancers against Prussian, the royals against the imperials: a fratricidal fight which prompted the poet Norwid's words about the charge, "the like of which had long been unknown in history".¹⁰ With time, in the days of autonomy, the uniform would gain in attractiveness. It would be worn at wedding ceremonies. The cut and colours would be praised. Nobody would forbid Poles or Hungarians to emphasise their identity in the multinational army, and nobody would "hurt" anyone. Examinations would be honest. The prime students of military academies, for example Tadeusz Rozwadowski, would have the right to choose their regiment. Jańcio the lancer from Stojowski's *Kareta* "loves that regimental life: easy and pleasant – like in a great big family". One could take command of a Slovak detachment due to the similarity of the language, and, moving from one garrison to another, become familiar "with the Kronland whole". Officers would receive theatre tickets and be so popular at balls. Manoeuvres were not too toilsome, and the Habsburg world teemed with attractions. Still, one could always say that there was no other country that would be more reminiscent of the bygone Commonwealth than the Monarchy.

Which is why Count Morstin from Joseph Roth's famous short story would easily find milk brothers in the military. They were the orphans of the Imperial and Royal Army, pining for it half a century after its disintegration. Yet what was all that pining actually for? The imperial size of the state? Its hierarchic structures? The place of the army within those structures? The status of imperial officer? The pleasantries of life related thereto? The astronomical authority of the first commander? Or perhaps first of all for the bygone years? Either way, Imperial and Royal officers were recognised by their facial expression and hieratic silhouette long after the Second

World War. Recently, I observed a mote of it at the funeral of Otto Habsburg, who was buried according to the old ceremonial. Standing stiff as pokers, elderly gentleman in colourful uniforms, sabres at their sides, shed a tear when the imperial anthem was played, intently bent on the past and at odds with the contemporary. The repossession "of dreams lost"?¹¹

Let us return, however, to Count Agenor Gołuchowski, to explore the scenario (or the tricks of the trade) of one of these micro-myths. At first, when "he adhered to loyalty alone", he was considered an apostate and traitor. He was charged with Germanisation of the Polish youth employed in the Galician administration. The nobility hated him, and Kraków ceremoniously boycotted him by extinguishing the lights to "welcome" him. The breakthrough came when the emperor nominated Gołuchowski his minister. Soon everything he did was wise, intricately planned, and even touched with genius: he began with federalism on purpose to work towards autonomy. He intentionally made Poles speak German, because he envisaged that he would soon be Polonising their offices, and would keep them on in their posts. He did things that were "too good, too clever for the Austrian Germans and for the ruling bureaucracy", Stanisław Tarnowski wrote, which is why he was not understood by his contemporaries.¹² In effect, he made no mistakes. His arrogance was no longer arrogance, but an interesting trait in his original personality. From an anti-hero, he was turning into a hero, a semi-mythical figure. In Galicia, he had plenty of busts, honorary titles, streets named after him, and even roads lined with fruit trees. Nobles would kiss him on the shoulder as a token of welcome. His family would not call for a doctor, so as not to raise suspicions that he could be equal to mortals. Gołuchowski was elevated to the ideal politician of a new type, and not an entirely Polish one: hard, wise, mercilessly pursuing the goals he set for himself, and victorious. The entire Kraków historical school was enamoured with him: he was an "anti-romanticist", a pragmatist, and one who was always lacking in our history (the only other such man, Bobrzyński wrote in

9 Quoted from M. Baczkowski, *Szarży podobnej dawno nie widziały dzieje. Ułani galicyjscy 1778–1918*, Kraków 2011, p. 40.

10 Ibidem, p. 7.

11 J. Roth, *Popiersie cesarza. Tryptyk galicyjsko-austriacki*, translation and introduction by S. Kaszyński, Poznań 1996, p. 9.

12 S. Tarnowski, *Domowa kronika dzikowska*, ed. G. Nieć, Kraków – Rudnik 2010, p. 160.

his famous synthesis, was King Bathory). It was, in fact, the Stańczyks who built his legend.

Later they would laboriously transfer this image onto others: Julian Dunajewski and Kazimierz Badeni, who was already a work "of theirs". As prime minister, he defiantly announced that he wanted to lead and not be led. He carried through plenty of difficult reforms (that of election law included), and successfully played the role of "strong-armed" man, much to the liking of Koźmian, Bobrzyński, and Szujski. He not only personified the known "theory of strong governments" but he used the same grave to bury *liberum veto* and *liberum conspiro*. The Stańczyks would frequently blur the past with the present, and, vanquishing the national myths, they created new ones. And believed in them.

The Kraków-based *Czas*, a Galician version of the omni-powerful *Neue Freie Presse* in terms of impact, rendered great services in the field. It is thanks to *Czas* that everyone in Kraków was a Stańczyk and everyone complained about the Stańczyks, succumbing to a pleasant, intellectual convention. It was *Czas* that created (and actually still does, as it continues to be quoted by historians) the image of Galicia: an image of sophisticated politics, brilliant journalism, a rich cultural and academic life, with the charm of Vienna, the benevolence of the heliocentric emperor, and the metaphysics of the Habsburg space and melancholy of distant travels. Lviv and Kraków contribute a significant part of that whole. They make an impact on the entirety, at once drawing from it their strength and power. Stanisław Tarnowski once wrote a treatise about the opinion that rules the world.¹³ The Stańczyks learned that lesson well.

Let *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego Galicji* be a proof: a publication verging on an anthology of sources. Various data are quoted therein. Important texts are published. The project is trademarked with the names of three respected authors under the leadership of Michał Bobrzyński.¹⁴ Nothing in this work is misrepresented or falsified. And yet one can easily imagine a different set

of sources and a different message of the whole. Reaching for Szczepanowski, and his famous work on Galician poverty, these facts can be juxtaposed with facts. Words with words. To bring in a clash of myths.¹⁵ It is worth remembering that Szczepanowski, brought up in the shadow of the Chłapowskis, was a man of Wielkopolska, with all the pros and cons of that.¹⁶ He was the Wielkopolska version of an anti-Korytowski. And his greatest discovery was the stunning power of the easy-to-remember, "catchy" title.

One must admit that it was with varying fortunes that *Czas* fought with the image of Galicia à la Szczepanowski. For example, it admitted that Czech peasants were enlightened and more efficient, yet it immediately added that Galicia exceeded the Bohemian lands in culture, art, and politics. That Bohemia may in fact have been "the monarchy's production plant" but that the Bohemians were incapable of building a lasting constellation in the Parliament, and they had long had no minister in the Cabinet. That they did not act in solidarity, squandered their energy, and were far inferior to us in efficiency. With the economy *Czas* juxtaposed politics, and with the production plant political, literary, and aristocratic salons. It looked good. Many complexes could be treated in this manner, and one myth could perhaps be supplanted with another.

And this is more or less how that scenario continued: Galicia is not an exceptional land in the monarchy, yet it holds absolutely unique people. For example Franciszek Smolka, Kazimierz Grocholski, Florian Ziemiałkowski, Apolinary Jaworski, Julian Dunajewski, and Wojciech Działuszycki have no equals in the entire monarchy. And who are Badeni's followers compared to him? Who is better at managing a group than Grocholski? Who can compare with Działuszycki in acuity and erudition? Who has excelled Dunajewski in the fiscal policy of the state? No one. No one. No one. A handful of our compatriots began their work at the ministry with... paid leave, but even this was absorbed. After all, how lordly that is, and how profoundly it attests to a sense of one's own worth! Offended, Dunajewski would lie down on the sofa, read

13 S. Tarnowski, *Królowa opinia. Wybór pism*, Kraków 2011; see also: B. Szlachta, "Stanisław Tarnowski jako myśliciel polityczny", [in:] idem, *Szkice o konserwatyzmie*, Kraków 2008, pp. 231–270; W. Łazuga, "Stanisław Tarnowski – publicysta", [in:] *Stanisław Tarnowski 1837–1917*, ed. R. Majkowska, Kraków 1999, pp. 17–24.

14 M. Bobrzyński, *Z dziejów odrodzenia politycznego Galicji 1859–1873*, Warszawa – Kraków 1905 (with W. L. Jaworski and J. Milewski).

15 S. Szczepanowski, "Nędza galicyjska. Mit i rzeczywistość", [in:] *Galicja i jej dziedzictwo*, op. cit., pp. 145–156.

16 L. Kuberski, *Stanisław Szczepanowski 1846–1900. Przemysłowiec. Polityk. Publicysta*, Opole 1997.

French romances, and turn down appointments? Not anyone could afford to do that! What a position in the state one would need for that! And what audacity! Badeni would slap his servants in the face "for the slightest fault"? What a force of unquenched energy, of masculine power he must have had!

There would have been no Galician myths without the anecdote and gossip that was repeated for several generations. Seeing Badeni in a theatre box, an actor mistook his lines and instead of "mikado" shouted out "Ba-de-ni". Bobrzyński knows the mystery of Mayerling; for his financial policy Korytowski was kicked by a charger, for which Lwów was ready to put up a monument to the steed. Koźmian has a faithful lover. There is a saying in Vienna that goes *die Erde bewegt sich zwischen zwei Polen, Franz Josef zwischen vier* (the world revolves between two poles, and Franz Joseph among four) – Badeni, Gołuchowski, Biliński, and Rittner. The heir to the throne hates Gołuchowski, Gołuchowski hates the heir to the throne. The Potockis have a problem with their daughter, who is the object of archdukes' affections. The Emperor has special favours for Apolinary Jaworski, although otherwise he's a politician of not too high an order. Everyone listens to Dzieduszycki in the cafés, and all political Vienna repeats his *bon mots*. And so forth, and so fifth. For Poles living in the two other partitions, this was a hermetic world, light years away, at once attracting and irritating. "Whoever feeds on white Galician bread, and has uniforms and sabres opening the doors to the rooms of the court can stretch the strings of love [to fatherland – author's note], and finds it easier to forget the hundred years' worth of streams of blood and tears."¹⁷ To spend money in the ascetic Bazar, you need to be quite daring if you live by the Warta. The aristocracy from Wielkopolska come to Galicia for the carnival, and "live it up" in the hotels and manor houses. The Raczyńskis – one of the best Wielkopolska families – spent only the summer and early autumn in Rogalin. The rest of the year, they lived in Kraków, where they went to school and acquired "the Kraków talk". A son of the cathedral organist, Ludwik Ćwikliński, later rector of the

University in Lviv and minister, also moved from Gniezno to Lviv. Yet the greatest career was that of Witold Korytowski (Kora), the closest associate of Julian Dunajewski and one of his successors in the Ministry of the Treasury. Whenever he visited Wielkopolska and his family home, he would talk of the banquets, balls, and visits to the Imperial Burg, and intricate politics. He would display his orders and beautiful printed invitations on the table. He told enchanting tales of the great world, and... grew infuriated.

That fury can be understood. His compatriots were fighting Germanisation at the time. They were setting up associations, banks, and farmers' groups. They propagated solidarity among people. They had no university, they were – as Sapieha believed – "all the same." And had no significant social talents. When Tarnowski and Bobrzyński arrived with their lectures, the Bazar hall was full to bursting point. The "flower of our citizenry" had come from the furthest corners of the Duchy of Poznań. Beautiful words about the solidarity which Wielkopolska contributed to the treasury of the national heritage were bandied about. There were also reasons for pride that transcended the partitions. Michał Bobrzyński, son-in-law of Hipolit Cegielski, was the governor of Galicia! Followed by Korytowski hailing from near Rogowo! Morawski from Jurkowo near Kościan a minister. And then Ćwikliński from Gniezno the minister of education. This is what we are capable of if the conditions are different! How much strength, energy and "vitality" there is! That's why, as *Kurier Poznański* wrote, "one must always remember about the natural difference between a great historical nation like the Polish and tribes without a historical future, and one need not apply empty democratic levelling to nations of various moral strength". After all, there are nations that can issue no more than "heads of counties".¹⁸ The Austrian successes of Poles in general, and ones from Wielkopolska especially, were dedicated to Prussians, as food for thought for them. To prove something.

The researcher of Galicia has heaps of letters and volumes of memoirs at his disposal. Frequently an excess of sources rather than their shortage. The world developed under the pen frequently makes a more powerful impact on the imagination than the real. And it can always be

17 W. Łazuga, "Organicznicy, stańczycy i społeczeństwo obywatelskie w Wielkopolsce", [in:] *Historiae Deditus. Profesorowi Adamowi Galosowi w 85. rocznicę urodzin*, Wrocław 2009, pp. 409–416 (Śląski Kwartalnik Historyczny Sobótka).

18 *Kurier Poznański*, 25th May 1895 (no. 119).

returned to. Bobrzyński's memories inspired attraction or boredom, Biliński's irritation or envy. Chłędowski gossiped, yet the virtues of his pen enticed one into a world not devoid of charm (for many readers, this is still the fundamental source for the history of Galicia). When the diaries of Bogdanowicz were published in the days of communism, i.e. the People's Republic of Poland, it was said that the intention was to ridicule the life of the leisure classes. It was otherwise. Readers would fight over the book. What did they find in it? A refined social life they did not know in their grey, drab world. Palaces. Balls. Gowns. The court ceremonial, and the peace of an evenly flowing life, saving the common mortal from unnecessary shocks. The style of a better society and a better world. Certain episodes could invite curiosity. Here's the governor travelling around the country. After a lush breakfast, he is taken to the river bank. He gets into a specially prepared boat. He soon alights. Welcomes the residents of a village, has a snack, stays for another while. Re-embarks, travels for some time. Disembarks, greets people, has lunch, says his farewells, goes on down the river. The natural surroundings are beautiful. The river meanders. In the evening, now by motor car, he returns for the night to the place where he began his journey. It was just... a few kilometres. He is not in a hurry at all. On the following day, he sets off again. People are favourably disposed. The authority is efficient. The emperor benevolent. Life is sweet.¹⁹ Naïve but beautiful.

In a recently published book, I tried to prove that towards the end of the 19th century many Poles were so strongly "assimilated" with Austria that they could no longer "abstract" (a term they used themselves) from it.²⁰ They became used to the civilisation of the Habsburg centre of Europe. Roots were plunged into the subsoil of this ancient monarchy. In effect, Austria was less and less associated with the partitioning. It was becoming the "depository" of hope. Still, it was somewhat reminiscent of the bygone Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. It cured plenty of national complexes, it let one live one's own way, and in the case of war, it was even ready to introduce the so-called Austro-Polish solution, which it allowed to be imposed on it. And shortly before the

war, two of the treasury portfolios (the Austrian and the joint) were in the hands of Poles. The governor of Galicia was making the country ready for a war with Russia. Under no other rule did we have such influence. Such potential. Such political experience. And such politicians. Therefore, the throne in Warsaw was already "reserved" for a Habsburg. Galicia was referred to as "the Polish Piedmont" in a parallel oblivious to the fact that none other but Austria was the greatest enemy of that mountainous region. The future Austro-Hungaro-Poland was to begin with Galicia. No other logic could make sense.

In 1918 the Habsburg Monarchy fell apart. New states were set up on its ruins. Politics and politicians changed. Wyspiański was promoted among the poet-prophets. Loyalism lost its *raison d'être*, ministers their pensions, and the Austro-Polish solution found its way into the museum of curios. What was to have been realism and iron logic proved fantasy or error. The Stańczyks, who were responsible for it to the greatest extent, were reduced to bankruptcy. Bobrzyński left Kraków, and for the last of the Cegielskis' money leased a measly estate under the name of Garby in Wielkopolska. Korytowski rented a modest apartment in Poznań. Morawski gave himself up to writing and returned to Kraków. Ćwikliński could find no place for himself. And once again, Stańczyk would be associated above all with Matejko's painting.

What did the heroes of Galicia feel when that world was becoming the past? Were they castaways, enjoying the independence they regained? Did they bury the old Galicia and conserve it in their memory? A psychologist would have plenty to say here, and escapism would be mentioned quite often. For what is the significance of their lending each other old issues of *Czas*? Of drowning in diaries and old letters. Moving away from active life. Dawid Abrahamowicz was irritated by contemporary politics. Bobrzyński found people politically "childish". Writing the history of the Green Balloon (*Zielony Balonik*), "Boy" created legends of Galicia at a time when Michałik, patron of the artists, had moved on to Poznań. Biliński remained primarily an excellency, and Bobrzyński cautiously considered his "first decade of work at the University" the most beautiful period in his life. The author of *Dzieje* did not believe that, thrust between a colossus on the East and another one on the West, independent

19 M. Rosco Bogdanowicz, *Wspomnienia*, vol. 1, Kraków 1959, pp. 386 and ff.

20 W. Łazuga, *Kalkulować... Polacy na szczytach c.k. monarchii*, Poznań 2013.

Poland could enjoy a long existence. Surrounded with books in rural Wielkopolska, he would return to the old Gołuchowski's federationist idea with the centre on the Danube in his thoughts. To a Danube confederation in its assorted varieties. To the construction of an Austro-Hungaro-Poland.

There were also unexpected nostalgias. A former deputy to the Parliament of Galicia, and prime minister in the free Poland, Wincenty Witos, announced that there was more freedom in Galicia than in Poland, and that this made him understand that freedom was not the same as independence. Once, already after the Second World War, Henryk Wereszycki confessed that he had never experienced "as much freedom as there was in 1910 in Lwów".²¹ A phenomenon of the Poland of the communist days was the eruption of the literary "school of the south: Buczkowski, Iwaszkiewicz, Kuśniewicz, Strykowski". Kuśniewicz's *Mieszaniny obyczajowe* sold out immediately (and were one of my favourite reads). Wyka spoke of a "resurrection of Young Poland". *Austeria* was screened in the cinemas. Grodziski published a biography of a Franz Joseph who was hardly reminiscent of an occupier. All Roth's books published in Poland enjoyed considerable success.

It is hard to say what the reason was for this uncanny popularity. Moods? Melancholy, pensiveness, transition, proximity of the worlds, contrasts, individualism, multiculturalism, or the allure of the form? Yearning for freedom? Possibly chiefly the last. Witos and Wereszycki could certainly be trusted.

One needs to remember that the most universally known figures in the Galician pantheon were men of letters and artists, who as a rule did not dabble in ideologies. The Stańczyk and Podolacy factions, politicians of the right wing, most characteristic of Galicia, were closely watched, even if they were Jagiellonian University professors. The worker movement in Kraków would be examined through a magnifying glass, Lviv in the USSR

was *de facto* glossed over, and the world of professors and counts was not eagerly dealt with, as of the wrong class and generally suspicious. Even in the middle of the Gierek decade, the time was, as a contemporary saying went, "still not ripe enough" to research conservatism and conservatives. Older historians would warn younger ones against such a risk. Going to Lviv was difficult. It could be difficult to published. School books urged the claim about the Galician poverty to the fore, and this was used in a cloak-like fashion to cover most of Galician life and the Galician myth. Piłsudski and his riflemen setting off from Kraków in 1914 clearly had not served Galicia either. The economic and civilisational underdevelopment sufficed for synthesis and dogma. It was only the people's power that could do away with such a burden of history. An impression of the "insignificance" or secondary importance of Galicia for our recent history developed.

Despite the passing years, and the changes that have taken place in Poland, plenty of this has remained in the general memory. I asked nearly a hundred people from Wielkopolska and Pomorze for their associations with the word "Galicia". Although it was just an opinion poll, it primarily pointed to Galician poverty. Later came loyalism, Kraków, cafés, professorships, theatres, ceremony, penny pinchers, C.K. *Dezerterzy* the movie, unenforced nonchalance and a penchant for conversation, and finally a contemporary commercial brand, Krakowski Kredens, and a few other trifles. No internal contradictions were perceived in this set of associations. Most of them were taken in isolation. Szczepanowski steered clear of any danger.

It was otherwise with Franz Joseph, who found himself way down the list, exhibiting a worrying tendency to break away from Galicia. Although his characteristic image is still featured on the label of Żywiec water, he is clearly losing his recognisability. Moreover, he has been reduced even there to a miniature. It is significant that some have even failed to notice this.

21 W. Felczak, *Europa Centralis*, Kraków 2013, p. 188.

Galicia as a “Ukrainian” myth*

Yaroslav Hrytsak

Lviv

In a letter dated 5th December 1969, Jerzy Giedroyc, editor-in-chief of the famous Parisian émigré magazine *Kultura*, informed Czesław Miłosz about the world that would emerge after the fall of Communism (“after the eruption”) in Eastern Europe: “politically, we are facing a burgeoning of Nazi-type nationalisms. It is so in Russia itself, it is so in Ukraine and in other republics, it is so in Poland itself. [...]. If this eruption occurs, it will be entirely blind, with people slaughtering one another; the problems of Lviv/Lwów, the Treaty of Riga, etc. will come to the fore again, and this time we are likely to die finally in the wreckage of that cataclysm.”¹

Speaking of “the problems of Lviv”, Giedroyc meant the Polish-Ukrainian war over Galicia and its capital city. The war began on 1st November 1918, no more than ten days before the end of the First World War, and continued for several months after that great conflict was over, until the middle of July 1919. That was a time when, as Winston Churchill phrased it, “the war of the giants [was] over; the wars of the pygmies [began]”. Strategically speaking, the Polish-Ukrainian war did not make much sense for either the Poles or the Ukrainians. Their fundamental interests were focused elsewhere: the new Polish state had to cope with Germany to the west, while the fate of the Ukrainian

state was being decided further east: in Kyiv, where, after the withdrawal of the German occupation army and the government of Pavlo Skoropadskyi, the troops of the Ukrainian People’s Republic had to face two Russian armies: the Red and the White. In Galicia, Ukrainians represented no more than 25% of the population of the ethnic Ukrainian territories. Yet they managed to form an army equal in number to that of the Army of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and one that was far superior in discipline and efficiency. If, instead of fighting for Lviv against the Poles, the Ukrainian Galician Army had been able to join its compatriots from the East, the Bolsheviks would have found it more problematic to capture Kyiv. In this way, the history of Eastern Europe in the 20th century might have followed a different course. Yet the Poles and Ukrainians preferred to kill one another in a war over Galicia and Lviv rather than think about strategic interests.

Galicia is one of those historical regions whose significance strongly exceeds their size or status. It is the locus of that Gordian knot of geopolitical interests whose method of solution influences the entire Eastern Europe. It was so at the end of the First World War, and it was so just before its outbreak. Galicia was a crucial *casus belli* between Vienna and Saint Petersburg. In significance, the Galician factor was second only to the Balkan question. In the perception of the Russian government, Austrian Galicia was a hotspot of Polish and Ukrainian nationalisms, which in turn constituted a mortal danger to the cohesion of the Russian Empire. That is why Galicia needed to be taken

* This text recapitulates my earlier publications on the myth of Galicia and the Galician identity, whose titles are quoted in the successive footnotes below.

1 Quoted from: *Nowa Europa Wschodnia* 2011, no. 3–4.

over and suppressed at the very outset: something that the Russian regime attempted to achieve in the short term of occupation in the first months of the war.²

The First World War started as a conflict of empires and ended as a war of nations. Galicia played a special role both in the first and in the second case. There is, however, a significant difference between what actually Galicia was before 1914 and what we know about it, or choose to remember, today. Who, let's say, remembers today that early in the 20th century Galicia was the world's third-largest crude oil producer, and that the question of oil was one of the most important factors influencing the discussion of the post-war borders during the conference at Versailles?

There were a number of factors that caused Galicia to be “put out of mind”. Let me mention here three that I believe to be most crucial. First of all, Galicia fell victim to Orientalism, in which schema the “Eastern” nations, as hardly civilised, were not worthy of separate histories. Yet, Galicia was not simply Eastern Europe: it was the *original* Eastern Europe. As Larry Wolff pointed out in *The Idea of Galicia*³, this Austrian province was the first territory where the image of Eastern Europe was constructed. For that reason, Galicia was usually referred to with irony as a symbol of East European poverty and backwardness. Suffice it to cite the Good Soldier Švejk: “In the whole world have I seen nothing more magnificent than this stupid Galicia.” It was believed that nothing good or serious could come from such a country, much as from the Galilee as presented in the Gospels. Interestingly, such a point of view was characteristic not only of politicians and intellectuals from the “true” (i.e. Western) Europe; it was subscribed to also by Polish and Ukrainian activists from Warsaw, Kyiv, and other cities, compared to which Lviv and Galicia emerged a backwoods periphery. In their eyes, this Austrian province was “that fatal rock in the ocean of civilisation against which all its vessels crash, and where only birds of prey make their eyries”.⁴ Going even further: “that orientalist perspective was assumed by the people of Galicia themselves, especially the reformers – “occidentalists” of the ilk

of Stanisław Szczepanowski – one proof of which being, for example, the vitality of his claim about Galician poverty.⁵

Another reason why Galician themes are so rarely remembered and taken up is connected with the properties of collective memory: the human memory is short and dominated by memories of recent events. Especially if they are full of tragic and violence. It is probably sufficient to quote one example here: according to demographic estimates, every other man and every other woman was killed in Ukraine as a result of violence between 1914 and 1945. Moreover, that “30-year war of the 20th century” (1914–1945) not only “obliterated” the memories of the relatively calm and peaceful 19th century; it literally “obliterated” the bearers of that memory. Hitler murdered the local Jews, Stalin resettled the local Poles, and both decimated the local Ukrainians. The last lost majority of the local elites: those of the educated Ukrainians who survived the Soviet (1939–1941) and German (1941–1944) occupations, saved themselves by fleeing en masse to the West. The wartime violence put an end to the existence of traditional Ukrainian villages and Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish towns, turning them into collectivised Soviet villages and industrial cities. A vast share of the population in the latter were the new, Russian-speaking population: Russians, Jews, and Ukrainians from eastern Ukraine, who had no idea of what had happened in Galicia before 1914. This builds the specific fibre of eastern Galicia: there was no such influx of new inhabitants in the case of the former western (Polish) part. It would be difficult to imagine another country that has experienced such a broad, deep, enforced transformation in such a short time. The profoundness of that collective trauma explains why local people find their historical memory such a problem.

And finally, the third reason for forgetting Galicia has been the policies of the regimes that originated here after the collapse of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. Their genesis lay in the conscious and systematic destruction of the most significant distinctive factors of Galicia. Thus, the official term used to define this former Austrian province in Poland between the two world wars was “Małopolska”. The purposeful replacement of the term “Galicia” was primarily a result of the eagerness to

2 For a more comprehensive treatment, see: K. Bachmann, *Ein Herd der Feindschaft gegen Rußland. Galizien als Krisenherd in den Beziehungen der Donaumonarchie mit Rußland (1907–1914)*, Wien – München 2001.

3 L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia. History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture*, Stanford 2010 (translator's note).

4 Quoted from: J. Rudzki, *Świętochowski*, Warszawa 1963, p. 204.

5 See the examples quoted in my book: J. Hrycak, *Prorok we własnym kraju: Iwan Franko i jego Ukraina (1856–1886)*, transl. by A. Korzeniowska-Bihun, A. Wylegała, Warszawa 2010.

remove from memory the broad political rights that the local population, and especially the national minorities – Jews and Ukrainians – enjoyed under the Habsburg reign.⁶ In turn, the Soviet powers preferred the term "Western Ukraine". This allowed them to question the rights of Poland to the territory between the two world wars and, going further, legitimised its inclusion in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic during and after the Second World War.⁷ The only regime to make conscious references to Galician images was the Nazi occupation regime. For example, the Ukrainian military division set up under Nazi supervision was known as *Waffen SS "Galizien"*. The idea in this case was to avoid any references to the Slavic (whether Polish or Ukrainian) character of the territory. In Hitler's plans, Galicia was to become a "purely German territory" within fifteen or twenty years. Luckily, the Nazi regime held this region too briefly to make these criminal plans a reality. Either way, its short-lived existence did not overcome the general 20th-century tendency to choose to make Galicia forgotten.

And here we encounter a paradox: despite and against the conscious efforts on behalf of political systems to obliterate the memory of Galicia from the consciousness of the local population, the Galician identity made its mark clearly and strongly after the end of the 20th century. Towards the end of the 1990s, a Polish expert in political geography, Tomasz Zarycki, compared electoral behaviours in post-Communist states – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. Among all these states in the regions, he singled out the former Austrian Galicia: "it is one of the few places", he wrote, "where one would much prefer to go beyond the current political borders [...], to show the vitality of the 19th-century borders".⁸ His conclusion was equally true for Ukrainian and Polish (Małopolska) Galicia. Despite the 20th-century state divisions, the Galician Poles and Galician Ukrainians have maintained certain shared traits in their civic constitutions that set them apart from their compatriots from other regions; these include

conservatism, an anti-Communist focus, and a strongly developed civic instinct.⁹

In the Ukrainian context, the local Galicians incessantly stand out in all the research as the Ukrainians with the highest national awareness and most pro-European focus. The Ukrainian Galicians are so very different from other Ukrainians that their language and behaviour has frequently irked the others. It was so in 1914–1945, when – amid the turmoil of war and revolution – Galicians came into contact with Ukrainians from the East on a more or less mass scale, and it stayed so after the proclamation of independence by Ukraine in 1991. Orest Subtelny (by the way, a Galician from the Canadian diaspora) was right early in the 1990s to write that no Galician has the prospect of becoming the president of Ukraine in the nearest future. What he meant was precisely Galicia and Galicians, and not the entire western Ukraine, that is the neighbouring regions of Bukovina, Volhynia, and Transcarpathia that were included in Russian Ukraine only after the Second World War. Much like Galicia and other western marches of the USSR, they were the least Sovietised and Russified. Yet none of these regions can match Galicia, be it in civic activity or in the sense of their own identity.

The distinctive nature of Galicia cannot be explained by geographic borders. It is not surrounded by impenetrable mountains, nor does it feature a shoreline. Its eastern border – the River Zbruch – was selected in the days of Austrian Russia quite randomly, and when a heat wave comes it dries up and can be easily forded. Nor is Galicia deeply rooted in the historical past. Although it takes the name from the mediaeval Principality of Halych (later Halych and Volhynia), and the Habsburgs legitimised their authority by citing the fact that the Principality once used to be a part of the Crown of St Stephen, the Austrian Galicia did not match any of the ancient borders. The notion of "a Galician" had been practically unknown before 1772, and the only recorded case of its use in historical texts concerned the people of *Przedmieście Halickie* [literally "Halych Suburb", translator's note] in the city of Lviv, and the very name *Przedmieście Halickie* is linked to the vicinity of the Halych Gate, where the road from mediaeval Lviv to the east began (to compare, the western gate was known as the Kraków Gate). Galicia and Galicians in the form we know today are a purely Austrian invention.

6 See: J.P. Himka, "Western Ukraine between the Wars", *Canadian Slavonic Papers / Revue Canadienne des Slavistes*, vol. 24:1992, no. 4 (December), p. 392.

7 See: T. Martin, *The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union*, Ithaca 2001, pp. 9, 24, 213, 218, 228.

8 T. Zarycki, *The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe. Comparative Study of Regional Political Cleavages in Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine*, Lund – Warsaw 1998, p. 58.

9 Ibidem.

This was recognised by the educated people of Galicia themselves, who were vexed in the mid-19th century with the Habsburgs' attempts "to create some non-historical Galicians".¹⁰ From today's perspective, one must admit that these were no failed attempts. One could even venture the claim that Galicia deserves first place in the ranking of all the artefacts produced by the Habsburgs in Central and Eastern Europe; after all, it was the greatest and most lasting invention they ever made.

Nevertheless, despite the special merits of the Habsburgs, there is scant mention of them in the collective memory of the Galician Ukrainians.¹¹ The most important place within that memory is occupied by historical figures of exclusively national significance: the Princes of Kyiv (Vladimir the Great, Yaroslav the Wise), the Cossack hetmans (Bohdan Khmelnytsky, Ivan Mazepa), three Ukrainian national poets: Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, and Lesya Ukrainka, and the leader of the 20th-century nationalistic Ukrainian movement, Stepan Bandera. Of them all, only two (Ivan Franko and Stepan Bandera) came from Galicia, and only one (Ivan Franko) is linked to the days of Austria.

Yet the greatest symbol of Ukrainian Galicia is Stepan Bandera. He strongly outranks Franko in popularity among Ukrainian Galicians. Yet, unlike Franko, he is not bound chronologically or ideologically to the days of Austria. The reverse would be truer: the activity of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) he led, and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) set up under its aegis were a blunt contradiction of the heritage of liberal traditions and national tolerance that are connected to the Habsburgs.¹² As a symbol of Galicia, Bandera makes Galicia stand out clearly from all other regions of Ukraine, where attitudes to him are clearly negative: the more so the further east they are.

It is no exaggeration to claim that there is no other figure whose memory would divide Ukrainians so powerfully.

Yet at the same time, he radically separates the Galician Ukrainians from Galician Poles: among Poles, Bandera is caught up with the memory of the anti-Polish ethnic cleansing executed by the soldiers of the UPA (Banderites) in Volhynia and Galicia in 1942–1943. Early in the 1990s, after long-lasting controversies, Ukrainians and Poles managed to reach an understanding concerning the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919. As yet, they have not managed to reach conciliation around the question of the Volhynia massacre, and that despite the incessant attempts by politicians and public intellectual figures on both sides of the border, including – if not notably – those from Galicia.¹³

The problem of divided historical memory concerns even more directly Ukrainians and the Galician Jews (Galitzianer). Although in both these groups the Galician identity is more than clear, they lack symbols they could share and make positive (or negative) references to. Much as in the case of the Poles, the main figure which keeps the two groups apart is Bandera himself, and the nationalistic Ukrainian movement. According to Galician Jews, Ukrainian nationalism collaborated with Hitler, and is burdened with responsibility for the Holocaust. In turn, the Galician Ukrainians have absolutely displaced the Galician Jews from their memory, and do not want or are not ready to admit that Ukrainian nationalists were connected to the mass murder of Galician Jews.¹⁴

Yet it is between Ukrainians and Russians that Galician-Ukrainian nationalism creates the strongest divide. That became especially visible in the events related to the Euromaidan, and the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. Putin and his environment consciously avoid the term "Ukrainians" when referring to their enemies, the Ukrainian democratic opposition that defeated the corrupted regime of Victor Yanukovich. They prefer the terms "Banderites" and "nationalists", in order to attain two goals in this way. On the one hand, Putin desires to vilify his opponents as (alleged) fascists and anti-Semites, and on the other he is keen to present the entire Euromaidan as "a Galician plot"

10 The words of Maurycy Dzieduszycki are quoted from: Z. Fras, *Galicia*, Wrocław 1999, p. 89.

11 W. Steciuk, O. Turkewycz, *Ukrayinska kultura ta istoriya Pridnistrovyia u pamyati narodniy*, <http://www.geocities.com/trybunazoo/HDUkrainci.doc> (accessed in October 2007; currently the portal is down. The article can be ordered from: http://www.history.iv-fr.net/email_article.php?article_id=949).

12 See: Y. Hrytsak, *Zhyttiia, smert' ta inshi nepriyemnosti*, Kyiv 2008, pp. 60–84; Wybitni Ukraińcy wszystkich epok. Grupa socjologiczna "Reytynh" [Outstanding Ukrainians of all times. Reytynh sociological group], May 2012.

13 See my article: Y. Hrytsak, *A Stumbling Block of Reconciliation*, *New Eastern Europe* 2013, no. 4.

14 O. Bartov, *Erased. Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in Present-Day Ukraine*, Princeton – Oxford, 2007. See also my criticism of factual errors and simplifications that Bartov unfortunately committed in his otherwise very important book: Y. Hrytsak, *Strasti za natsionalizmom. Stara istoriya na novyi lad. Esei*, Kiev 2011, pp. 241–250.

supported by the West, yet without extensive support in the majority of Ukraine.

Yet matters are actually the other way round: the Kyiv Euromaidan received mass support both from Russian-speaking Ukrainians and from Ukrainian Jews, and the number of fascists on the streets of Kyiv, to quote Mikhail Khodorkovsky, does not exceed the number of fascists on the streets of Moscow or Saint Petersburg.¹⁵ What is more: the longer the Russian aggression against Ukraine lasts, the greater popularity Bandera is gaining among Ukrainians, especially the young and educated, and the more the hatred of Putin increases.¹⁶

Either way, after the fall of communism, Galicia and the Galician myth were such that it was bound to become more and more popular, in fact reaching international impact. This impact, it seems, is largely imperceptible to the intellectual eye of Ukraine. This is a question that is usually discussed in a narrow context, or more strictly speaking: in a provincial, Galician-Ukrainian framework.¹⁷ Yet in line with its international status, this myth

deserves an international debate. The discussion of the Galician myth should especially provide answers to two questions. They concern not only the myth itself, but also the creation of myths as such.

The first question is the extraordinary vitality of the myth: how has this myth not only survived but also gathered momentum, given the lack of favourable political conditions throughout the entire 20th century? The examples and illustrations concerning the cult of Franz Joseph, Galician cuisine, Galician dialect, etc. would not suffice alone. However charming, they would only mean skimming the surface, without touching the deeply hidden mechanisms of myth formation.

The other question is whether it will ever be possible to reformat the myth so that it is inclusive and not exclusive. In other words, so that it serves reconciliation and not building divides between nations. This is not an academic question. And it goes beyond the borders of historical Galicia itself. What is the essence of the game here is the political future of all Europe. Because what is happening on its eastern borders makes an impact on the entire European construction. It was so 100 years ago. Whether good or bad, it remains so to this day, and the current Ukrainian-Russian conflict manifests this clearly.

Before an answer is given to these two questions, if one ever is, one cannot fail to appreciate the important initiative of the International Cultural Centre in Kraków, which proposed a discussion of the myth of Galicia in an international context. Whether this initiative proves a small or a great step forward, it is important that it is a step in the right direction.

Translated from the Polish by Piotr Krasnowolski

15 <http://www.segodnya.ua/politics/pnews/hodorkovskiy-na-may-dane-rossiyskaya-propaganda-vret-zdes-net-fashistov-i-nacistov-501382.html> (accessed on 20th May 2014).

16 See the study on "Nostalgia za ZSRR a stosunek do poszczególnych postaci" (Nostalgia for the USSR, and attitude toward individual figures). Reytynh sociological group, May 2014.

17 See my article: Y. Hrytsak, "Leidenschaften für Galizien. Ukrainische Debatten über die galizische Identität", [in:] *Region, Staat, Europa. Regionale Identitäten unter den Bedingungen von Diktatur und Demokratie in Mittel- und Osteuropa* (in print; see: <http://kulturportal-west-ost.eu/region-staat-europa-regionale-identitaeten-unter-den-bedingungen-von-diktatur-und-demokratie-in-mittel-und-osteuropa>, accessed on 20th May 2014).

Galician Jews: Imperial mythologies and provincial identities

Larry Wolff

New York

The Habsburg territorial acquisitions in the first partition of Poland, in 1772, were given the name of “Galicia,” and at that time the Jews living in those lands (estimated at almost 10% of a population of 2.6 million) became “Galician” Jews.¹ This was a category that would become increasingly meaningful over the course of the nineteenth century, as Jewish Galicians, “Galitzianer,” were believed to possess – and believed themselves to possess – a particular cultural character among the Jews of Eastern Europe, especially as distinct from the Jews of the Russian empire. This ethnographic – and semi-mythological – identity of the “Galitzianer” would actually outlive Galicia itself, which ceased to exist in 1918 with the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. From 1772 to 1918 the Galician Jews were, by far, the largest population of Jews within the Habsburg Monarchy, and Jewish issues within the monarchy were often pre-eminently Galician issues.

From the moment of its creation in 1772 – during the joint reign of Empress Maria Theresa and her son Emperor Joseph II – Galicia was of particular interest to Joseph, who traveled to visit the province immediately in 1773. He viewed Galicia as a sort of tabula rasa – a brand new province, without a provincial history and established prerogatives, and therefore the perfect arena for carrying out comprehensive enlightened reforms. Habsburg government began to modify the kahal system of the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth, which had permitted a considerable degree of Jewish self-government, and Joseph ultimately sought to create a characteristically Josephine centralized subordination of religion to the state. The 1776 “Allgemeine Ordnung für die gesamte Judenschaft der Königreiche Galiziens und Lodomerien” placed the Jewish population under a centralized body of Jewish elders and a single directing rabbi (Landesrabin), directly responsible to the Habsburg government of the province.² In the 1780s Joseph’s ecclesiastical and political reforms for the monarchy would establish a stricter subordination of religion to the state, for Judaism, as for the Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic churches in Galicia.

When Joseph began to rule alone, after his mother’s death in 1780, his reforms became more fundamentally radical, and his Edict of Toleration of 1781, issued in the spirit of the Enlightenment, had implications for the practice of Christianity and Judaism, in diverse confessions and rituals. An extension of the edict in 1789 specifically guaranteed freedom of worship to the Jews of Galicia and also offered equal protection under the law: “in accordance

1 Israel Bartal, *The Jews of Eastern Europe, 1772–1881*, trans. Chaya Naor, Philadelphia 2005, pp. 71–72.

2 Stanisław Grodziski, “The Jewish Question in Galicia: The Reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II, 1772–1790,” Polin: *Studies in Polish Jewry*, vol. XII, *Focusing on Galicia: Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, 1772–1918*, eds. Israel Bartal & Antony Polonsky, London 1999, pp. 61–72; Wolfgang Häusler, *Das galizische Judentum in der Habsburgermonarchie: Im Lichte der zeitgenössischen Publizistik und Reiseliteratur von 1772–1848*, Vienna 1979, pp. 18–45; Nancy Sinkoff, *Out of the Shtetl: Making Jews Modern in the Polish Borderlands*, Providence 2004, pp. 203–224.

with which the Jews are to be guaranteed the privileges and rights of other subjects.”³ This stipulation promised something like emancipation, and Joseph’s economic and educational interventions accordingly envisioned an evolving integration of Jews and Christians within Galicia and the wider Habsburg Monarchy. In 1784 a kosher meat tax was premised on the conviction that the state should be able to profit if the community insisted on distinctive customs. In 1785 the Habsburg government restricted Jews in the leasing of financial prerogatives (*arenda*) on Polish noble estates, including leases for the production and sale of alcoholic beverages (*propinacja*). Such leasing had been frequent practice in the Commonwealth, and the Habsburg restriction was intended to normalize Jewish economic life and encourage Jews to pursue agricultural and commercial activities alongside Christian Galicians. In 1787 the establishment of German-language schools for Jews in Galicia (as originally conceived by Herz Homburg for the Jews of Bohemia) envisioned a cultural assimilation in which German would supersede Yiddish, the linguistic sign of Jewish cultural distinctiveness. In 1787 Joseph further mandated the assigning of conventional family names – often German names – to Jews whose names had previously existed only in Hebrew and Yiddish patronymic forms.⁴

In 1788, most controversially, Joseph mandated the military conscription of Jews, removing young men completely from their traditional culture, while attempting to preserve some of the conditions of particularity: “The Jew as a man and as a fellow-citizen [Mitbürger] will perform the same service that everyone else is obliged to do [...]. He will be free to eat what he will, and will be required to work only on that which is necessary during the Sabbath, much the same as Christians are obligated to perform on Sundays.”⁵ Joseph’s measures, though intended to have an enlightened and emancipatory effect, were generally experienced as persecution by the great majority of traditionally-minded

Galician Jews – both the Orthodox rabbinical communities and the Hasidic communities, who were particularly numerous in Galicia, the original heartland of Hasidism. It was here that the Baal Shem Tov had created the movement in the early eighteenth century, before Galicia itself existed. Retrospectively, Hasidism would come to be seen as a specifically Galician Judaism in stark opposition to the vanguard of modern and enlightened Jews, who were shaped by conditions of Josephine toleration and influenced by the principles of the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment.

The German writer Franz Kratter, a partisan of the Josephine Enlightenment, visited Galicia in 1784 and published a volume of *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand von Galizien* in 1786. Notably sympathetic to the Jews of Galicia, he illustrated the inhumanity of the Polish nobles (a favorite Josephine theme) by describing their cruelty to the Jews. Kratter was also a dramatist and sometimes wrote his accounts of Galicia in dramatic form:

PRINCE: Hey, captain. [He comes.] Hang the Jew up in the next room.

CAPTAIN: Right away! [He seizes the Jew and drags him away.]

PRINCE: Servant, hey! Bring us some of my best tokay! Sit down, nobleman, drink with me! [They drink. Soon after.]

CAPTAIN: The Jew is hanging already!

PRINCE: Bravo!⁶

In the spirit of the Enlightenment Kratter regretted that “every private citizen, every society, every class, every nation, even the state itself permits inhumanity toward the Jews, without self-reproach,” and he acknowledged the Jews as “a whole fraternal class of humanity.”⁷ This fraternity was to be recognized in the new province of Galicia.

Kratter disapproved of Jewish leasing as a business that alienated Jews from the rest of society, and he therefore approved the Josephine restrictions as introducing a new normalization of the Jewish relation to the European economy:

6 [Franz Kratter], *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand von Galizien*, Leipzig 1786; rpt. Berlin 1990, Erster Theil, pp. 176–178; Larry Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia, History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture*, Stanford CA, 2010), pp. 20–32.

7 Kratter, *Briefe*, op. cit., Zweiter Theil, pp. 42–43

3 Grodziski, “The Jewish Question in Galicia,” op. cit., p. 68.

4 Grodziski, “The Jewish Question in Galicia,” op. cit., pp. 61–72; Häusler, *Das galizische Judentum*, op. cit., pp. 43–49.

5 Michael Silber, “From Tolerated Aliens to Citizen-Soldiers: Jewish Military Service in the Era of Joseph II,” [in:] Pieter Judson & Marsha Rozenblit, *Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe*, New York 2004, p. 25; Raphael Mahler, *Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment: Their Confrontation in Galicia and Poland in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century*, Philadelphia 1985, pp. 3–7.

All Galicia wishes to be placed in different relations with the Jews [...]. These general wishes have reached all the way up to the ears of the government, which now is ready to recast [umzuschmelzen] the whole Jewish system, because, after all, there is no Moses willing to take pity on his fellow Hebrews, free them from the yoke of despotism, and lead them into a promised land.⁸

It was the semi-feudal economy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth which seemed like “despotism” to Kratter, placing the Jews in an exploitative relation to society as middlemen (paying the nobles for leases and then trying to recoup the fees with payments from the peasants). Therefore, he hailed Josephine reform (which some called despotism) as the messianic invitation to a promised land of economic emancipation.

Kratter believed that the Josephine reforms would bring about “the complete recasting of the Jewish system,” but acknowledged that unenlightened Jews themselves were mistakenly responding with “panic-stricken terror” to Joseph’s measures. For Kratter the ultimate purpose of the reforms was to achieve some sort of emancipation: “Does the state owe any less to the Jew than to the Christian? The sun rises over one as it does over the other.”⁹ The sun was, of course, one of the great symbols of the Josephine Enlightenment, as invoked in the 1791 finale of Mozart’s *Die Zauberflöte*: “Die Strahlen der Sonne vertreiben die Nacht.” Kratter saw the transformation of Jewish life in Galicia as only a part of the messianic Josephine transformation of Galicia as a whole: “Das Ganze is seiner Umschmelzung nahe.”¹⁰

In another travelogue concerning Josephine Galicia, *Dreissig Briefe über Galizien*, published anonymously in 1787 by a Habsburg army officer, Alphons Heinrich Traunpaur, the author imagined himself as Robinson Crusoe exploring the “desert island” of Galicia and discovering, instead of the naked savage Friday, a black-robed Galician rabbi. The officer engaged the rabbi in dialogue:

ME: What do you say about the Emperor Joseph II?

RABBI: Ach! Sir, do you love him?

ME: Infinitely!

RABBI: And I adore him as much as you love him. He has been chosen by Providence and has been loaned to the world.

ME: How do you like the nation among whom you live?

RABBI: I recognize only two nations in the world: good people and bad people.

ME: Do you sincerely believe in the coming of the Messiah?

RABBI: My duty obliges me to believe.¹¹

The rabbi seemed to possess the enlightened wisdom of Gotthold Ephraim Lessing’s Nathan from the drama *Nathan der Weise*, and his declaration of love for Joseph II was all the more important in 1787, as Joseph’s reforms were becoming increasingly unpopular; that was also the year of the pamphlet “Warum wird Kaiser Joseph von seinem Volke nicht geliebt?” The supposed love of the Galician Jews for the Habsburg emperor, whose enlightenment offered them both emancipation and protection, was thus already articulated as one of the founding myths of Habsburg Galicia, and would achieve broad and profound resonance a century later during the long reign of Kaiser Franz Joseph.

Yet the Jews of Galicia were regarded as backward and Oriental, representing the aspects of the province that most required Josephine transformation and modernization. In 1790, after Joseph’s death in that year, the Habsburg official Ernst von Kortum published a defense of the Habsburg German bureaucrats and settlers in Galicia, seeing the German presence as the vanguard of modernization:

Imagine for a moment all the German inhabitants gone from Poland and Galicia, with their industriousness and business, and then imagine the image of those lands. Would one find any other counterpart except – Tartary, or at best Moldavia and Wallachia? Consider the Polish towns that once had, with their German inhabitants, a sort of prosperity, and would be now the sad residence of Jews, poverty, uncleanness, and ignorance.¹²

11 [Alphons Heinrich Traunpaur], *Dreissig Briefe über Galizien: oder Beobachtungen eines unpartheyischen Mannes, der sich mehr als nur ein paar Monate in diesem Königreiche umgesehen hat*, Vienna & Leipzig 1787; rpt. Berlin 1990), pp. 109–114.

12 [Ernst Traugott von Kortum], *Magna Charta von Galizien: oder Untersuchung der Beschwerden des Galizischen Adels pohlischer Nation über die österreichische Regierung*, Jassy 1790, pp. 205–206.

8 Ibidem, p. 42

9 Ibidem, p. 48.

10 Ibidem, “An den günstigen Leser”.

Kortum's peculiar thought experiment served to emphasize that the Jews represented precisely those aspects of Galician backwardness – pejoratively associated with poverty, uncleanness, and ignorance – that Josephine intervention had been seeking to transform. For that very reason, the mythological ideal of the economically modern, non-leasing, army-serving, German-educated, German-named, religiously enlightened Galician Jew metonymically represented the fantasized Josephine metamorphosis of the province as a whole.

Habsburg politics and Jewish emancipation in Galicia

In 1815, at the conclusion of the Napoleonic wars, Metternich reflected on the population of Galicia and suggested that Habsburg policy should be “not to make Poles into Germans all at once, but above all first to make true Galicians [ächte Gallizier zu machen].”¹³ Galicia itself had been created in the eighteenth century, and it was to be the work of the nineteenth century to create “Galicians” – a population that would identify with the province they inhabited. It had been the policy of enlightened education in the late eighteenth century to make Jews into Germans, but over the course of the nineteenth century there were many who became Galicians instead, identifying themselves with the province – as Galitzianer – more closely perhaps than any other part of the population. Yet Metternich, when he traveled to Galicia eight years later, in 1823, found the Jews to be an incongruous presence in the province and expressed himself in a letter to his wife with strong distaste: “The country is quite different from how I had imagined it. It is very beautiful and well cultivated. The entry into Galicia is very mountainous and resembles Upper Austria; then comes the plain, but it is varied, wooded, and very beautiful. What spoils the country [ce qui gâte le pays] is encountering Jews at every step. One sees only them, and they swarm [ils pullulent].”¹⁴ Like Kortum in 1790, Metternich one generation later still saw

the Jews of Galicia as emblems of the backwardness of the province, their “swarming” evocative of insect or animal life, suggestive of poverty, uncleanness, and ignorance.

In fact, the Metternich era witnessed an increasing polarization within the Jewish population of Galicia. The enlightened Jewish writer and educational reformer Josef Perl received an order of merit from Emperor Franz in 1821. Perl consulted with Metternich about establishing a “Society for the Spread of Useful Industry and Employment among the Jews of Galicia,” and composed a fierce literary satire in Hebrew – *Revealer of Secrets* [Megalleh Temirin] – representing Hasidism as superstitious fanaticism.¹⁵ In the 1830s Perl further denounced the Hasids of Tarnopol (his own hometown) to the Habsburg police, mentioning illegal assemblies, acts of violence in vandalizing the local synagogue, and even sexual misconduct. The police chief in Lemberg (today Lviv), Leopold von Sacher-Masoch (the father of the famous novelist), was himself suspicious of Hasidic indifference to Habsburg law. When Perl died in 1839 there were supposedly Hasids who danced on his grave.¹⁶

A Galician journal in 1842 published the reflections of an enlightened Jew from Rzeszów, Dr. Wilhelm Turteltaub, who had studied medicine in Vienna, and was now looking for progress in backward Galicia, expressing “the wish to see progress of the spirit and the heart also among the Jewish inhabitants of Galicia.”¹⁷ In 1844 it was considered a triumph of enlightened Jewish reform when Abraham Kohn became the rabbi of one of the principal synagogues in Lemberg, but in September 1848 the traditional Orthodox Jews of the community managed to have Kohn poisoned, purportedly by slipping arsenic into his soup.¹⁸

The revolutions of 1848 in the Habsburg Monarchy brought the promise of Jewish emancipation at the very

13 “Vortrag des Fürsten Metternich an Kaiser Franz über die Situation in Galizien,” 18 April 1815” [in:] Arthur Haas, *Metternich: Reorganization and Nationality, 1813–1818: A Story of Foresight and Frustration in the Rebuilding of the Austrian Empire*, Wiesbaden 1963, pp. 167–168; Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., pp. 79–81.

14 Metternich, letter of 25 September 1823 [in:] *Mémoires, documents, et écrits divers*, ed. Richard de Metternich, Part II (1816–1848), vol. IV, Paris 1881, p. 15.

15 Joseph Perl, *Revealer of Secrets*, trans. Dov Taylor, Boulder 1997, pp. xxv–xxxii; Michael Stanislawski, *A Murder in Lemberg: Politics, Religion, and Violence in Modern Jewish History*, Princeton 2007, pp. 16–17, 31–32; Israel Bartal & Antony Polonsky, “Introduction: The Jews of Galicia under the Habsburgs,” Polin, vol. XII, op. cit., pp. 12–13; Sinkoff, *Out of the Shtetl*, op. cit., pp. 25–40; Mahler, *Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment*, op. cit., pp. 121–148.

16 Mahler, *Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment*, op. cit., pp. 99–103, 134–135, 139–141, 144–145, 148.

17 Gertraud Marinelli-König, *Polen und Ruthenen in den Wiener Zeitschriften und Almanachen des Vormärz*, Vienna 1992, p. 95.

18 Stanislawski, *A Murder in Lemberg*, op. cit., pp. 74–75; Häusler, *Das galizische Judentum*, op. cit., pp. 76–78.

moment when the preeminence of Kohn seemed to promise an enlightened form of Judaism that could be integrated ecumenically into Lemberg society. His murder in September was a setback to that promise, while the revolution foundered, and emancipation itself was never confirmed by the new emperor, the eighteen-year-old Franz Joseph, who came to the throne in December. Full emancipation in the form of civic equality, without any particular restrictions for Jews, came with the liberal constitutional government of 1867 that accompanied the Austro-Hungarian compromise as conceded by Franz Joseph. Under the terms of that compromise Galicia became a part of Cisleithenia, the "Austrian" (as opposed to Hungarian) half of the monarchy, but a secondary compromise also created a system of Galician autonomy that was politically dominated by the conservative Polish gentry of the province.

The tensions and divisions within the Jewish population of Galicia did not diminish with emancipation; it greatly increased opportunities for integration and even assimilation, but these were enthusiastically embraced by some Galician Jews and emphatically rejected by others. It also permitted Jews to play a political role in the parliamentary life of the province by participating in elections to the Galician Sejm in Lemberg and the Cisleithanian Reichsrat in Vienna. With the expansion of the franchise over the next fifty years, leading to universal male suffrage in 1907, Jews sometimes held the balance between the roughly equivalent Polish and Ruthenian (or Ukrainian) parts of the Galician population. While this gave Galician Jews some political leverage, the triangular situation was also dangerously conducive to the emergence of political anti-Semitism, which aggravated traditional forms of religious prejudice in the province. The Polish priest Stanisław Stojalowski was particularly provocative in deploying anti-Semitism to mobilize the Galician peasants in the cause of Polish national politics.

The Cisleithanian context, which elevated language and nationality to crucial political issues, with constitutional protection for collective national rights established in article 19 of the constitutional law of 1867, also provoked the question of whether the Jews themselves constituted a nationality entitled to such collective protection. Since nationality was determined by language, and Yiddish was not a recognized choice in the Habsburg decennial population census, Jews often chose Polish, which helped to construct the fiction of a Polish majority in Galicia. There

was, in fact, a Polish Jewish journal, *Ojczyzna* (Fatherland), which advocated the cause of Polish cultural assimilation among Galician Jews in the 1880s. In a political system fundamentally characterized by national political competition, the Jews of Galicia inevitably took a particular interest in Jewish nationalism. In the early twentieth century many were interested in Zionism, focused on Palestine, but others pursued a specifically Habsburg agenda of seeking to practice Jewish national politics within the multinational framework of the monarchy.¹⁹ Furthermore, because Galician Jews were not able to constitute themselves officially as a Habsburg nationality, they came to cultivate a particularly reverential and semi-mythological form of loyalty to the Emperor Franz Joseph as the transnational protector of the rights of his many peoples, including the Jews.

Galician Jewish identity

In the highly nationalizing context of Habsburg politics, Jewish Galicians came to think of themselves, in spite of their internal cultural divisions, as possessing a Galitzianer cultural identity, distinct from other Jewish populations. The advent of emancipation, constitutional government, political elections, and Galician autonomy in the 1860s led to wide-ranging reflections in the 1870s upon the nature of Galician Jewishness, articulated both within the Galician Jewish community and from outside. The publication in 1874 in Vienna of the memoirs of a "former Hasid," *Der Weg meines Lebens: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Chassiden*, by Josef Ehrlich, summed up the polarization between religious traditionalism and modern enlightenment by emphasizing that they could be contained within the same individual life history. Ehrlich, who came from the majority-Jewish town of Brody on the Habsburg-Russian border, was among the first to pronounce publicly on the distinctive culture of Galician Jews as compared to Russian Jews. He remembered himself, even as a child, declaring: "I don't like Russia, for this reason, because the pronunciation of Russian Jews disgusts me ['weil mich die Aussprache der russischen Juden anwidert'], whenever I hear them speak;

19 Joshua Shanes, "Neither Germans nor Poles: Jewish Nationalism in Galicia before Herzl, 1883–1897," *Austrian History Yearbook*, XXXIV (2003), pp. 205–209; Ezra Mendelsohn, "Jewish Assimilation in L'viv: The Case of Wilhelm Feldman," [in:] *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia*, eds. Andrei Markovits & Frank Sysyn, Cambridge 1982, pp. 94–110.

always 'e' instead of 'ei' – they just cannot say 'ei.'" With anthropological precision Ehrlich transliterated the Galician pronunciation of "Umein" for "Amen."²⁰ In fact, with the coming of emancipation there were no longer any residence restrictions on Habsburg Jews, and Galician Jews therefore spread out over the monarchy and became familiar figures with their unusual customs and pronunciations. Within a generation Galician Jews in Vienna often became fully Germanized and would then regard with existential alienation and snobbish condescension the next wave of Galician Jews arriving in the capital.

The writer Karl Emil Franzos came from the town of Chortkiv in eastern Galicia, but received a German education in Chernivtsi and Vienna, and wrote fiction about his hometown – which he viewed from an enlightened perspective that highlighted the peculiar backwardness of the Galician Jews. He summed up Galicia and the domain of the Galician Jews as *Halb-Asien*, the title of his collection of stories in 1876. This demi-Orientalism, which framed the formulation of "Half-Asia," was all the more potent inasmuch as Franzos exoticized the world of his own childhood, which was likewise the childhood of many traditional Galician Jews who grew up to become modern Cisleithanian citizens. Another writer, not himself Jewish, who brought Galician Jews to the attention of Europe was Leopold von Sacher-Masoch Junior (the son of the Lemberg police chief), whose fictions and memoirs very often took place on Galician soil, inhabited by exotic Galician Jews who seemed alien to European civilization. Sacher-Masoch depicted Hasidic rabbis presiding over their courts as if they were Oriental pashas.²¹ Some of this sense of Oriental fantasy would later be channeled into the rhetoric and imagery of Galician Zionism, with the Habsburg urbanite Theodor Herzl envisioned as a sort of Hebrew prince reigning over his primitive Jewish subjects from Galicia.

In 1876, the same year as Franzos's *Halb-Asien*, a pair of Polish anthropologists, Józef Majer and Izydor Kopernicki, published in Cracow their *Physical Characteristics of the Population of Galicia*, based on racial measurements of Polish, Ruthenian, and Jewish recruits as they entered the Habsburg army: height, chest circumference, color of

skin and eyes, color and quality of hair, and formation of skull, face, and nose were all recorded. The conclusions of this ostensibly "scientific" study, carried out in the spirit of early racial science, emphasized that while Poles and Ruthenians had much in common, the Galician Jews were fundamentally distinctive and, furthermore, alien to the land of Galicia.

The population of this third nationality in Galicia, not native but immigrant [nie rodzima lecz napływowa], and of a completely different breed [całkiem odmiennego szczepu], is an interesting and scientifically important subject of research precisely on account of its own distinctiveness. . . for in spite of its many centuries of existence in our country, this people, living in villages and small towns – those we dealt with exclusively in our research – did not grow from the earth, so as to be able to distinguish themselves by any stamp of the locality [...]²²

In the Habsburg political context, with different groups staking national claims to the crown lands of Cisleithenia – Ruthenians to eastern Galicia and Poles to the province as a whole – there were naturally political implications to the anthropological assertion that Galician Jews had no authentic relation to Galicia, and did not "grow from the earth." Ivan Franko's Ukrainian 1878 novella *Boa Constrictor* presented a harshly negative view of a Jewish magnate in the Galician oil industry who on the one hand did feel a sense of local attachment to his native Galician landscape, but on the other hand was bitterly alienated from himself by the exploitative economic role he had assumed.

The idea of Jews as aliens within Galicia encouraged national movements, both Polish and Ukrainian, to cultivate their own sense of national solidarity by stoking political anti-Semitism, which defined the national self with hostile reference to an outsider group. Habsburg law, however, curbed violent anti-Semitism, and the most extensive pogroms in Galician history, carried out in Polish-speaking western Galicia in 1898, resulted in much destruction of property, but significantly less violence to persons, and were met by the government with martial law, approximately three thousand arrests, and around a thousand

20 Josef Ehrlich, *Der Weg meines Lebens: Erinnerungen eines ehemaligen Chassiden*, Vienna 1874, p. 30.

21 Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, *A Light for Others: And Other Jewish Tales from Galicia*, ed. Michael O'Pecko, Riverside 1994, pp. 6–7.

22 Józef Majer & Izydor Kopernicki, *Charakterystyka Fizyczna Ludności Galicyjskiej*, Kraków 1876, pp. 15, 36–38; Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., pp. 236–239.

prosecutions.²³ The protective structure of Habsburg law, taken together with the general Jewish conviction that Franz Joseph was an impartial arbiter who viewed his Jewish subjects beneficently, was, in some sense, vindicated at the moment of the collapse of the monarchy in November 1918. The ensuing civil war between Poles and Ukrainians in Lemberg, in which the Poles were victorious, led immediately to a pogrom against the city's Jews, in which perhaps as many as a hundred were killed, a more deadly episode for Galician Jews than any in the whole history of Galicia.²⁴

Galician Jewish appreciation of Franz Joseph was cultivated with mythological intensity, such that it became the subject in 1903 of an article on folklore in the Viennese journal *Zeitschrift für österreichische Volkskunde*, which described the emperor as an "almost legendary figure" in the "fantasy of the Jewish people." One story concerned the emperor's encounter with the Hebrew prophet Elijah, who offered Franz Joseph special protection in recognition of his magnanimity. Another story concerned Galician Jews in the Habsburg army, and told of the emperor himself stepping in to replace a Jewish soldier who had left his guard station to pray during Yom Kippur. Later the soldier was summarily condemned to death for abandoning his watch, and was saying his final prayers before the execution: "Suddenly the emperor appeared, riding up on a horse, and laid his hand on the soldier's head. And no-one whom the emperor has touched may be executed. So the soldier's life was spared, but from that time on, the emperor commanded that all Jewish soldiers be given leave on Yom Kippur."²⁵ Such tales suggested that the emperor

was imagined as having a personal relation to his Jewish subjects, and indeed, like all his subjects, they were entitled to seek audiences with him in Vienna during the hours that were set apart for receiving petitions from his subjects. Such audiences inevitably produced new legends of imperial beneficence.

Indeed, this special relationship with the emperor partly defined what it meant to be a Galician Jew, and this emerged strongly in post-Galician literature. The Galician Jew Bruno Schulz, from Drohobych, writing in Polish, described in the story "Spring" ["Wiosna"] (1937) a boy's fascination with the image of the emperor: "The world at that time was circumscribed by Franz Joseph I. On each stamp, on every coin, and on every postmark his likeness confirmed its stability."²⁶ The Galician Jew Joseph Roth, from Brody, writing in German, narrated in his novel *The Radetzky March* (1932) the Jewish homage paid to the emperor when he visited Galicia: "The patriarch stopped three paces from the emperor. In his arms he bore a purple Torah scroll decorated with a gold crown, its little bells softly jingling. Then the Jew lifted the Torah scroll toward the emperor. And his widely bearded, toothless mouth gabbled in an incomprehensible language the blessing which Jews utter in the presence of an emperor. When one of the Habsburg officers at the emperor's side commented, 'I couldn't make out a word that Jew was saying,' Franz Joseph responded reprovingly, 'He was speaking only to me.'"²⁷ Such fictions preserved the special relation between the emperor and the Galician Jews beyond the existence of Galicia itself, and, in fact, elderly Galician Jews in America in the second half of the twentieth century, fifty years after the emperor's death, could still be heard pronouncing their appreciation of Franz Joseph.

In 1888 the Polish economist Stanisław Szczepanowski published *Nędza Galicji* (The Misery of Galicia), which statistically quantified the extreme poverty of Galicia, and during the following decades there was a massive wave of poverty-driven emigration of Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews from the province, often to the United States and Canada. Perhaps as many as a third of a million Jews left Galicia (the total population of Galician Jews was 872,000 according

23 Piotr Wróbel, "The Jews of Galicia under Austrian-Polish Rule, 1869–1918," *Austrian History Yearbook*, vol. XXV (1994), pp. 130–131; Daniel Unowsky, *The Pomp and Politics of Patriotism: Imperial Celebrations in Habsburg Austria 1848–1916*, West Lafayette 2005, p. 177; Keely Stauter-Halsted, "Jews as Middleman Minorities in Rural Poland: Understanding the Galician Pogroms of 1898," [in:] *Antisemitism and its Opponents in Modern Poland*, ed. Robert Blobaum, Ithaca 2005, pp. 39–59; Frank Golczewski, "Rural anti-semitism in Galicia before World War I," [in:] *The Jews in Poland*, eds. Chimen Abramsky, Maciej Jachimczyk, & Antony Polonsky, Oxford 1986, pp. 97–105; Frank Golczewski, *Polnisch-jüdische Beziehungen 1881–1922: Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Antisemitismus in Osteuropa*, Wiesbaden 1981, pp. 60–84.

24 William Hagen, "The Moral Economy of Popular Violence: The Pogrom in Lwów, November 1918," [in:] *Antisemitism and its Opponents*, op. cit., pp. 124–147.

25 Benjamin Segel, "Zwei jüdische Volkssagen über Kaiser Franz Josef," *Zeitschrift für österreichische Volkskunde*, IX. Jahrgang 1903 (Vienna), pp. 124–125; Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., pp. 319–324.

26 Bruno Schulz, "Spring," [in:] *The Fictions of Bruno Schulz: The Street of Crocodiles & Sanatorium under the Sign of the Hourglass*, trans. Celina Wieniewska, London 1988, pp. 158–159.

27 Joseph Roth, *The Radetzky March*, trans. Eva Tucker, Woodstock 1974, pp. 215–216.

to the census of 1910), and these emigrants paradoxically developed a particularly powerful sense of Galician identity after they left the province. In New York City (or any other American city with a large immigrant population), every Galician Jew encountered Jews from elsewhere, and the cultural communities of the Galitzianer and the Litvak (from Lithuania, in the Russian empire) defined themselves according to a perceived reciprocal opposition in their customs, character, piety, and, of course, Yiddish pronunciation. The Galicians formed hometown associations in America, and these associations joined together under the umbrella of the United Jewish Galician Societies.²⁸ Galician Jewish identity was similarly consolidated in Mandate Palestine and independent Israel.

Within the Habsburg Monarchy Galician Jews often appeared in stark contrast to the metropolitan Jews of Vienna. This contrast partly recapitulated the difference between enlightened Jews and traditional Jews within Galicia, and the gulf could be bridged within a generation by those Galician Jews who moved to Vienna and became metropolitan. When Gustav Mahler traveled to Lemberg in 1903 for a conducting engagement, he reacted with something like horror to the Galician Jews – “who run around

here like dogs elsewhere.” He exclaimed: “My God! So I am supposed to be related to these people!”²⁹ Though he himself had already converted to Catholicism, Mahler still recoiled at the possibility of any relation to the Galician Jews. The Viennese Jewish humanitarian Bertha Pappenheim, who traveled to Galicia in 1903 to investigate Jewish poverty, struck a more sympathetic tone in her report, but could not conceal some degree of bourgeois distaste for the “negative moral and hygienic conditions” of Galician Jewish life.³⁰ In fact, her commitment to philanthropic reform in Galicia at the birth of the twentieth century echoed, in part, the messianic Josephine mission to transform the Galician Jews in the late eighteenth century, a mission that dated back to the creation of Galicia itself. In the early twentieth century the Viennese Jew Martin Buber revisited the province of his Lemberg grandparents and in 1908 published the *Legend of the Baal-Shem*, paying literary tribute to traditional Hasidism, and attempting to embrace the contradictions and oppositions that defined the whole history of the Galician Jews.

28 Daniel Soyer, *Jewish Immigrant Associations and American Identity in New York, 1880–1939*, Cambridge 1997, pp. 51–53, 147–148; Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., pp. 401–404.

29 Henry-Louis de la Grange, *Gustav Mahler*, vol. 2, *Vienna: The Years of Challenge, 1897–1904*, Oxford 1995, pp. 598–602.

30 Bertha Pappenheim, “Zur Lage der jüdischen Bevölkerung in Galizien: Reiseeindrücke und Vorschläge zur Besserung der Verhältnisse” (1904), [in:] *Sisyphus: Gegen den Mädchenhandel – Galizien*, ed. Helga Heubach, Freiburg 1992, p. 64.

On Galician myths

Krzysztof Zamorski

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It has long been known that the historical myth is a particular form of “parallel knowledge” about the past, which coexists with critical knowledge. Jerzy Topolski, a recognised methodologist of history, defined the historical myth as a type of legacy knowledge that can hardly be subjected to verification. The historian may only wonder how the historical myth does exist, and why, in the face of the obvious resulting from the reading of historical sources, it has such influence on narratives about the past. In the arsenal of historical myths, the myth of Galicia assumes one of the more important places, and is alive and kicking. It sparkles with variety and richness of colour, dazzling the actual greyness and sadness of the 19th-century one-time province of a one-time empire into obscurity. It is curious that the myth of Galicia still persists, and even assumes ever new and more decorative robes. Therefore, like any myth, the myth of Galicia, too, is a living phenomenon, although a counterfactual one. Counterfactual? An example, perhaps? Here you are, the first one to hand.

While writing these words I learnt about an invitation from the Chair of 20th- and 21st-Century Literature at the Faculty of Polish Studies at the University of Warsaw to a scientific session organised from 6th to 8th June 2014 as part of the Austrian Culture Forum in Warsaw. The title of the session is purely mythically Galician: *Galicyjska polifonia. Miejsca i głosy* (literally: Galician polyphony. Places and voices). There is more than the title to fascinate us in the invitation to the conference; its organisers claim that “Galicia is [my emphasis – KZ] one of the multicultural,

multi-ethnic, and multidenominational regions in Europe.” And obviously it is not the Spanish Galicia that is meant here but ours. It was with something of a grudge that I thought at that point of all my “Galician” geography teachers in “Galician” schools, from the days of the rightly deceased People’s Republic to the still very much alive Third Republic of Poland, and even of the authors of contemporary maps. However hard pressed you are, you will not find a region called “Galicia” on them. I went further: I took a popular map of contemporary Poland, held it up against the light, and looked from the perspective of the former Congress Kingdom, or to be more precise – from the point that is marked “Warsaw” on it and... I never noticed any region by the name of Galicia! So does Galicia exist or not?

I calmed down slightly when I remembered the advice given to me by an especially respected member of my family, a judge in a county court in a once extremely Galician small town, a graduate in law from the University of John Casimir in the period that we find so fascinating here. In 1971, well over 50 years after Galicia had disappeared from the maps of the world, I said farewell to a former Galician village to go to study in the Royal Capital City of Kraków. The project seemed serious and called for reflection. Eager to help me, my much lamented grandmother took advantage of one of the visits of her learned brother to ask him what I should most avoid in that city. Gramps, already a hoary sage at the time, considered things for a while before uttering the memorable words: “Child, you should distrust the Congress Kingdomers most!” If a member of

my grandparents' generation could divide the world into Congress Kingdomers and Galicianers in the latter half of the 20th century, why should the latter not take revenge and re-establish Galicia in the second decade of the 21st century? It was not always so in the past. After all, Orgelbrand's *Encyklopedia* approaches the question of Galicia's being or nonbeing thus: "The existence of that kingdom [of Galicia and Lodomeria – K.Z.] is diplomatic, and its name based on misinterpreted historical premises."¹

What, then, is really the issue with the being or non-being of Galicia? The issue, obviously, is its chronotope. Yes, there exists such a chronotope, this space-time representation of ours is alive; it returns and emerges in the form of values assigned to it, discovered in it, or denied it today. The mythical quality of our spatial representations is culturally important, it dynamises the image of the world, helps to understand it somehow, and is the past perceived "as if": as if it really existed. At the same time, this chronotope is a myth inasmuch as it draws in everything that is absolutely unreal historically, and attaches itself to our present, trying to explain it. As if it wanted to tell us something about our reality through fiction and pure fantasy. Sometimes it does so imperfectly, hurriedly, and perfunctorily, becoming – in line with the principles of our mass culture – a news hunter favouring stereotypes and virtualising the past. Sometimes, it hits the bull's eye. For it does happen that a chronotope based on the foundations of deep culture discovers the depth of past human experience and may become a source of specific insight. Can the chronotope of Galicia operate in this way?

As a historian I am tormented and horrified by the "as if" and the "some kind of" understanding in all of this. Galicia "exists" as if it were not a proof of the calamities that befell our country. As if it were not simply the Austrian Partition. A century after Poland regained its independence, Galician nostalgia inspires both a smile and horror. When the clerks of Empress Maria Theresa wrote the famous *Wywód poprzedzający praw korony Węgierskiej do Rusi Czerwonej i do Podola tak jako Korony Czeskiej do Księstw Oświęcimskiego i Zatorskiego* (literally: The argument deducting the rights of the Hungarian Crown to Red Ruthenia and to Podolia, and likewise of the Bohemian Crown to the duchies of Oświęcim and Zator), issued in Vienna in 1772, in the printing house of Johann Thomas de Prattern,

the printer and "bibliopolis" of the court, they could not even imagine that the term Galicia (actually: the Duchy of Halych) and Lodomeria (actually: the Duchy of Vladimir), so useful in their time, would live on for centuries solely as a chronotope. Once pearls in the crown of Maria Theresa, as the heiress to the Crown of St Stephen, that were to reinforce the traditional claims of that Crown to the heritage of the 13th-century realm of Daniel of Galicia, they have lost the real significance originally assigned to them with such great assiduity. As a chronotope, Galicia would, however, erase from the historical memory the fact that it was an absolutely artificial construct at the moment of its creation, one which broke the cultural and economic bonds of the traditional Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lands of which it was built: parts of Małopolska, Red Ruthenia, and Podolia. Moreover, the chronotope obliterates the fact that from the very beginning the official name of the province accounted for the Duchies of Oświęcim and Zator, and – since 1846 – also for the Grand Duchy of Kraków, a construct as artificial as Galicia itself.

One might say that, well, the years of Austrian rule made it possible for us to perceive Galicia as a certain whole, as a uniform historical territory. Yet another myth. We can certainly refer to it as to a historical territory, yet not one that is a whole, or internally coherent. The Galician tradition clearly distinguished Eastern and Western Galicia already after the Congress of Vienna of 1815. In a sense, this found legal reflection in the act of 1861, which introduced the administrative precincts of Kraków and Lemberg (Lviv). In practice, however, the efforts of Ukrainians to make this division more extensive and permanent in the sense of an administrative division met with capable Polish counteraction. Yet a formal division is not the same as the actual distinction existing in the mindset of our grandparents.

The division of Galicia into eastern and western is one of the symbolic examples of the plethora of differences reigning supreme in the historical Galicia. Today, these differences are being obliterated by the myth of the cultural polyphony of Galicia. The search for "a foreign land" where various voices resounded in polyphonic harmony akin to the fugues of Johann Sebastian, and various nationalities coexisted still continues. What we actually had was a territory abundant with peoples, denominations, and traditions. It is true that each of them found room for development, the more so as the days of Galicia occurred at a time of dynamic development of the new concept of

1 Orgelbrand M., *Encyklopedia powszechna*, Warszawa 1862, vol. 9, p. 514.

the nation. Yet any conception of consonance, polyphony or primordial model of the European Union must, however, be discarded this instant. What must actually be heard in Galicia is a cacophony of traditions, intentions, and ambitions. What must be perceived is a sea of mutual accusations, more or less justified. This is a territory where Ukrainians and Poles despised each other. For a Pole, a Ukrainian was in most cases, to use parliamentary words, a Ruthenian *sine* refinement, and for a Ukrainian a Pole was “a Polish lord”. Poles were not overfond of Ruthenians nor Ukrainians of Poles; both detested Jews, who repaid them with the same. Growing nationalisms and increasing anti-Semitism were quite efficient in pushing Jews out of Galicia: they emigrated to Vienna, where anti-Semitism was at least as high, so they escaped further across the pond (or “the Great Water”, as they saw it). We do not actually know the share of Galician Jews in the wave of emigration that took approximately eight hundred thousand people from Galicia to the United States.

It must also be remembered that Galicia lived not only on these conflicts. Despite the immense work of the throngs of Galician intelligentsia at the grassroots, the exercise of filling in the trench of hatred dividing the world of rural Galicia from that of Galician landowners failed. The society itself was unbelievably varied. The descendants of great Polish dynasties, related to the most eminent houses of the Empire and Europe, rubbed shoulders with an army of Galician barons. The modest number of wealthier Jews drowned among the throngs of Jewish traders who found it most difficult to make ends meet. Rich peasants, for such there were in Galicia, had as neighbours “farmers” who could barely survive each pre-harvest, and fought literally to the death for each lump of soil and baulk between the strips of land. Cities and the bourgeois were slowly moving up the scale of social prestige, hordes of servants sought urban employment with the army of government officials. Physical labourers were in short supply. In a sense, this flavour is well rendered by the humorous words of Kazimierz Bartoszewicz in his *Słownik prawdy i zdrowego rozsądku* (literally: Dictionary of truth and common sense) published in Warsaw in 1905:

Galicia – a part of the Earth discovered 130 years ago, inhabited chiefly by exiles from Jerusalem, and the wild tribes of Stańczyks, Democrats, and Stojałowczyks. In professional terms, the population of Galicia falls into

aficionados of art (over 5,000), insurance agents (7,500), cyclists (25,000), doctors (around 50,000), presidents and directors (around 100,000), governors, counsellors, and superintendents (1,106,315), illiterates (2,000,000) and hungry mouths (3,000,000).

It is quite symptomatic that even in jest, Bartoszewicz did not deign to notice Ruthenians as inhabitants of the land. Nevertheless, he touched on a problem that is connected with the fundamental myth of Galicia, namely Galician poverty.

The term “fundamental myth” was introduced into the theory of history by Jerzy Topolski, in a reference to Paul Ricœur’s notion of “fundamental metaphor”. It is a myth that is deeply entrenched in the layer that controls the representation of history. Topolski reserved it for fundamental notions and/or metaphors defining the dynamics of represented history, e.g. the myth of revolution or evolution, yet he also accepted its presence in the form of theoretical myths deeply rooted in the culture of the scientist. “Poverty” seems to have been permanently attached to Galicia already in Austrian days. This is visible for example in Bartoszewicz’s facetious definition quoted above. One can only wonder today how it is that this is still the most powerful of the Galician myths. As it was and still is influenced by a range of factors, let’s touch on just a handful of them.

The first is a part of a greater whole, and concerns not only the Galicia operating to this day efficiently in our mentality, and in the Polish vision of the world and the human. Here, in a period of rapid and powerful modernisation so typical for the 19th century, the noble self-satisfaction from the days of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania was being displaced by the strata who realised how great the civilisational distance between our lands and the Western part of the continent was. On the other hand, the common people of Galicia too had a greater opportunity to see and compare the standard of life in other parts of the monarchy. Moreover, as they gained, albeit slowly, political and civil rights, together with their growing participation in social life and culture, the people were enriching the undersoil of our mentality with that peasant aversion to counting their chickens before they hatch, so well-known to historians from old Polish supplications, with the peasant sense of inherent eternal misfortune and equally inherent eternal injury. By the way, it is hard to resist the feeling that we have been left with these to this day. After all, it is our general

belief that any Pole satisfied with his life is a weirdo, if not to be suspected of a certain condition that in the days of Galicia was treated in Kulparków in Eastern Galicia, and somewhat later in Kobierzyn in Western Galicia.

An exceptional role (it must be strongly emphasised that not the only one, though a unique one indeed) in giving this myth its wings was played by a man acting in good faith and brimming with the best of intentions: Stanisław Szczepanowski. As he rightly defined himself, “an industrialist, that is: a representative of a stratum that as yet hardly exists in Galicia; one that is yet to emerge”. In 1888, immediately after becoming a member of the Parliament in Vienna, he published his programme in Lemberg, in the form of a political pamphlet with the highly suggestive title *Nędza Galicji w cyfrach. Program energicznego rozwoju gospodarstwa krajowego* (literally: Galicia’s poverty in numbers. A programme for the energetic development of the national economy). Hardly anyone remembers today that this was not a scientific treatise, and that the fervour of political and patriotic activism dazzles those browsing through its pages. Yet a number of claims supported by numerical data have clung stubbornly to the history of Galicia. For one, the fantastical number, nowhere corroborated, that there were fifty thousand people dying of starvation in Galicia every year, or the famous claim that “every Galician works for a quarter and eats for a half of a human”. The evaluations and polemical voices from the period proving that precisely in those years work at the grassroots was beginning to bear its first fruits in Galicia were to no avail. Even today historians, who by no means claim that Galicia was a land flowing with milk and honey, though they try to prove a clear civilisational change visible in the land in the days of Galician autonomy, find it hard to break through to public opinion with their findings. A change that – by means of a paradox – was in part also a result of the work of Szczepanowski himself. Galicia was indeed one of the poorest provinces of the Habsburg Monarchy. Galicians’ standard of living was far inferior to that of the Poles in the Prussian Partition, and the level of industrialisation diverged significantly from what was happening in Łódź or in Warsaw. Yet, “spots of industrialisation” aside, the average citizen of the Congress Kingdom did not actually live better than their Galician counterpart. In this sense, the work of modernising Galicia, visible at least in the vigorous expansion of Lemberg and Kraków, and in the development of the foundations of a railway

infrastructure and a decent network of schools at all levels – was entirely nullified by the myth.

One might say that the myth of Galician poverty as presented by Szczepanowski results in a sense from another equally Galician myth: the myth of the Polish Piedmont, of which the author of *Galicia’s poverty* was an ardent supporter, making repeated references to it. He believed that on this scrap of Polish land he and his like would succeed in restoring the bygone splendour of Poland, and that Galicia would play the same role in the unification of the country as Piedmont did in the case of Italy. Brought up in the spirit of apologetics for the Constitution of 3rd May, he would not even admit the thought that the Kingdom of Poland could not develop better than any of the other Polish lands. Hence his lack of trust in Galician achievements. Incidentally, nobody at the time realised that the memorable Act of 3rd May had no time to function in practice or make any impact on everyday life. It entered the pantheon of national myths, and from there it has radiated with energy to this day.

Today’s historians eagerly return to the myth of Galicia as Piedmont, especially as Galicia was to be the Piedmont not only for us Poles but also for the Ukrainians. To us, this is the Galician myth that has found a path for itself in reality. On the whole, Galicia in the period of autonomy, after 1867, proved to be a melting pot from which much of the Polish legal system developed; the Galician act on municipal self-government played an important role in the revival of local and regional authorities in the Third Republic of Poland, and experience of Galician politicians gained in the Parliament in Vienna had an influence on the Polish political system of the Second Republic. The army of Galician clerks, the army of teachers so harshly criticised by the industrialist Szczepanowski, became useful in liberated Poland. The Jagiellonian University, the University of John Casimir in Lemberg/Lwów, the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (PAU), the Academy of Mining and Metallurgy in Kraków (today: AGH University of Science and Technology), Lemberg Technical University, the Agricultural Academy in Dublany, and the Galician system of specialist medical care provided the experience without which the civilisational success of the Second Republic of Poland would probably have been impossible.

The Ukrainians’ story took a different route, even though in a sense the myth of the Ukrainian Piedmont has not lost its relevance and fulfils a certain role in the process of

building the national identity of the Ukrainians, in Galicia generally referred to as Ruthenians. Galicia played a vast role in the development of Ukrainian national awareness, yet it was not the only centre of its formation. At the time, it developed in opposition to the dominant Polish element. The history of national movements in Galicia played and will play an important role in the understanding of nation-forming processes in today's Ukraine, yet our eastern neighbours should be warned against belief in the myth of Galicia. They should deconstruct that myth at the nearest opportunity. For the Ukraine of the early 21st century already has 20 years of contemporary experience of operation of the state to draw on, and in its current dramatic moments it needs profound analysis of contemporary experiences rather than the Galician myth. Yet this is an absolutely different matter, it is a question of the relationship between the historical myth and the critical knowledge of the past.

There is one more realm currently influenced by the myth of Galicia that should be mentioned in conclusion. One might jokingly say that this dimension of the existence of the myth came to the fore at the moment of the decomposition of the Soviet system, when portraits of the Most Serene Franz Joseph I began to appear in Kraków cafés. At the time they were there to show and emphasise the difference between private points of reference and official civilisational traditions. They spoke proudly that once this was Europe... When we regained freedom, and when the free market took over the economy, Franz Josef and with his royal person the name "Galicia" were appreciated as decent marketing tools. When the Polish word *sklep* was replaced by "market" (or by "shop" Polonised as *szop*) and *restauracje* and *jadłodajnie* transformed into "restaurants",

the consumerist version of the myth ended in the addition of the word "Galician" to the latter. Moreover, in the commercial, not to say vulgar version of the myth of Galicia and the Good Emperor, the latter certainly once current among the common people of Galicia, it melded itself with a more or less accurate and often nuanced assimilation of Hašek's Good Soldier Švejk. And this orderly of Lieutenant Lukáš, the most famous of the global army of orderlies, dressed the mythical tale of Galicia up as comedy. Hayden White, a great contemporary theoretician of history, was absolutely right to mention comedy side by side with the novel, tragedy, and satire among the principal styles of historical writing. After all, this is how we discuss history.

Thus, the historical myth is a type of parallel knowledge about the past, important knowledge, as it remains within the realm of our first reflection about the bygone world, in a way parallel to critical reflection – original reflection, in which historical memory, stereotype, yes, and myth, and exultation and nostalgia assume a prominent place. In reference to the myth, the historian may assume, as Jerzy Topolski remarked, one of three attitudes. He can reject the myth and make the fight against mythical knowledge the focus of all his energy. Alternatively, he may recognise the futility of that struggle and treat the myth as a cultural phenomenon, as an element of delivering and sharing the experience of the past, and analyse it. And, finally he can rehash the myth. Above, I have tried my hand at the second, analytical approach. Nevertheless, I did so with the deepest trivial and subversive conviction that Galicia was "one of the multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multidenominational regions in Europe".

Translated from the Polish by Piotr Krasnowolski

Reinventing Galicia

Mykola Riabchuk

Kyiv

A simple glance at the Google references to the word “Galicia” reveals nearly 700,000 entries for *Galicja* in Polish and *Галичина* in Ukrainian, and three times fewer for *Galizien* in German – even despite the fact that the German web is generally richer than the Polish, let alone the Ukrainian. These findings roughly reflect the topicality of the term in different national discourses – relatively high, if asymmetrical, in the Ukrainian and Polish, and rather low, though still significant, in the German/Austrian.

Galicia was invented by Austrians, appropriated by Poles, and reinvented and ultimately re-appropriated by Ukrainians. For all these reasons the history of Galicia is “the history of a place as an idea, as a cultural accumulation of meanings,”¹ something that ultimately emerged as the interaction of different discourses, of which the youngest and weakest paradoxically emerged the winner. One may easily attribute this victory to the external political forces that changed radically all the discursive field – either those that after the First World War stamped out the Habsburg empire, or those that after the Second World War replaced Polish dominance in Eastern Galicia with Soviet. But the problem can also be seen from a different angle. Neither the Austrian nor the Polish myths of Galicia appeared vital enough to withstand the political changes – changes that were harmful to the Ukrainian myth as well, at least in

the aftermath of the First World War but also, with some ambiguity, after the Second World War.

The vitality of all three “Galician” myths depended therefore not only on external factors but also on the internal qualities of those myths, on certain of their strong and weak points. We shall try to examine them in more detail in the three successive parts of the essay.

Imperial “mission civilisatrice”

The piece of land that was eventually designated the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria under the Habsburg crown was incorporated into the Habsburg Empire in 1772, after the first partition of Poland. Its name was a reference to the medieval Principality of Galicia-Volhynia (Lat. *Galicia et Lodomeria*) that once upon a time, in the twelfth century, was under Hungarian auspices. In 1795, after the third (and last) partition of Poland, the Habsburgs acquired one more piece of land, which was this time simply tacked onto the Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria without any attempt at historical legitimization and in fact without any history of the application of the name Galicia to that land. The Age of Enlightenment ushered in a new mode of legitimization of dubious territorial acquisitions – something that had been applied for centuries by colonial powers in “barbarian” lands of Asia, Africa, and America.

The myth of Galicia elaborated by the Austrians was a typical Enlightenment myth of the superiority and civilizing mission of the West vis-à-vis wild, backward, poor Eastern lands. Larry Wolff provides a detailed analysis

¹ Larry Wolff, “Kennst du das Land? The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and Fredro”, *Slavic Review*, vol. 67, no. 2 (Summer 2008), p. 279.

of this myth in his illuminating books *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (1994) and, especially, *The Idea of Galicia. History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture* (2010). He bases his study on multiple sources that include letters, diaries, travelogues, newspaper articles, books, and theater productions. In most of these sources, truthful accounts of local life are whimsically juxtaposed with various anecdotes, sometimes absolutely incredible but presented as real, like, for example, the recurring story about a landlord who forced a Jew to climb a tree and shot him down just for fun, or the apocryph about the emperor who got stuck with six horses in a deep morass of excrement in the middle of Lemberg.

Polish landlords were the main targets of the scathing reports, probably for two reasons. First, they represented the upper, presumably most educated and cultured stratum of the local society. The savagery of the lower classes could therefore be imagined on even a greater scale. And second, the Polish nobility, with its proverbial “unruly, anarchic spirit”, was reasonably perceived as the main, if not only competitor of the German newcomers in the province and a potential (at least) challenger to the imperial dominance. Other groups, too, however, were not spared their share of blame, systemic “othering” and deprecation.

Predictably, the authors of such texts contended that “in German monasteries even the pigsties were customarily cleaner than the kitchens and refectories here”; the Uniate ritual was just a “low comic burlesque”; and local peasants seemed to possess “no more than human form and physical life”. The huge number of Jews in Galicia was presented just as another sign of its oriental, uncivilized character that had to be fixed by enlightenment. Assimilation, promotion of hygiene, and German-language education were to make the inhabitants of the province more familiar with a civilized way of life – “less coarse, less given to drink and idleness”.²

In sum, as Larry Wolff aptly notes, the imperial discourses sought to describe the process of development that led from backward Poland through the progress of Galicia to the civilization of Europe. “The supposedly Polish aspects of Galicia – a cruelly oppressive nobility, a brutalized alcoholic

peasantry, fanatical and superstitious Roman Catholicism, and the alien presence of so many Jews – were dramatized all the more forcefully to vindicate and legitimate the Habsburg government and its program of enlightened Josephine reforms.”³

The project of the province’s transformation also envisioned the creation of a new identity for its inhabitants. The Habsburg administration was well aware of the religious, linguistic, and ethnic heterogeneity of Galicia and sought to promote a provincial identity fully compatible with imperial loyalty. The Polish gentry, as the only political class in Galicia, was the major concern of chancellor Metternich, who reasonably suggested “not to make Poles into Germans all at once, but above all first to make true Galicians, since only through this course of stages can one hope to achieve the ultimate goal, and any other conduct by the government would not only lead away from it, but could become at the present moment even dangerous”.⁴

“The imperfect intermediary Galician identity [Larry Wolff comments on Metternich’s project] was in fact ideally adapted to the political circumstance of submission to the Habsburg Monarchy. The invention of Galicia in the eighteenth century called for the invention of Galicians in the nineteenth century.” The project produced only partial success. A regional “Galician” identity was forged but its correlation with the overarching imperial identity proved much more complex and controversial. For the smaller – more advanced, cosmopolitan, and ambitious – part of the gentry (and, eventually, of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia) the Galician identity did become a convenient signifier of certain local/corporate interests subordinated to the needs of their imperial career, status, and self-esteem. For the majority of Galicians, however, the Galician identity within the Empire still meant belonging to a backward, impoverished, uncivilized region, openly despised by the imperial elite.

Whereas the Empire promised Galicians some fruits of enlightenment and civilization in the remote future, to be achieved gradually by hard work, education, and discipline, the nascent nationalism offered them status and self-esteem immediately, by a sheer act of imagination. Galicia as a part of an idealized primordial Polish (or Ukrainian)

2 Franz Kratter, *Briefe ueber den itzigen Zustand von Galizien*, Leipzig 1785, quoted in: L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia. History and Fantasy in Habsburg Political Culture*, Stanford 2010.

3 L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., p. 60.

4 Quoted in L. Wolff, “Kennst du das Land? The Uncertainty of Galicia in the Age of Metternich and Fredro”, op. cit., p. 278.

nation was much more attractive than the real Galicia within the Habsburg realm. Poles, Ruthenians, and even Jews were converted into Galicians, but most of them still remained Poles, Ruthenians and Jews, with increasingly strong loyalty to their imagined “nations” than to the Habsburg state.

The Polish schism

By the end of the 18th century the Polish nation was still a nation of Polish gentry who felt themselves to have much more in common with the cosmopolitan, mostly French-speaking nobility all over Europe than with their own peasants or burghers. Such an elite would probably have been able to accept the newly invented Galician identity within a broader Austrian (Habsburgian) noble nation if this had promised them additional privileges and higher status. Instead, the Empire offered them the role of the poor provincial relatives of the established imperial aristocracy, castigated for wildness, futility and obscurantism, and demanded that they shed their customary habits and privileges for the sake of enlightenment, progress and the common good. Moreover, the Galician “nation” was envisioned as a nation of all the ethnic, religious, and social groups inhabiting the province – hardly an attractive idea for conservative 18th-century aristocrats. Hence, the Galician identity, as Larry Wolff notes, was conditioned by a “sense of resentment against Habsburg officials and observers who supposedly maligned ‘the nation’ – that is, the Poles”.⁵

The powerful metaphor of the crucified Polish nation striving for resurrection became an effective ideological antidote against the Habsburgian project of making Poles into Galicians and incorporating them through enlightenment and reforms into the multi-ethnic imperial nation. Romantic nationalism scored a victory against rationalistic cosmopolitanism all over Europe, and the ultimate fall of the Habsburg empire prefigured, in Timothy Snyder’s acerbic words, today’s troubles of the European Union with local, largely irrational nationalisms and particularisms.

In the meantime, the 1795 abolition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the incorporation of its southern remnants into the Habsburg Empire contributed to the Polish character of the emerging Galician identity in a number of ways. First, the new lands, defined as “Western Galicia” made the entire province much more Polish in

ethnic terms. Secondly, the new lands included the royal city of Cracow, historical capital of the Polish Kingdom and, thereby, a powerful symbol of Polishness. And thirdly, the very disappearance of the Polish state and placing of the two other parts of it under the more repressive regimes of the Romanovs and the Hohenzollerns charged Galicia with a special (and honorable) duty of preservation of Polish culture in the absence of the Polish state.

In sum, the ground was well prepared for both Herder’s ideas of *Kulturnation* and the Napoleonic vision of *la nation des citoyens*. The latter, explicitly egalitarian view was not easy for the Polish nobility to adopt; only after having experienced a number of humiliating defeats in uprisings did they dare to reconsider the notion of a Polish nation and to spread it beyond the upper classes. Still, it took many years and much mundane “organic work” to make illiterate peasants into nationally conscious Poles.

By the mid-19th century the “party of Mickiewicz” had won in Galicia over the “party of Schiller”. That meant, in particular, a strong expansion of the Polish language in education (including Lemberg University), administration, the media, and cultural institutions, and *de facto* Polish self-rule in the province. The side effect of this success story was the principled exclusion of Ruthenians from this ethnocentric, inherently Catholic project and their increasing alienation. Maciej Janowski, a Polish historian, remarks that the Poles in Galicia, exactly like the Germans in Bohemia, were deeply surprised by the emergence of the “other” nationality in the country they believed they owned unilaterally. “Before the Spring of Nations, they had not ever thought that their stance vis-à-vis Ukrainians or Czechs could be deemed nationalistic. Polish or German was just a “natural” language of the upper strata, indispensable for social advance or access to the high culture.”⁶

Ironically, Ukrainians rather than Germans became the Poles’ main rivals in Eastern Galicia. An even greater irony stemmed from the fact that Ukrainian nationalism – with all its arguments, claims, institutions, and ideology – was nothing other than a mirror image of the Polish exclusivist, ethnocentric original. “The ‘nationalistic’ programs of each of the camps,” Danuta Sosnowska notes, “had little in common with the reality of life, and had nothing good

5 L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., p. 41.

6 Maciej Janowski, *Inteligencja wobec wyzwań nowoczesności. Dylematy ideowe polskiej demokracji liberalnej w Galicji w latach 1889–1914*, Warszawa 1996, p. 65.

to offer, for either they failed to take account of the arguments of the Polonized or Polish population of Galicia, or they ignored those of the Ruthenians, who had no intention of rescinding their national independence.”⁷

Unexpected Ukrainians

By the mid-19th century the emergence of a separate Ukrainian nation had not been predetermined in either Austrian Eastern Galicia or Russian-ruled Dnieper Ukraine. Ukrainians in Galicia (or Ruthenians/Rusyns, as they called themselves at the time) had at least four different options for eventual collective self-identification.⁸ The most probable scenario was a gradual assimilation into the greater Polish nation – something that the Ruthenian elites had been doing for centuries since the incorporation of the Principality of Galicia into the Polish Kingdom in 1340. The only obstacle on this path was the exclusivist character of Polish nationalism. It could accommodate the narrow circle of those of the Ruthenian elite who could be tempted to change their language and even their confession, but was barely suitable for the broad Ruthenian masses who were increasingly entering the political scene in the 19th century. Many of these could follow the path outlined by Miroslav Hroch in his seminal study of the nationalism of small European nations. The Habsburgian “Kingdom of Galicia” provided them with an alternative template for eventual nation-building. They could fill the “invented tradition” with genuine Ruthenian content. The idea was not so odd since the medieval Galicia had indeed been Ruthenian in both ethnic and linguistic and religious terms.

If the Habsburgs had really been interested in developing the Ruthenian nationality as a primarily anti-Polish project, they could have bet on the ethnicization/Ruthenization of the medieval Galicia-Lodomeria and (re)establishment of the historical continuity between the old and new entities. The idea was not entirely alien to Austrian/German intellectuals. Some of them, for example, occasionally tempered the arrogance of the Polish landlords by reminding them that they were “no more and no less alien

in Galicia than the Germans”.⁹ But the Habsburg establishment was apparently not interested in nationalistic argumentation, remaining attached to dynastic legitimacy and the civic/non-ethnic notion of imperial citizenship.

In the meantime, the Ruthenian national project unexpectedly received a boost from two other corners – the Ukrainian and the Russian. Both the Russian imperial and Ukrainian national projects subsumed Galicia within a greater Ruthenian myth centered on Kyivan Rus (Ruthenia) and elaborated respectively in a pan-Slavonic or pan-Ukrainian way. The “local” Ruthenian project was thus not rejected but rather extended and reinterpreted to enable the self-identification of the Habsburg Ruthenians with *both* the medieval Galician Principality *and* the medieval Kyivan Rus – the precursor of modern Russia in one version and modern Ukraine in the other.

Both the Ukrainian and Russian projects (unlike the Polish one) appeared inclusive; neither of them required the Ruthenians to sacrifice any element of their identity – either linguistic, or cultural, or religious. They merely offered them the possibility to gain additional strength vis-à-vis the dominant Poles through symbolic self-identification with the alternative cultural/civilizational center. At first glance, the (all-)Russian project had better chances of winning the Ruthenians’ souls since it was real, resourceful and perfectly institutionalized. The Ukrainian project was largely imaginary, supported only by the *Kulturwerk* of a very small stratum of national intelligentsia.

There were two factors, however, that enabled it to successfully compete with the (all-) Russian project in Galicia – actually more successfully than in Dnieper Ukraine. Firstly, Ruthenians had always been much closer to Ukrainians than to Russians in all respects. And secondly, the Habsburgs were much more seriously concerned at Russian inroads into Galicia than Ukrainian ones. Their relatively liberal policies enabled Ruthenians to institutionalize their nation-building project – first through the Uniate Church, which received equal rights with the dominant Catholic Church in Galicia, and then via education, media, cultural institutions, civic organizations and finally political parties.

By the end of the 19th century the issue of Ruthenian identity had essentially been sealed: the Galician peasants

7 Danuta Sosnowska, *Inna Galicja*, Warszawa 2008, p. 53.

8 John-Paul Himka, “The Construction of Nationality in Galician Rus’. Icarian Flights in Almost All Directions”, [in:] Ronald G. Suny and Michael D. Kennedy, eds., *Intellectuals and Articulation of the Nation*, Ann Arbor 1999, p. 112.

9 Ernst Traugott von Kortum, *Examination of the Grievances of the Galician Nobility of the Polish Nation*, quoted in: L. Wolff, *The Idea of Galicia*, op. cit., p. 47.

became Ukrainians, first in terms of their self-awareness and eventually in self-name. The very fact that the Ruthenian identity was conceived as a regional form of the (all-) Ukrainian identity resulted not only in discursive nationalization – the Ruthenization/Ukrainization of the province in the nationalistic mythology – but also in the bestowal on Galicia of a special mission vis-à-vis the rest of Ukraine, where the envisioned “national revival” was being stalled by the repressive tsarist regime. The metaphor of “Ukrainian Piedmont” was firmly attached to Galicia after two programmatic articles by Mykhaylo Hrushevsky, published in 1906 – “Ukrainian Piedmont” and “Galicia and Ukraine”. Józef Buszko contends that the rival notion of Galicia as the “Polish Piedmont” emerged in the milieu of Polish liberals in the late 1870s, during the Russian-Turkish war in the Balkans.¹⁰

In any case, the idea was in the air – even before the actual Piedmont had played its crucial role in the Italian national unification. On the one hand, the adoption of the Risorgimento metaphor was determined by a rapid growth of both Polish and Ukrainian national consciousness in Galicia; on the other, the relative liberalism of Habsburg rule gave both Ukrainian and Polish Galicians a huge advantage over their ethnic brethren in the Russian (and in the case of the Poles, also the Prussian) Empire.

Throughout the 20th century, the myth of Galicia as a “Ukrainian Piedmont” underwent various modifications, articulations and instrumental applications. But its essence remained the same. It supported the all-Ukrainian teleology of national liberation and statehood which assured Ukrainians that they were not a “nowhere nation” but rather a community with a long (“millennial”) history and, importantly, a long tradition of pro-independence struggle. The myth enhanced the self-esteem and mobilization of Western Ukrainians by endowing them with a special mission vis-à-vis the rest of the country, while providing all other Ukrainians with an encouraging symbol of national strength, solidarity, and resistance against multiple enemies.

National independence, despite expectations, has not reduced the topicality of the myth. Ukrainian sovereignty still is challenged in multiple ways by its former colonial master, and Ukrainian identity still is threatened by structural deformations and the advance of Russification.

Galicia in this context is still seen as the bastion against both external and internal threats, including also recurrent inroads of authoritarianism in Ukrainian politics. After independence the region acquired an additional meaning that had existed in a rather rudimentary form before. Today, the “Ukrainian Piedmont”, the westernmost part of the country, symbolizes Ukraine’s Europeanness – which is vehemently denied by Russians and ambiguously questioned by other Europeans. Galicia is the only part of Ukraine whose European identity, European belonging is unquestionable. Even the ardent Russian nationalists, chauvinists, Slavophiles and anti-Occidentals who typically deny Ukraine any separateness or sovereignty, do agree that Western Ukraine, specifically Galicia, is different, alien, spoiled by Catholicism and the West; it is simply “not ours” – a cause definitely lost to the Moscow-led “Russkiy mir”.

In this perspective, it is quite clear that the myth of the national “Piedmont” is much more important to Ukrainians than the equivalent myth to Poles, which predictably faded after Poland gained independence. Now, for Poles, it is largely a cultural/historical phenomenon with little political meaning beyond some marginal groups of *kresowiaczy*. In the case of Ukrainians, the myth of Galicia as the national “Piedmont” is central to their identity – alongside two or three other “founding” myths: those of Kyivan Rus, of Cossackdom, and probably of Shevchenko-the-Prophet and the National Awakening (“Resurrection”) he heroically ushered in. Of all these myths, however, the myth of Galicia is the most future-oriented, the most clearly connected to the idea of (European) modernity and modernization. The Polish myth of Galicia is more nostalgic and retrospective, in this regard; it is rather about Kresy-that-have-been-lost than about Europe-that-should-be-retrieved.

Such centrality of the myth of Galicia to the Ukrainian national consciousness and the European identity (i.e. identity defined implicitly as non-Russian, non-Eurasian, non-Soviet, and not as primarily East Slavonic or Orthodox Christian) substantially complicates Ukrainians’ relations with Poles, who have their own myths of Galicia – very different and often opposed to that of Ukrainians. The myth will inevitably lose its luster as soon as Ukraine successfully solves its post- and neo-colonial problems, primarily those of its threatened identity and endangered sovereignty. This, however, does not seem likely to happen in the foreseeable future.

¹⁰ Józef Buszko, *Galicja (1859–1914). Polski Piemont?*, Warszawa 1989, p. 9.

Galicia today

Taras Wozniak

Lviv

What usually comes to mind, for Ukrainians, as well as Poles and Jews, when Galicia is mentioned, is the old “Austrian” myth of Galicia: Maria Theresa, Franz Joseph, the Spring of Nations, Lviv’s *belle époque*: the rise of the University, the Technical University, the opera, the Main Railway Station, the Church of St Elizabeth, and so forth. Although each of these nations makes its own amendments to that myth.

Poles, as justifiably as somewhat over-emphatically, emphasise the role of Kraków – the cradle of Polishness. And they consider Lviv a royal city, making reference to Casimir III.

Ukrainians, as much justifiably as along the lines of “a replica”, shift the focus to the “princely city of the lion”. Admittedly, to this day they confuse the titles of the Galician rulers – the same figures may once be called dukes, only to be referred to as kings a moment later. And that without even mentioning the young Hungarian heirs apparent who sat on the throne while it was still in Halych. Ordinary people can’t keep track of all those Daniels, Leos, Kolomans, and Casimirs.

Jews, in turn, tend to build their Galician identity on the famous tzadiks and a plethora of magnificent writers working in various languages, beginning with Sholem Aleichem (שׁלום עליכם), Solomon Naumovich Rabinovich, 1859–1916), who wrote in Yiddish, via Joseph Roth (Moses Joseph Roth, 1894–1939), who worked in German, and Bruno Schulz (1892–1942), who employed the Polish language, to the king of Hebrew, Shai Agnon (שמואל יוסף עגנון), Shmuel

Yosef Halevi Czaczkes, 1888–1970). And of course also, via the origin of their families, to Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and even Karl (Heinrich) Marx (1818–1883).

In a word, there comes a point when the old “Austrian” myth of Galicia splits into three independent, mythological narratives. They clearly form grand national myths: the 20th century, the century of nationalisms, is approaching.

Nations awake. And this awakening often results in hecatombs and national tragedies.

The situation is complicated further by the fact that overlapping with nationalisms are the great social utopias: socialist, communist, and national socialist.

The winds of these utopias carry entire sections of the Galician community away into oblivion.

Nazism almost entirely destroyed the specific Jewish world of Galicia. Literally only individuals were left: on both the Soviet and Polish sides of the border. Even if a certain number of Jews come to the “Soviet Galicia” – that is, four, and later three Soviet districts (Lviv, Drohobych, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil), they are entirely different people, from different regions. And, generally, they are “Soviet” people.

The Polish-Ukrainian ethnic conflict, and in fact the war of 1943–1945 and the “exchange of population” between the USSR and the People’s Republic of Poland (PRL), left hardly anything of what used to be a blossoming Polish life in the eastern parts of the “good old” Galicia.

The Habsburg myth evaporates. For a long time – practically almost the entire “Soviet” period.

Many completely new people arrive in Galicia in the Soviet days: Russians from central Russia, Eastern Ukrainians. Early in the 1950s, Russians are the ethnic majority in Lviv. And it is only early in the 1960s that Western Ukrainians return to the cities of Galicia, and the cities clearly begin to Ukrainianise: people return from Stalinist camps, from transportation, resettlement, exile; the forms of deportations had been plenty.

Late in the 1970s, the Ukrainian Galicia finally assumes its contemporary shape. Even the break-up of the USSR did not result in mass changes in its population structure.

Yet nothing of what has been written above describes what the Ukrainian part of Galicia was and what it remains to this day. Obviously, what is meant here is the Ukrainian narrative of Galicia; and it is on purpose that I do not refer to the territory, as it has less distinct borders than the Polish narrative that encompasses the same territory. As does the Jewish. Thus, in this text, I shall rather speak of a narrative: the Ukrainian narrative.

Obviously, the Ukrainian narrative seeks its “foundations” in the virtual past: princely, royal, Cossack. But the contemporary Ukrainian Galician narrative begins to take shape with the Ukrainian national awakening: with Markiyan Shashkevych, with Ivan Franko.

Due to the lack of wherewithal to organise Ukrainian cultural life in Ukraine remaining under Russian rule, in the Russian Empire, Eastern Galicia, functioning as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, developed **the first myth of the Ukrainian Galician Piedmont**, from which the Ukrainian national revival began. And to a certain degree, it became the truth. Yet it did not crystallise until the early 20th century. Intertwined into it were the myths of the Ukrainian struggle for the independence of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic in 1919–1923, of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, of the uprising in Lviv on 1st November 1918 (when the Ukrainian units of the Austrian army took power). Then the Ukrainian Galician narrative was invaded by force, whether anyone likes it or not, by the myth of Ukrainian nationalism and its struggle for the independence of Ukraine. The blue-and-yellow national flag was resolutely joined by the revolutionary black-and-red. Beyond doubt, this was the Ukrainian Galician narrative, which originated from conflict with the Polish one. It would be difficult to say that the Polish narrative was “Galician” or had a clear “Galician” undertone. But what took shape in Ukraine was the “Galician” variety of

the Ukrainian narrative, with very clear and very precise contours. It was this that shaped today’s Galicia: the Galicia that for 23 years has been part of independent Ukraine.

External observers frequently fail to see this Galician specificity; nevertheless, it was in its clash with both inter-war Poland and the Stalinist regime of the USSR that today’s Ukrainian Galicia (possibly to some extent also with neighbouring Volhynia and Bukovina) developed its clear perception of Ukraine, and of Galicia as one of the cornerstones of a future independent Ukraine. Partially, this clear perception borders on myth. Yet to a great extent it is founded on solid, almost rock-hard, foundations.

The awareness and mentality of the Galician Ukrainians were noticeably crystallised in the 20th century. What occurred was not only a gentle national awakening of the Galician Ruthenians, but the crystallisation of the national identity. Certainly, a contribution to this was the failure of the Ukrainian fight for freedom in the 1920s, which the Galician Ukrainians initially accepted as a national tragedy, but later transformed into a mobilising stimulus. To some degree, the Ukrainian Galician narrative was a mirror image of the same Polish narrative from between the two world wars. To a great extent, the Galician Ukrainians followed in the footsteps of the Poles and the Czechs, starting with institutions and ending with rhetoric. For the two decades between the wars, a Polish-Ukrainian fracas, both invisible and open, raged in Galicia. Though we should not dramatise everything; there was also a shared life.

This process of mobilisation and eventual reconstitution of the Galician Ruthenians into Ukrainians ended in a powerful mobilisation within the the nationalistic and national liberation movements of the 1940s and 1950s. There were plenty of errors, and even crimes, in that movement, yet this by no means alters the fact that it was responsible for the shape of the extremely acute Galician form of the Ukrainian identity. This was not broken even by the Stalinist repressions, which is no metaphor but a fact.

This is how **the myth of the second Ukrainian Galician Piedmont** originated. Much in the same way, today in now independent Ukraine, it is the people from Galicia and Volhynia who have been and still remain the main source of mobilisation in the national “reconquista” and the Orange Revolution of 2004, and the Euromaidan of 2013/2014.

Without this venture into the 20th-century Galician past, it is impossible to understand what today’s Galicia is, for

both Ukraine and itself. I believe it necessary to repeat here with due emphasis that the history of 20th-century Galicia seen by Ukrainians may or may not be to our liking; after all, what we are discussing here is not “facts” but a narrative. This is not what it is all about. Much like it is not about “who was right in all that fuss” either. It is about the origin of the Ukrainian Galician narrative, which programmed plenty of events that were to happen for many decades after its origin. There is no doubt: today’s Galician narrative will continue to define the development of today’s Galicia, and will even have a significant impact on the development of Ukraine, for more than a decade. And again, whether or not it is to my liking or anybody else’s.

The attainment of independence came to a highly diversified Ukraine. In certain aspects, it was reminiscent of interwar Poland: possibly only the national minorities in Ukraine are smaller. Poland, on the other hand, did not have the experience of a large share of non-Polish-speaking, though ethnically Polish, population.

Galicia was one of the centres that sent the impulses that finally upset and destroyed the USSR. Naturally, its significance should not be overestimated. The USSR collapsed for more important reasons: economic insufficiency, lack of competitive edge, etc. Yet there were only a handful of regions that “upset” the USSR: Moscow itself (now it sounds strange), the Baltics – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, Galicia, and the Caucasus. The major part of Ukraine was asleep. To a drum beaten by Galicia, and partially Volhynia, Kyiv followed, and heated the atmosphere up. Later, Kyiv was the epicentre of events, yet with clear participation of none other but the Galicians.

That was the time when the **backbone of today’s independent Ukraine, based on the alliance of Kyiv and Galicia**, originated. Obviously, it does not make sense here to fall into not-too-well justified Galiciomania, as other regions significantly contributed to the development of the Ukrainianness of independent Ukraine too, though it was long a post-Soviet territorial creation. Nevertheless, the tandem of Kyiv and Lviv was strengthening from year to year and becoming ever more obvious.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Galicia was gripped by mass national democratic enthusiasm. And it is the democratic constituent of these mass movements that needs emphasising here. Even before the disintegration of the USSR, the people of Galicia were the first to elect the organs of power anew: district, municipal, and

regional councils, and executive committees at various levels. Later, the democratically elected district councils of three Galician districts – Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil – set up the Galician Diet, being something akin to a regional parliament. To a certain degree, this echoed the establishment of the West Ukrainian People’s Republic. The district councils of other, non-Galician western districts were also ready to join this union. This was a major scare both for the marionette government in Kyiv, and for the central authorities of the USSR. This is how, on the eve of gaining independence, Galicia created **the third myth of the Galician Ukrainian Piedmont**.

Nevertheless, after Ukraine gained independence, the centre of political life and decision-making suddenly shifted to Kyiv. To a great extent, Galicia began to grow provincial. During the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma, major takeovers of former state property took place, and the first incredible fortunes were established. Galicia remained somewhat on the margins of this process due to both the structure of its economy and its mentality. Similarly, it did not participate very actively in the political life of the country: 6 million people out of the 48 million living in Ukraine were, after all, a minority. As a result, an oligarchic state had developed in Ukraine by 2000, governed by a number of oligarchic families, with Leonid Kravchuk at the helm.

Nevertheless, that was when the middle class began to develop in Ukraine. Its main bases were – again – Galicia, Volhynia, Bukovina, and Kyiv. The clash of the middle class with the oligarchs ended in fireworks during the Orange Revolution of 2004. Galicia played a visible role in those events. And not only in Kyiv, but also “at the rear”: in Lviv, in Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil – this is where the Orange Maidan of 2004 had its base.

Yet the Orange Maidan ended the way it did, dissatisfaction led to counterrevolution, which set Ukraine back for four years. To a degree, this recalled the beginning of the 1920s, when Galicians felt shattered. Frustration reigned for four years, and much like in the 1930s, it helped the transformation to stalwart opposition against the regime. From the spring to the autumn of 2013, local, semi-clandestine associations sprang up in Lviv at nearly every step, with continuing heated discussions about “What is to be done?”. Protest was in the air again. Quite obviously, the same Galician narrative made itself known.

Besides the good fruit, the mythological structure of that narrative brought plenty of deviations: for example, attempts to revive nationalistic practices from the 1930s in today's Galicia. And there were moments that this awarded the demagogues, who styled themselves to the 1930s, tangible consequences at the polls.

But the very discourse of the processes was fruitful. And it brought about the outbreak of a revolt late in November 2013, when President Yanukovich refused to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement.

Initially it was a student protest with the participation of many students from Galicia, although they were not a majority. This was already Euromaidan.

When they were brutally dispersed, a large part of the country rose up, and it began in Kyiv, and Galicia and Volhynia. The backbone of independent Ukraine revolted against the regime. What began was the Maidan of honour, which transformed into the Ukrainian national revolution of 2014. And again, Galicia became the base for the revolution at its most difficult moments. The Orange Maidan of 2004 and the Maidan of 2014 developed **the fourth myth of the Galician Ukrainian Piedmont** – the strong powerbase of Ukrainian statehood.

Are all these myths only myths? No, not really. Yes, there is much exaggeration in them, and not everything is consistent with the facts, and many elements are judgmental, if not downright emotional. Sometimes there is too much Galician snobbery and glorification. At times there is even borderline demonisation of the Galicians and Galicianness: the sly political manipulators from Moscow fall back upon this to scare the residents of south-eastern Ukraine. And the stratagem frequently succeeds: the Galicians are presented not only as “awful”, “pro-American”, and “pro-European” but also as unbelievably strong, virtually superheroes who “will come and do something incredible, so save yourselves from them”. This was the demagogic rhetoric of Putin when he annexed Crimea. Even in his throne speech in the Kremlin's Hall of St George to mark the “annexation” of Crimea to the Russian Federation, he could not fail to mention the Galicians: he reduced them to “awful Banderists”, to whom he was not going to return Crimea. This may well have been the apotheosis of Galician fame: in a last-ditch effort, “the tsar of All Russia” saved Crimea from them.

One may wax ironic over this coincidence or sneer of history, yet independently of all Putin's conscious

manipulations it seems that the Ukrainian Galician narrative proved not a cabinet construct, not a figment of the mind of dwarfish Galician snobs, but an unexpectedly efficient weapon that works effectively in living history.

The modern Ukrainian Galician narrative does not boil down to 19th-century peopleism (*narodnichestvo*), although it grew out of it. The modern Ukrainian Galician narrative does not boil down to 20th-century nationalism, although this contributed greatly to its establishment. The modern Ukrainian Galician narrative is highly vital today. It has found itself new democratic and neo-cosmopolitan forms. Yes, there are still political profiteers who exploit old nationalistic trends that have already gathered their moss. Yet the most attractive feature of contemporary Galicia is the fact that developing within it – as in a melting pot – is the latest (post-modernist, if you like) Ukrainian Galician identity.

We say “Ukrainian Galician”, as in fact it is both Ukrainian and Galician. And in its “Galician quality” it certainly differs from that of other regions. These – Transcarpathian Ruthenia and Bukovina, for instance – are developing their own, interesting identities.

To some degree these identities compete with each other, and to some degree they complement each other. In this paper we pay attention to the most general trends. They can be expanded, with reference to more than just political or social factors, as we do below.

The cultural and spiritual factors are very interesting.

As far as confession is concerned, Galicia is a unique region of Ukraine. The great majority of the faithful belong to the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. The level of religiousness of Galicians, both real and ritual, is a number of orders of magnitude higher than in other regions of Ukraine. The level of spiritual and religious openness to the world, the world of religion included, is also a number of orders of magnitude higher. This openness has roots both traditional and institutional – in the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, for one.

As far as the cultural factor is concerned, in the last decade the Galician quality has certainly been a stylistic trend. In Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Ternopil, everything Galician is cultivated. Even Chernivtsi, which in the fairytale Habsburg days were also a part of Galicia, may at times have Galician sentiments, at least in the styling of its cafés.

Nevertheless, besides the formal and café Galicianness, a more serious tendency has emerged. It hinges on the

reconstruction of the same “fairytale Austrian Galicia” (Lviv, Kolomyia, Drohobych, and even Bolekhiv may be substituted for Galicia).

When Galicia was “guttled like a fish”, it could not but perish. I use that brutal comparison on purpose, as what was done to this poly-ethnic, poly-cultural, and poly-confessional land in the cruel 20th century can hardly be described by any other term. In fact, Galicia was robbed of its essence: all its charm and originality. It was a terrible trauma for the land, whatever the patriots of this or that hue considered it. Seventy years later, it is no longer as painful. The people who experienced it have passed away; all that remains are testimonies to the shock in the works of Stanisław Lem (1921–2006), Zbigniew Herbert (1924–1998), Paul Celan (Paul Antschel, 1920–1970), and Rose Ausländer (Rosalie Beatrice Scherzer, 1901–1988). But also of Yuri Andrukhovych and Yuriy Vynnychuk.

And thus it began to dawn on the people of contemporary Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Drohobych that the architectural spaces where they were born and where they had lived their whole lives contain certain empty spots, niches, syncopes. That there is someone missing from alongside them. The contours of that “someone” gradually began to fade away from being passed over, from a simple lack of knowledge. At a more peaceful moment, once the pain of deportation, repression, and persecution has long passed, there is more time and eagerness to just take a piece of chalk and draw the outline of that “unmentioned figure” who has always been near us, on the wall or the floor.

But enough of this poetic digression. At the time of independence the “problem of re-construction” of the whole cultural Galician landscape, without exception, was born

and blossomed in Ukrainian Galician society – in its local varieties, of course.

Yes, it is impossible to return the Polish, German, Jewish, or Czech populations. But someone must be the guardian of the Galician cultural heritage. Yet who? There is no one in today’s Galicia save for today’s people of Lviv, Ternopil, and Kolomyia. That is why the answer is clear: it is we who are primarily responsible for the Jewish, Polish, and Austrian cultural heritage of Galicia. Yes, there are small national communities and associations. But it is beyond their strength. On the other hand, this heritage is very much needed by today’s Galicians. And that is why in Galicia in recent decades we have been able to observe certain processes of the Galician majority becoming aware of their responsibility not only for Ukrainian Galicia, but also for Jewish and Polish Galicia.

Obviously, such behaviour may be expected only from people who no longer have to be afraid for what is “theirs”, i.e. free people. In this sense, today’s Galicia has vast potential. And more than only retrospectively: the “re-constructed Galicia” speaks out in the new Galician culture; it is worth mentioning here once again Taras Prochasko, and Yuri Andrukhovych, and Yuriy Vynnychuk, and Ostap Slivinski, but also a bevy of fantastic translators, for example Andriy Pavlyshyn and Yurko Prochasko; the list may be very long. They are all building the contemporary culture of Galicia in the context of its “re-construction”. And we ourselves have tried to contribute to that in our independent culturological journal *Yi*.

In fact, since the turmoil around Schultz, they all have been rebuilding the old Galician home.

Translated from the Polish by Piotr Krasnowolski

Galician literature: Texts and contexts

Alois Woldan

Vienna

Galicia was a subject for literary writings from the earliest days of its existence, and after its decline in the latter years of the First World War it again became the object of literary attention, in particular after the end of the Second World War. Galician literature can thus claim to be almost 250 years old, and it is written in many different languages, above all Polish, German, Ukrainian and Yiddish, with a few texts written for various reasons in other languages. This co-existence of different languages and narrations, genres and cultural codes is justification enough to speak of one “Galician literature”, which, as an open, dynamic system, comprises the sum of all texts connected with Galicia. All the elements of this system are interdependent, irrespective of whether the connecting aspect is the content of a given text or not; this is why Galician literature is something more than the simple sum of its national and literary factors. It is a supranational literature, just as the historical Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria was a supranational unit.

How to describe a system for which in view of its capaciousness no unequivocal definition has ever been coined? This article is an attempt to give an overview of this system on the basis of texts selected thematically. The author will also try to demonstrate links between texts in different languages. It will not be a broad enough presentation to take in all the content elements of the literary system of Galicia, but on the basis of examples it will attempt to show all its notable properties. The co-existence and correlations of these texts may ultimately also be seen as

a reflection of the hybrid cultural situation so characteristic of the former crownland.

The term “Hutsul text” encompasses a large group of isolated individual texts connected with the Hutsul ethnic minority, an East Slavonic group inhabiting the Carpathians, and with their customs and folklore.¹ The Hutsuls first feature in travelogues from the late 18th century, although their first German-language “discoverer”, the Austrian professor Balthasar Hacquet (1739–1815), calls them “mountain Ruthenians”.² The elements of otherness and alienness that the traveller to Galicia encounters at every step in this newly acquired country are especially sharply delineated in the Hutsuls: though they are primitive and unlearned, they are nonetheless intrinsically “good”, and ideally suited to the category of “noble savage” so characteristic of the Enlightenment. Hacquet’s description inspired a whole series of ethnographic texts, which began to appear around a century later, written by Polish, Ukrainian and Austrian scholars.³

1 See: A. Woldan, “Wielki tekst huculski jako pole transgresji między literaturami narodowymi”, [in:] *Na pograniczach literatury*, ed. J. Fazan and K. Zajas, Kraków 2012, pp. 288–301 (Biblioteka Literatury Pogranicza, vol. 21).

2 B. Hacquet, *Neueste physikalisch-politische Reisen in den Jahren 1788 [...] durch die Dacischen und Sarmatischen oder Nördlichen Karpathen*, part 3, Nürnberg 1794, p. 18.

3 See: L. Waigiel, *O huculach. Zarys etnograficzny*, 1877; J. Celewicz, *O Oleksie Dowbuszczuku*, 1887; R.F. Kaindl, *Die Huzulen*, 1894; W. Hnatiuk, *Narodni opovidania pro opryshkiv*, 1910.

In the first half of the 19th century Hutsul folklore was discovered by Polish Galician Romanticism; on the crest of the Romantic wave that was sweeping all Europe, young Polish poets eagerly collected Ukrainian songs, in particular those rooted in the epic tradition of the Hutsul region eulogising the leading Hutsul heroic figure of Dobosz (Dobosh), robber baron, who robbed the rich to give to the poor. This was the genesis of the almanac *Haliczanin* (The Galician, 1830), which comprised texts from the Hutsul folk tradition, recorded in Polish and – which makes the history of these literary connections even more interesting – in accordance with the contemporary Polish viewpoint: Dobosz is portrayed in them as a Romantic hero who perishes as a result of betrayal by the one he loves. One of these paraphrased stories about Dobosz opens with a quotation from Adam Mickiewicz's second Crimean sonnet⁴, which speaks of the unfathomable nature of the human soul; this excerpt illustrates the character of the literary prism through which Polish writing filtered its assimilation of Hutsul folklore.

The last Hutsul text of the Polish Romantic period, the drama *Karpaccy górale* (The Carpathian Highlanders, 1840) by Józef Korzeniowski (1797–1863), addresses the theme in a completely different way – the Dobosz at the centre of the story is no longer the legendary hero of folk tradition but a simple country lad, a deserter from the Austrian army, who gathered about him in the mountainous wastes similar “louts” to himself. Korzeniowski's play was highly successful – its interpretation of the Dobosh story, based on social and personal motifs, also appealed to Ukrainians of his time. Mykola Ustianovych (1811–1885) not only translated Korzeniowski's text into Ukrainian⁵, but also penned a few Hutsul tales of his own. One of them is inarguably inspired by the constellation of characters in *Karpaccy górale*: in the story *Mest verkhovyntsia* (1849) the situation at the start is virtually identical to that in Korzeniowski's drama, but Ustianovych gives his version a different, happy ending, and has his hero decide against executing the revenge to which he is entitled.

In the second half of the 19th century a German-language Hutsul story joins this Polish-Ukrainian dialogue, adding – not surprisingly – new ideological accents. Leopold von Sacher-Masoch Junior (1836–1895) first encountered the Ukrainian folkloric tradition in his early childhood, and returned to it several decades later with his story *Karpatenräuber* (Carpathian robbers, 1873), which portrays the Hutsuls as a freedom-loving Ukrainian tribe that is on no account prepared to submit to a despotic Polish ruler. Only under just Austrian rule is this social and national conflict resolved. This is an sample of the national sympathies and antipathies typical of Sacher-Masoch's entire Galician oeuvre: this son of the Austrian director of police in Lviv sympathised with the Ruthenians, who were from his perspective the support base for Austrian authority in Galicia, but evinced an undisguised antipathy towards the Polish upper class, which strove untiringly to overthrow that authority.

Also around this time the Hutsul theme is taken up in the journalistic and literary writings of Karl Emil Franzos (1848–1904). In his sketch *Ein Culturfest* (A culture festival, 1878) his description of the Hutsuls as people living in a primeval, natural world recalls Hacquet's perspective of a century previously – one that had provoked a lively polemic on the part of ethnographers.⁶ In the novel *Ein Kampf ums Recht* (A struggle for the right, 1882) Franzos sets out the fate of an unjustly wronged man who, after being turned away by all the state instances, elects to use violence to exercise his rights. As in Korzeniowski's play, the very fact that the plot plays out in a Hutsul setting indicates that this is a demythologised variant on the theme of the Dobosh story. And just as his predecessor's play made a great impact on his Ukrainian milieu, so Franzos's novel was echoed in a play by the well-known East Ukrainian writer Mykhail Starytsky (1840–1904). Even in the subtitle to the play *Yurko Dovbysh. Istorychna drama... z zhittya karpatskikh hutsuliv* (1888) Starycki credits his forerunner: *Syuzhet pozycheno z romanu Frantsoza „Za pravdu”*.⁷ In this way, it was an interpretation by a German-language writer (whose novel was known only to his Ukrainian emulator from its Russian translation) that brought the

4 “Opryszki w Karpatach. Powieść z podań gminnych (przez E. Brockiego)”, *Haliczanin* (Lwów), vol. 2: 1830, p. 78.

5 The only surviving element of the first translation of the play into Ukrainian is one song written by Korzeniowski as part of the work: “Pisn opryshkiv”, [in:] *Tvory Mikoly Ustianovycha i Antona Mohylnytskoho*, Lviv 1913, p. 24 (Ruska Pysmennist, part III, vol. 2).

6 See A. Malycky, “The Influence of Karl Emil Franzos on the German Image of the Hutsuls”, *Wiener Slawistisches Jahrbuch*, vol. 10: 1963, pp. 109–119.

7 Mykhailo Starytsky, *Tvory v vosmy tomakh*, vol. 3: *Dramatychni tvory*, Kyiv 1964, p. 223.

Hutsul tradition into Ukrainian *belles-lettres*. A more profound reading of Starytsky's drama also reveals references to the abovementioned Polish Hutsul text, Korzeniowski's play, which, while not cited directly, cannot be overlooked in this constellation of dramatic figures. Starytsky's is thus a key text in Hutsul literature, linking the Ukrainian, Polish and German variations of the story.

Around the year 1900 the Hutsul theme blossomed anew in Ukrainian literature. Ivan Franko (1856–1916), in his realist drama *Kamyana dusha* (1895), a worthy continuator to the works of Franzos and Starytsky, draws on the same folk ballad that was to be the basis for the novel *Kaminna dusha* (1911) by Hnat Khotkevych (1877–1938). This latter bears clear neo-Romantic characteristics; likewise the famous short story by Mykhaylo Kotiubynsky, *Tini zabutykh predkiv* (Shades of forgotten ancestors, 1912). In Polish literature, in turn, an extensive synthesis of the Hutsul folk tradition is to be found in *Na wysokiej połoninie* (On the high pasture) by Stanisław Vinzencz (1888–1971), an epic poem written in Polish with a fictional plot. The first part of this trilogy came out in 1936, and the last not until after the author's death, in 1979⁸; this was a period in which the Hutsul theme was taken up not only by émigré Polish and Ukrainian writers but also in Soviet Ukrainian literature. Thus Hutsul literature extends far beyond the period in which the historical Galicia existed, and continues to bear fruit, for instance in the poetry of authors such as Vasyl Herasymyuk (b. 1965) and Halyna Petrosaniak (b. 1969).

Another type of text that illustrates the mesh of internal relations within Galician literature are works addressing the theme of "oil fever" and telling of Galicia's troubles in connection with the mixed blessing and curse that this natural resource presented. In this case again the extra-literary context is unequivocal: the crude oil and ceresin wax extraction industry that developed in the region around Gorlice in western Galicia and around Boryslav in the eastern part of the province around 1850 and reached its acme after 1880 not only forced far-reaching social changes, but also

found reflection in literature. The first author to describe these processes in detail was Ivan Franko, arguably Galicia's most brilliant Ukrainian writer. The doings on and around the oil fields formed the background to the prose writings of Franko, who was born not far from Boryslav. For over 30 years, beginning with the cycle of short stories *Boryslav. Kartyna z zhyttya pidhirsokoho narodu* (1877), and ending with the final version of the work *Boa constrictor* (1907), Franko wrote sketches, novellas and novels describing the hazards that came with this new source of wealth.

Franko's "oil stories" may be divided into two groups. The first examines the fates of the Ruthenian peasants who, attracted to the lure of wealth, sold their oil-rich fields but in the quest for big money lost even this little property that was all they possessed (as in the case of the heroes of the short stories *Navernennyi hrishnyk*, 1877; *Yats Zelepuha*, 1878, for instance). Those who bore the responsibility for this state of affairs were on the one hand the Jews, who deceived the peasants and took advantage of their ignorance of the arcanities of this new sector of the economy, and on the other the peasants themselves who, rather than working honestly on the land, preferred to seek their fortunes underground, at great risk. The second group of texts by Franko, the two versions of the slim novel *Boa constrictor* (1878, 1907), does not place the Ukrainians and Jews in mutual opposition in their identical struggle for money. This book charts the social rise of an orphan boy to millionaire. Yet Hermann Goldkremer's vast fortune does not bring the Jewish hero great happiness – on the contrary, he becomes a slave to his money, which, like the eponymous snake, begins to crush and suffocate him.

Franko's unfinished novel *Boryslav smiyetsya* (Boryslav laughs, 1881), planned as an oil story on a grand scale, combines both the above strands. Here, too, we find impoverished Ukrainian labourers struggling against Jewish exploiters; he also describes two Jewish entrepreneurs, deadly rivals and mutual sworn enemies.

There are incontrovertible analogies to this novel in Polish "oil" writing. Józef Rogosz (1844–1896), who lived for some time in Stryi, not far from the Boryslav oil fields, narrates the plot of the titular short story in the volume *W piekle galicyjskim* (In the Galician hell, 1896) in a tone that harmonises perfectly with the first group of Franko's works as described above. His hero is also a Ruthenian peasant who does not want to sell his oil-rich field and after losing

8 Following the publication of the first volume, *Prawda starowieku* (The truth of the bygone age, Warszawa 1936), the release of the successive parts was prevented by the outbreak of the Second World War and the author's own emigration. Not until the years 1956–1979 did all three volumes come out, in London. The first full Polish edition was published in the years 1980–1983.

his fight against his Jewish antagonist is reduced to begging. In both this and other stories by Rogosz there are marked anti-Jewish accents.

The same unfinished story by Franko also bears similarities, though entirely different ones, with Artur Gruszecki's (1852–1929) work *Dla miliona* (For a million, 1900). Both deal with the rivalry between two entrepreneurs attempting to maximise their profits from crude oil and ceresin wax. The difference, however, is in the nationalities of the heroes: Franko's are two competing Jews, while Gruszecki uses a Pole and a Jew; the loser in this duel is the Pole, who cannot compete against the criminal practices of his Jewish rival. This attribution of blame to one particular nation is reminiscent of Franko's short story about the Ukrainian peasants embroiled in a hopeless struggle against their oppressors, except that in this case the author changes the nationality of the victims of the Jewish dishonesty: here they are not Ukrainians but Poles.⁹

The composition of Gruszecki's novel incorporates a certain peculiarity that reveals links with subsequent texts. The battle for oil and the attendant riches is waged by two successive generations; after the death of the first-generation hero, his business is taken over by his daughter, who is married to a Belgian chemist. This love interest plays an important role in the history of the family. A similar composition, structured around a family history, is to be found in the novel *Der Weg zum Reichtum* (The road to riches, 1913) by Hermann Blumenthal (1880–1942), which was written significantly later than most of the texts in this current. Blumenthal, who came from Bolekhiv in eastern Galicia, also knew at first hand life among the Boryslav oil wells. Like many other Jewish writers from eastern Galicia, he wrote only in German, but unlike his compatriots he also addressed themes not directly connected with his own Jewish milieu.¹⁰

The abovementioned novel by Blumenthal is the story of a family in which the misfortune of the first generation is turned around into a tardy and hard-won success in the second. The love strand linking the two generations (the

daughter of the first-generation fortune-hunter marries a stranger, this time a chemist from Vienna) ends tragically, for the quest for riches at all costs destroys this partnership, the relationship of love between spouses. The motif of the drive to get rich, of the millions that are to flow from the new oil fields, is one that links the novels of both Gruszecki and Blumenthal with *Nafta* (Oil, 1884), a work by Ignacy Maciejowski (1835–1901) set in the western Beskids. The overarching theme of both volumes of this novel is the quest for great riches that promises the completely impoverished noble hero a return to a life that would be more appropriate to his social status. As in Blumenthal's novel, the struggle waged by Maciejowski's heroes is not against a hostile national or social class but against nature, jealously guarding her riches. The oil industry takes on the properties of a game of chance that addicts the main characters, who go from being beggars to tycoons ploughing all their profits into successive wells. Ultimately, however, they finish up as poor as they were at the start of the story, and in Maciejowski's novel they also lose their chance for happiness and fulfilment in the form of love for another. These striking similarities between the above texts, however, are only revealed in the broader context of the literature describing the "oil craze".

After the Second World War there are precious few examples of texts representing a convergence in Polish, Ukrainian and German literature; the various Galician narratives become starkly heterogeneous. Polish writers rediscover Galicia in the 1960s, and between then and the 1989 watershed many important texts were written that were rapidly classified by the critics as a "Galician myth" current.¹¹ What is characteristic of all of them is the positive reminiscences for the times when this part of Poland was under Habsburg rule. This affirmative perspective on historic Galicia may in all certainty be understood as a protest against the reality of the People's Republic of Poland: back then, before 1918, life was better.

In the earliest period, issues related to Galicia were addressed by authors born back when the region was still part of the Austrian state. In his novel *W drodze do Koryntu*

9 See: A. Woldan, "Die „Hölle von Boryslaw“ – Arbeiterelend in Galizien", [in:] *Literatur im Kontext. Ein gegenseitiges Entbergen*, ed. H. van Uffelen, W. Kriegleder, E. Mengel, A. Woldan, Wien 2010, pp. 67–82.

10 See: A. Woldan, "Hermann Blumenthal im Kontext der polnischen und ukrainischen Literatur in Galizien", [in:] *Jews and Slavs*, vol. 23: *Galicia, Bukovina and Other Borderlands in Eastern and Central Europe. Essay on Interethnic Contacts and Multiculturalism*, ed. W. Moskovich, R. Mnich, R. Tarasiuk, Jerusalem – Siedlce 2013, pp. 105–116.

11 See: E. Wiegandt, *Austria felix, czyli o micie Galicji w polskiej prozie współczesnej*, Poznań 1988 (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Filologia Polska Series, no. 38); A. Woldan, *Mit Austrii w literaturze polskiej*, trans. K. Jachimczak, R. Wojnakowski, Kraków 2002.

(En route to Corinth, 1964) Andrzej Kuśniewicz (1904–1993) examines the fates of Galician émigrés in interwar Vienna, while his next novel, *Strefy* (Zones, 1971), addresses the issue of the co-existence of various ethnic groups in eastern Galicia; multinational does not mean conflict-free. In his book *Lekcja martwego języka* (A lesson in a dead language, 1977) he writes of the decline of Galicia over the course of the First World War, which marked the beginning of the end of the whole cultural system created over the course of the “long 19th century”. Kuśniewicz’s last two novels, *Mieszaniny obyczajowe* (Mixed mores, 1985) and *Nawrócenie* (Conversion, 1987), are first-person monologues comprising the author’s reminiscences from the years leading up to both world wars; an attempt to salvage from oblivion the world of the landowning nobility and the Jewish intelligentsia.

Austeria (1966), by Julian Strykowski (1905–1996), a Jewish author from eastern Galicia writing in Polish, depicts the world of the K.u.K. Monarchy as if untouched by time. The work opens at the beginning of the empire’s collapse, on the first day of the First World War, and is written through the eyes of its Jewish characters, for whom the defeat of Austria spells the end of a world. In the diology *Głosy z ciemności* (Voices from the darkness, 1956) and *Echo* (1988), Strykowski recreates the cramped conditions of the east Galician Jewish shtetl and the process by which his heroes extricate themselves from its narrow, confining strictures. In *Sen Azrila* (Azril’s dream, 1975), the dominant theme is also the Jewish question, which frequently takes on autobiographical form with Strykowski’s treatment. His Polish writings are a superb counterpart to German-language east Galician literature on the ghetto theme (see the essay by Maria Kłańska in this volume), but they have yet to see any detailed analysis.

One middle-generation author who has tackled the Galician myth is Andrzej Stojowski (1933–2006), a scion of an old Galician dynasty who describes the history of just such a family in a saga that unfolds over several volumes (*Romans polski* [A Polish affair], 1970; *Chłopiec na kucu* [The boy on the pony], 1971; *Kareta* [Carriage], 1972); for the heroes of this work, the years of Austrian rule in Galicia were the best of times, which favoured all the family’s ventures. Stojowski’s short stories (*Zamek w Karpatach* [A castle in the Carpathians], 1973) also give a superb description of the world of the Habsburg Monarchy. Proponents of the young generation of “Galician authors”, such as Włodzimerz Paźniewski (b. 1942) and Ryszard Sadaj (b. 1950), though

they do not have their own direct experience of the historic Galicia, nonetheless take up the dominant narrative in postwar Galician literature. In both his essays (*Kakania*, 1982) and his fictional prose (the novel *Krótkie dni* [Short days], 1982) Paźniewski describes Galicia as an ideal form of synthesis of Poland and Austria. Sadaj, on the other hand, in his Galician novels, which read like family sagas (*Galicyjda* [The Galiciad], 1985; *Kraina niedźwiedzia* [Bear country], 1989), writes about Polish-Galician history between 1772 and 1945.

The political watershed in Poland in 1989 extinguished the literary myth of Galicia, but saw the advent of a fashion for Galicia in the realm of consumption and everyday culture. Merchandise from beverages to household items, as well as restaurants, etc., marketed with the label “Galician”, continue to sell well to this day. Numerous editions of historical guides, albums and illustrated encyclopedias (e.g. Zbigniew Frasz, *Galicja* from the cycle *A to Polska właśnie*, 1999) are proof that Galicia in its unique Polish context is still in its heyday.

In parallel with the decadence of the Polish Galician myth we are seeing a process of discovery of Galicia by young Ukrainian literature, whose proponents, since the restitution of the country’s independence in 1991, have been tackling themes connected with the province, and in particular with its eastern part, which since that same year has been part of Ukraine itself. The leading name in this context is Yuriy Andrukhovych (b. 1960), whose description of the history of Ivano-Frankivsk (the former Stanisławów), his native city, includes a positive evaluation of the period of Austrian rule, contrasted with the time that Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union (see the essay *Erz-Herz-Perz*, 1994).

Reminiscences from the time of Austrian hegemony also feature in his poems about Lviv, written in the 1990s. There are particularly clear references to Austrian literature in his novel *Dvanatsat’ obruchiv* (Twelve rings, 2003), which not only may be read as a paraphrase of *Radetzky March* (the first indication of this is the main character’s name – Karl Joseph), but even ends with the famous formula spoken on behalf of deceased Habsburgs requesting admission to the Emperor’s Tomb. Andrukhovych’s novel, as a variation on *Śmierć w Galicji* [Death in Galicia]¹², may be compared not only with *Radetzky March*, but also with

12 See: Z.H. Kaszyński, “Śmierć w Galicji”, *Nurt* 1987, no. 2, pp. 12–14.

Kuśniewicz's *Lekcja martwego języka* mentioned above. Both Joseph Roth and Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, writers whose works have been of increasing interest to translators into Ukrainian for the past few years, are important stepping-stones on the path back to Galicia, as is the literature of Bruno Schulz, which enjoys widespread popularity in Ukrainian visual art circles, among others (as in the installation of Vloděk Kaufman *Znykannya Bruno*, 2001).¹³

Issues connected with the Austrian Galician past also feature in works by some proponents of the "Stanisławów phenomenon" – a group of writers and artists from Ivano-Frankivsk – such as the lyric poetry and essays of Halyna Petrosaniak (b. 1969) and the prose writing of Taras Prochasko (b. 1968) (e.g. his novel *NyepriOsti* [The Unsimple], 2002). In Ukrainian writing, as in Polish literature, Galicia as a better "yesterday" and a contrast with an unsatisfactory "today" serves a certain political function: this is a region that has always belonged to Europe, whether in the age of the Ruthenian principalities long before the Polish conquest, or under Austrian rule in the 19th century. This region is all Ukraine's bridge to Europe, its link with European values and culture. However, Ukrainian discourse, discussing this function of Galicia as "connector", often passes over its Polish component, projecting Galicia as an incontrovertibly idealised Austro-Ukrainian union.

In the German-speaking countries Galicia was first discovered in the 1980s by literary scholars, ahead of German journalists and writers, who did not begin to address this issue until the political turning-point in the CEE countries. This interest was essentially restricted to one genre: travel writing.¹⁴ Thus, *nolens volens*, contemporary German literature continues the tradition of the late 18th century, when Franz Kratter, Alphons Traunpaur, Balthasar Hacquet and others (see the essay by Maria Kłańska in this volume) were discovering the territory of Galicia, newly incorporated into the Austrian monarchy, for German-language readers. The situation post-1991 is similar: with the end of the Soviet Union it became relatively easy to travel around

eastern Galicia – i.e. western Ukraine – and describe the region for oneself and others. A significant aspect of such descriptions is comparison with times past on the basis of the testimonies of writers of those times; authors reference Karl Emil Franzos, Joseph Roth, Alfred Döblin and other late 19th-century and early 20th-century travellers to Galicia to help them comprehend the western territories of post-Soviet Ukraine. The Polish, western part of Galicia is of little interest to them, however.

A pioneering role was played by Martin Pollack and his book *Nach Galizien. Von Chassiden, Huzulen, Polen und Ruthenen* (Around Galicia. Of Hassids, Hutsuls, Poles and Ruthenians; Polish edition: *Po Galicji. O chasydach, Huculach, Polakach i Rusinach*, 2000, 2007), which came out back in 1984, though only its re-edition in 2001 was part of a wider contemporary German interest in Galicia. Pollack in fact made his journey only virtually, illustrating the route of the K.u.K. Northern Railway and its various branch lines using texts by other authors that he managed to link with places along that route. This expedition into Galicia was to a considerable extent a journey back in time, into Galicia's pre-1918 past, and entirely unconnected with issues related to its current situation.

Shortly after the watershed, Verena Dohrn's book *Reise nach Galizien. Grenzlandschaften des alten Europa* (Journey to Galicia. The borderlands of old Europe, 1991; reprinted in 1993 and 1997) came out, a description of a real journey. Dohrn is one in a line of many German and American scholars: she is only interested in Jewish Galicia, and her quest – even though she cites a few names from Polish and Ukrainian literature – is guided by entries in the *Encyclopedia Judaica*. And although there is certainly value in a description that places the Jewish Galician world annihilated by the Holocaust at its heart, so much erroneous information on historical figures and events is incomprehensible.

The Swiss journalist Kaspar Schnetzler takes a different approach. He treats his journey around Galicia not as a documentation of the differences between the past and the present, but as a personal assimilation of something new that is of value to the traveller's ego; the very title of his book is an indication of this (*Meine galizische Sehnsucht. Geschichte einer Reise* [My Galician nostalgia. The history of a journey], 1991). Galicia even in the present is for Schnetzler a space which combines experience, tradition and imagination: in the station restaurant in Lviv he meets fellow writer Joseph Roth, and in the scene describing the Last

13 See: A. Woldan, "Galizische Topoi als Argumente in der ukrainischen Identitätsdebatte (zwischen Vereinnahmung und Aneignung)", [in:] *Wo liegt die Ukraine? Standortbestimmung einer europäischen Kultur*, ed. S. Höhen and J. H. Ulbricht, Köln – Weimar – Wien 2009, pp. 91–108.

14 See: A. Woldan, "Zum deutschsprachigen Galiziendiskurs der letzten zehn Jahre", *Polendiskurse* [Convivium. Germanistisches Jahrbuch Polen 1993–2003], Bonn 2004, pp. 87–105.

Judgment he has Bruno Schulz and Józef Wittlin polemicise with Franz Kafka and Heinrich Böll.

Similarly, the 2000 book *Reise nach Schlesien und Galizien* (Journey to Silesia and Galicia) contains a powerful personal element, as intimated by its subtitle, “The archeology of feeling”. Its author, Roswitha Schieb, explores first Silesia, the homeland of her expellee parents, and while in Wrocław learns that most of the present-day residents of the city are resettles from Lviv. Thus her journey takes her to Galicia, to Lviv, where she learns about the city’s Polish past and, as before in Silesia, following the traces of its German past, nevertheless treats its Ukrainian present with sensitivity. Silesia and Galicia have many attributes in common, from a multicultural past to painful experiences in the 20th century, and it is no wonder that the theme of these similarities is also addressed by German writing (Schieb’s book has been reprinted in 2014). In 2010 the most recent German-language publication to date on travels in Galicia was published: Sabina Janesch’s book *Katzenberge* (Cat Mountains), which retraces the history of the resettles while simultaneously

charting a journey leading from Lower Silesia to eastern Galicia. This story, too, comprises a powerful personal strand: the book’s main character, in search of the truth about a certain blight on her family’s past, sets out on a journey in both time – back to the 1940s – and space – to western Ukraine. And even though this first book by this young German author, referencing Volhynia (Wołyń) and the resettlement of the Poles from their eastern territories, deals with what is in fact post-Galician history, it nevertheless continues the tradition of German Galician literature.

The Polish book with the fitting title *Galicja – opowiadać dalej* [Galicia – telling on], published in 2011, asks how to continue the story of Galicia, and at the same time, in its structure as an anthology of texts by Polish and Ukrainian authors supplemented with contemporary photographs, offers an appropriate suggestion: Galicia is a vast narrative that still has the power to unite writers of various languages and cultures.

Translated from the Polish by Jessica Taylor-Kucia

German-language literature in Galicia

Maria Kłańska

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After the partitions of Poland it was several decades before a German-language literature emerged in Galicia, and even when it did, it never played a leading role. In the period before 1848 this was writing – above all para-literary forms – practised by foreign incomers. In the initial decades there was a large influx of ethnic Germans into Galicia because they were needed by the military, the administration and the school system, many positions were vacant, and rural colonisation was encouraged by the state. At the same time, demand was growing outside Galicia for literature, both fact and fiction, about the new province.

The first to reach for their pens were immigrant authors: Franz Kratter of Oberdorf on the river Lech; Alphons Heinrich Traunpaur from Brussels, a captain in the Austrian army; the Vienna-born Lviv police commissar Joseph Rohrer; scholars for whom Galicia was merely one stage on a longer scientific tour, such as Belsazar Hacquet of Brittany, who made geological expeditions into the Carpathians; the pastor Samuel Bredetzky from Hungary; and others. The works considered most important in terms of description of the new province are the two dialogic, anonymously published fictional collections of letters, Kratter's *Briefe über den itzigen Zustand von Galizien* (Letters on the present state of Galicia, 1786) and Traunpaur's cycle of *Dreyßig Briefe über Galizien* (Thirty letters about Galicia, 1787), designed as a polemic with Kratter's work.

Kratter had first come to Galicia in 1784 in search of work, applying in vain for a professorship at the university in Lviv. His collection of impressions of Galicia that was the fruit of

that sojourn was received in Galician circles as a lampoon. A few years later he returned to Galicia for good, and in 1819 became the director of the theatre in Lviv. His letters, written from the position of a burgher and propagator of enlightened ideals, portray a drastic picture of Galicia as a country of feudal lawlessness among the nobility, savage peasants and Jews, and dishonest, self-serving representatives of Austrian authority.

Traunpaur's is the most considered response to Kratter's letters; even in his subtitle he emphasises that, unlike the latter, he was intimately familiar with the country; indeed, he had been in Galicia for eight years. Yet his own image of these lands is deeply negative. He devotes far less attention to their socio-economic problems than Kratter, and though he describes similarly drastic images of the civilizational and cultural backwardness of the province, he nevertheless lauds the hospitality of the nobles. Other collections of sketches from tours or hikes around Galicia also contributed to producing a stereotype of the province as a barbaric land of menacing landscapes and a life that was exotic but from the Josephinian perspective lived in conditions that were an affront to humanity.

In this initial period the foremost German-language cultural milieu developed around the university and theatre in Lviv. The numismatics professor Gottfried Uhlich founded a Reading Society in Lviv that subscribed to 32 German- and French-language press titles. Another figure with an important role in the city's literary life was the director of its university library, Heinrich Gottfried von

Bretschneider, the author of *Lemberger Musenalmaanach* (the Lviv Almanac of Muses, 1788). For four years (1784–1788) the former Capuchin monk Ignaz Aurelius Fessler was also active in the city; initially a professor of theology there, he was nevertheless forced to flee after a denunciation following the world premiere of his stage play *Sidney* at the city's theatre. Other professors made their own contributions to the repertoire of the German theatre. In Kraków, which was annexed to Galicia after the third partition of Poland, a German theatre was founded as early as in 1796, and until 1805 plays might only be performed in Polish in exceptional circumstances. In Lviv, however, even from 1772 there were stage plays in both German and Polish. In the years 1799–1808 Kraków had its first German-language newspaper, *Krakauer Zeitung*; in Lviv the *Lemberger Zeitung* was published from 1812. There were also periodicals, such as *Lemberger Miscellen zur Belehrung und Unterhaltung* (1822–1824), *Mnemosyne* (1824–1840), and *Leseblätter für Stadt und Land zur Beförderung der Kultur in Kunst, Wissenschaft und Leben* (1841–1848).

In the period 1830–1848 the German-language authors in Galicia were still not local-born Galicianers but incomers, most of them members of the Austrian army, and the main theme from 1846 was the failed Polish insurrection, nipped in the bud, and the slaughter of the Galician nobles. These accounts, which defended the interests of the Austrian state, tended to paint a highly unfavourable picture of the Polish nobility, while the Galician peasants, incited by Austrian officials, were portrayed as conscious Austrian patriots. One such account, for instance, was the diary of the Austrian officer Jakob Nitschner (1819–1878), who spent the days of the “slaughter” in Tarnów; others are *Das Polen-Attentat im Jahre 1846* (The Polish coup in 1846, 1846) and a slim volume from the series *Antediluvianische Fidibus-Schnitzel von 1842 bis 1847* (Antediluvian kindling scraps, 1850) attributed to the Austrian aristocrat Friedrich Schwarzenberg, who went to Western Galicia to put down the Polish insurrection.

Only in two cases were authors who had come to the Polish lands as Austrian officers capable of fairness, and even of representing the province and its striving for independence with a benevolent empathy. They were Cezar Wencel Messenhauser of Prossnitz in Moravia (1813–1848) and Konstant Wurzbach von Tannenberg (1818–1893). Second Lieutenant Messenhauser, who was from the lower echelons of society, was drafted to Galicia in 1846. During the

Spring of Nations he came out actively on the side of the revolutionary movement, first in Lviv as a member of the National Guard, and later, when recalled to Vienna, as its commandant there. After the debacle of the revolution, he was sentenced to death and executed. His contribution to Galicia in literature was a short story on the Galician slaughter favouring the Poles, published in 1848 under the pen name Wenceslaw March: *Polengräber* (Polish graves).

Konstant Wurzbach, from Laibach, spent longer in Kraków and Galicia; he was stationed first, in the years 1837–1841, in the Free City of Kraków, and after that his regiment was moved to Lviv, where in 1843 he passed his doctoral examination. At that point he left the army and took up a position in the University Library. At the request of the viceroy, Count Stadion, he began to contribute to the Lviv *Amts-Zeitung*, but when Stadion summoned him to Vienna in 1848, he was never to return to Galicia. His reminiscences from his sojourn in Galicia, and in particular Kraków, were first expressed in an anonymously published documentary pamphlet, *Galizien in diesem Augenblick. Ein dringendes Wort in einer drängenden Zeit* (Galicia at this moment: An urgent word at a pressing time, 1848), which called on Austria to implement reforms and, grant the province autonomy, and in the longer-term perspective help to rebuild a Polish state. An immense openness to the Other and a benevolence towards Poles and Jews are also tell-tale characteristics of his epic Romantic poetic cycle *Von einer verschollenen Königsstadt* (On a vanished royal city, 1850). Further products of the time spent in Galicia by the later author of a lexicon of famous Austrians in the Polish lands are his collections of folk songs and sayings of the Poles and Ruthenians (1845 and 1852), as well as a historical work on the churches of Kraków (1853), and his translations of Polish literature by Kraszewski, Korzeniowski and Mickiewicz.

The period after 1848 gradually developed into a period of German-language writing by native Galicianers, though most of it is work by Jews striving for German acculturation. The first figure in this gallery, however, was the son of von Sacher-Masoch, the Austrian chief of police, despised in Lviv, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch Junior (1836–1895), who was born in Lviv and spent the first 12 years of his life in Galicia. In 1848 his father was sent to Prague, but Galicia was to remain the “landscape of the soul” for him as a writer, and he returned to it frequently in his epic works, whether out of a need of his own heart or in

response to his readers' demands for exoticism. Sacher-Masoch's literary debut was a novel about the uprising and the "slaughter" in Horozhana, eastern Galicia, entitled *Eine galizische Geschichte*. 1846 (A Galician story: 1846, 1858). This offers a broad section through (east) Galician society and its attitude to Polish strivings for independence, and expresses a devotion to a multicultural Galicia and the conviction that it would be possible to develop in peace under Habsburg rule. This train of thought is pursued in the short story *Der Emissär* (The emissary, 1863), woven around the events of 1848, in which the author comes out fully in favour of a model in which Austria would give its peoples national and cultural freedoms, and expect political loyalty in return. Sacher-Masoch Junior also addressed the theme of Galicia in some of the stories in the series *Das Vermächtnis Kains* (Cain's testament, 1870 and 1877). This was an anonymously published cycle of sketches of "criminal delinquencies", including *Sociale Schattenbilder* (Social silhouettes, 1873), a history of Polish strivings for independence in Vormärz Galicia as seen from the point of view of his police commissar father. Then there were two series of stories from Galicia (*Galizische Geschichten*, 1875 and 1881), which depicted the Galician Ruthenians with particular sympathy; four series of "images from the ghettos" (*Ghettogeschichten*, between 1878 and 1896); and three extended stories about Galician Jews (1882), written with immense sentiment for orthodox Jewish circles. Nowadays the name Sacher-Masoch is more immediately associated with the name of the sexual deviation coined from his name, but he was nevertheless initially a talented epic writer who later squandered his skills.

One Bukovina Galician who enjoys a somewhat better reputation today as a German-Jewish epic author was Karl Emil Franzos (1848–1904), brought up in Chortkiv in eastern Galicia. Admittedly, he too only spent his childhood in Galicia; by 1859 he was attending *gymnasium* in Chernivtsi in accordance with his late father's wishes, after which he spent time in Graz and Vienna, and in 1888 he moved permanently to Berlin, where his political orientation was pro-Prussian. Franzos was brought up by his father, a physician, in the conviction that he was a German of the Mosaic faith, and in spite of bitter disillusionment with the anti-Semitic policy in the Empire, remained faithful to these convictions, although in works from the latter ten years of his life a more lenient approach to Jewish tradition emerges. As a young man and in his middle age he saw in

Hasidism and orthodox Jewish religiosity an expression of backwardness and cultural retardation, and urged his compatriots to assimilate German culture. This attitude emanates particularly from his first collection of short stories, *Die Juden von Barnow* (The Jews of Barnów, 1877), but also from his later stories of the life of the Galician Jews. His novel *Der Pojaz* (The comedian, 1905), however, betrays a warmer tone toward orthodox Jews.

Aside from stories from the life of the East European Jews, Franzos also wrote short stories and journalistic impressions from these regions, which he termed, in a phrase he coined himself that betrayed his colonial outlook, "Half-Asia". In all, he had six volumes of these "cultural images" *Aus Halb-Asien* (From Half-Asia, 1876, 1878 and 1888) published; in them he offered an insight into the life of the East European nations, from Galicia, through Bukovina, Romania and Russia, depicting realistically the backward relations in society, and the cultural retardation and exoticism of life in those countries. The works themselves were hugely popular, but their author contributed to the creation and entrenchment in Europe of the negative stereotype of Galicia. He portrays Ukrainian peasants critically, but – like Jews (and Jewesses) – generally benevolently, as victims of (Polish) societal pressure. Franzos was a skilled author of epic poetry with a talent for observation (though he often described a status quo that was already in his own time anachronistic and somewhat incidental), and he was capable of pandering to his readers – at least as long as these themes were in vogue.

Other writers of Jewish stock, without going as far as Franzos in their views on the need for German assimilation, nevertheless share his critical attitude toward the traditional Jewish society in Galicia. They are all proponents of the Jewish Enlightenment, whose first languages in Galicia were admittedly Hebrew and Yiddish, though in time, as some young Jews learned German, this was to become the third language of the Haskalah. It was not until the age of autonomy after 1867 in Galicia, with a Polish school system in place, that Polish acculturation, and subsequently the Zionist movement, began to supersede German. Jewish authors, who were often intellectual professionals such as teachers, doctors or school inspectors, wrote their impressions of shtetl life with the accented didactic aim of influencing their readers in a certain way, sometimes also pitching them at a Christian audience in order to demonstrate that the "ghetto", for all its backwardness,

represented important moral values such as family love or confessional solidarity. Only the first of these authors, the city physician in Lviv, Maurycy (Moritz) Rappaport (1808–1880), made no secret of his dual identity – as a Jew and a Pole – as testified to by his Romantic poem, written in German, *Bajazzo* (1863), and his translations into German of poems by Mickiewicz, Słowacki and Ujejski.

Other authors demonstrate an unequivocal leaning towards German culture. Among these we might mention for instance Leon Herzberg-Fränkell (1827–1915), who came from the famous Haskalah centre of Brody and from 1854 held the position of secretary of the Chamber of Commerce and Guilds, as well as being an inspector of Jewish schools. As a maskil he served the ideas of a Jewish Enlightenment in numerous short stories and journalistic sketches on life in the ghetto, above all in the collection *Polnische Juden* (Polish Jews, 1866, 2nd expanded edition 1878). Also due a mention is Nathan Samuely (1846–1921) of Stryi, who was a teacher in a common school in Lviv. He had work published in both Hebrew and German. From the mid-1880s he had short stories, humoresques and sketches from the life of the Galician Jews published; worthy of mention are two series of *Cultur-Bilder aus dem jüdischen Leben in Galizien* (Cultural images of Jewish life in Galicia, 1885 and 1892) and his programmatic story with the metaphoric title *Zwischen Licht und Finsternis* (Between light and darkness, 1887), which dealt with the struggle of the Galician Haskalah movement against ignorance and backwardness. Another advocate of Haskalah was Julie Thenen of Lviv (1835–1919), who wrote colourfully about the obscurantism and intolerance of the Hassidim, as in the stories *Der Wunder-Rabbi* (The rabbi who worked miracles, 1880) and *Die Wunderthäter von Kock und Plotzk* (The miracle workers from Kock and Płock, 1883). Although German culture remained attractive to Polish Jews up until the Second World War, German-Jewish literature in Galicia lost its emancipatory thrust in the latter decades of the 19th century, and ceded ground to texts in other languages.

The turn of the 19th and 20th centuries is the last period of existence of both Galicia and German Galician literature. In terms of literature by writers from Galicia, probably the only exponent of high-level literature prior to Joseph Roth (1894–1939), who was not active until after the Galicia period, was the bilingual dramatist and epic Tadeusz (Thaddeus) Rittner (1873–1921). The Lviv-born Rittner was brought up in Vienna, the son of a high-ranking civil

servant who for a time was minister of Galician affairs, but he spent his summers in Galicia, and his first language was Polish. Rittner wrote almost all his plays and epic works in two versions, Polish and German. The best known of his dramas were – for they have since been forgotten in Austria – German texts such as the realistic and symbolist *Das kleine Heim* (*W małym dworku*, The little manor, 1908), *Unterwegs* (*Don Juan*, 1909), *Der dumme Jakob* (*Głupi Jakub*, Jacob the fool, 1910) and *Wölfe in der Nacht* (*Wilki w nocy*, Wolves in the night, 1917), and the plays performed at the Burgtheater during the First World War *Kinder der Erde* (*Dzieci ziemi*, Children of the earth, 1915), *Der Garten der Jugend* (*Ogród młodości*, The garden of youth, 1916) and *Die Tragödie des Eumenes* (*Tragedia Eumenesa*, The tragedy of Eumenes, 1917) that offered the Viennese an escape from the reality of war into a fairytale land. Among Rittner's best prose texts is his autobiographical novel *Das Zimmer des Wartens* (*Drzwi zamknięte*, Closed doors, 1918).

The fin de siècle and the First World War were also a time when German-Jewish writers from Galicia were highly active. Some of the leading figures were Hermann Menkes of Brody (1865–1931), Efraim Frisch of Stryi (1873–1942), Hermann Sternbach of Drohobych (1880–1942) and Hermann Blumenthal of Bolekhiv (1880–1942), whose works related to Galicia include his entire trilogy of autobiographically influenced novels *Der Weg der Jugend* (The path of youth, 1907–1910) and a volume of realistic impressions of war *Galizien. Der Wall im Osten* (Galicia. The eastern rampart, 1915). Though born in Vienna, the philosopher and pedagogue Martin Buber (1878–1965), had strong links with Galicia through his upbringing in Lviv by his grandparents. One of the founding fathers of cultural Zionism, and an author of Hasidic legends, which were initially published in German, e.g. *Die Geschichten des Rabbi Nachman* (*Historie rabbiego Nachmana*, Stories of Rabbi Nachman, 1906) and *Die Legende des Baalschem* (The legends of Baal Shem, 1908), Buber lived until 1938 in Germany, and only then emigrated to Palestine. These examples give a good illustration of the affiliations of the Galician Jews with German culture and German-language literature, though the attitudes of authors to the orthodox and Hasidic Jewish world of the 20th century changed diametrically, evolving into a kind of mythology and nostalgia for the hermetic Jewish diaspora that cultivated traditional values but was becoming a thing of the past. This is also visible in the novels of the Brody-born Roth.

This picture of German-language literature in Galicia would not be complete without a look at the writing of the Galician Germans descended from the rural German colonists and the pastors working among them, who tend to represent a nationalistically oriented regional literature ("Heimatliteratur" – literature of the homeland) from the beginning of the 20th century until Poland's autonomy in the interbellum. After 1867 the German population of Galicia went into decline; it no longer had a press organ or cultural institutions of its own. Its literature was largely confined to oral folk creativity in various dialects, above all Swabian. The only institution that integrated these groups at least at the local level was the Protestant Church. Not until around 1903, under the influence of Prussian propaganda, which encouraged Galician German colonists to move to the Poznań region, did this situation begin to change. The efforts of those who wished to remain in Galicia were integrated by a Lutheran pastor from Greifswald, Theodor Zöckler (1867–1949), who was active in Stanisławów from 1891, founding first a committee to safeguard the interests of the Lutheran Church in Galicia and a periodical connected with it, *Evangelisches Gemeindeblatt für Galizien*, and later (in 1907), jointly with the Catholic community in order to defend the Germans' interests, a Union of Christian Germans in Galicia ("Bund der christlichen Deutschen in Galizien"), which brought together work on behalf of the German nationality and culture. The Union's main paper was *Deutsches Volksblatt für Galizien*.

It was these periodicals in particular, but also the broader "national revival" movement, that developed a journalism and didactically oriented popular literature which extolled the German homeland in these Galician enclaves, recorded the group's customs, and combatted the Polonization of the Germans. One writer who fell within this current, in part as one of the precursors of the "Heimatliteratur" from this region, was the Lviv-born lawyer Hans Pokorny (ps. Weber-Lutkow, 1861–1931), who owned the landed estate of Łowce in Galicia. He spent his childhood there, and returned when he retired in 1912. Weber-Lutkow's publications include two volumes of short stories that portray the "Little Russian" peasants as colourful barbarians devoid of even the most basic moral compass, steered by primal instinct. This type of gloomy, criminally exaggerated image of rural eastern Galicia is portrayed in his collections *Schlummernde Seelen* (Slumbering souls, 1900) and *Die schwarze Madonna* (The Black Madonna, 1901).

Literary and para-literary "Heimatliteratur", though without such aggressive tones, was also written by Protestant pastors, foremost among them Zöckler, who composed poems and moralistic short stories about the life of the Lutheran parishes in Galicia. Another pastor, his Saxon colleague Max Weidauer (1879–1937), wrote short stories expressing his love for his homeland and all its nationalities. Another group of "people who wrote" were rural teachers descended from peasant colonists. One who was writing in the period before the Second World War, for instance, was Friedrich Rech (1883–1951), of the Schönthal colony near Lviv, a teacher and educator who wrote, in both dialect and literary language, cultural impressions, farces and poems on the life of colonists from the North Rhine region. Another teacher in the German diaspora was Jakob V. Rollauer (1881–1963) of the same colony, who at first even wrote in Polish, but later severely censured all rapprochement with the Polish element.

Since Galicia ceased to exist in 1918, it is only possible to speak of German-language literature in Galicia up to that point, although in the interwar period there is the excellent fictional prose of Joseph Roth, and virtually into our own times memoirs by German-language writers, particularly of Jewish descent, have continued to be published. Some salient names in this context are the psychologist and writer Manès Sperber of Zabolotiv (1905–1984), the Viennese teacher from Terebovka Minna Lachs (1907–1993), Roth's own close friend Soma Morgenstern of Budaniv (1890–1976), and the Bukovina-born Moses Rosenkranz (1904–2003), who also had biographical links with Galicia. This literature, though written after the First or even Second World Wars, contributes to the creation of a myth of Galicia, with its filter of nostalgia for childhood and the safe world of pre-modern times. These narratives cannot, however, be considered literature in Galicia, as the images they create are images *temporis acti*.

Translated from the Polish by Jessica Taylor-Kucia

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
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